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Abstract
This thesis seeks to establish a semi-automatic methodology for security analysis when
users are considered part of the system. The thesis explores this challenge, which we refer
to as ‘socio-technical security analysis’. We consider that a socio-technical vulnerability
is the conjunction of a human behaviour, the factors that foster the occurrence of this
behaviour, and a system. Therefore, the aim of the thesis is to investigate which human-
related factors should be considered in system security, and how to incorporate these
identified factors into an analysis framework.
Finding a way to systematically detect, in a system, the socio-technical vulnerabilities
that can stem from insecure human behaviours, along with the factors that influence users
into engaging in these behaviours is a long journey that we can summarise in three research
questions:
1. How can we detect a socio-technical vulnerability in a system?
2. How can we identify in the interactions between a system and its users, the human
behaviours that can harm this system’s security?
3. How can we identify the factors that foster human behaviours that are harmful to a
system’s security?
A review of works that aim at bringing social sciences findings into security analysis
reveals that there is no unified way to do it. Identifying the points where users can harm
a system’s security, and clarifying what factors can foster an insecure behaviour is a com-
plex matter. Hypotheses can arise about the usability of the system, aspects pertaining
to the user or the organisational context but there is no way to find and test them all.
Further, there is currently no way to systematically integrate the results regarding hy-
potheses we tested in a security analysis. Thus, we identify two objectives related to these
methodological challenges that this thesis aims at fulfilling in its contributions:
1. What form should a framework that intends to identify harmful behaviours for se-
curity, and to investigate the factors that foster their occurrence take?
2. What form should a semi-automatic, or tool-assisted methodology for the security
analysis of socio-technical systems take?
The thesis provides partial answers to the questions. First it defines a methodological
framework called STEAL that provides a common ground for an interdisciplinary approach
to security analysis. STEAL supports the interaction between computer scientists and
social scientists by providing a common reference model to describe a system with its
human and non-human components, potential attacks and defences, and the surrounding
context. We validate STEAL in a two experimental studies, showing the role of the context
and graphical cues in Wi-Fi networks’ security.
Then the thesis complements STEAL with a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) methodology
for security inspired from the ones used in safety. This methodology, called S·CREAM
aims at being more systematic than the research methods that can be used with STEAL
(surveys for instance) and at providing reusable findings for analysing security. To do so,
S·CREAM provides a retrospective analysis to identify the factors that can explain the
success of past attacks and a methodology to compile these factors in a form that allows for
the consideration of their potential e↵ects on a system’s security, given an attacker Threat
Model. The thesis also illustrates how we developed a tool—the S·CREAM assistant—
that supports the methodology with an extensible knowledge base and computer-supported
reasoning.
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La conscience qui s’e´meut ressemble assez a` la conscience qui
s’endort.
—Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Esquisse d’une the´orie de l’e´motion’
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1.1 The human factor of security
Even ‘secure’ systems can turn out to be vulnerable when attackers target not
the technical system and its security mechanisms but the people interacting with
it. In such situations, security is not a purely technical property but rather a
socio-technical quality stemming from factors such as people’s interactions with
the technology and the underlying cognitive and psychological factors.
While security experts are just starting to explore this new field, hackers have
already mastered the art. Verizon’s 2015 Data Breach Investigation Report [26]
assessed nearly 80,000 security incidents that occurred across 61 countries in 2015.
It states that: ‘the common denominator across the top four patterns —accounting
for nearly 90% of all incidents— is people.’
If a large majority of attacks use people to trespass into computer systems, it is
simply because it works. Phishing, for instance, is often the first step of an attack
and has been proven to be highly e↵ective. A phishing campaign of 10 emails has
a 90% chance to yield at least one victim, and across the campaigns that Verizon
analysed, the median time for the first victim’s click was less than two minutes.
Worse, attackers are getting better at it as the overall e↵ectiveness of phishing
campaigns jumped from 10%–20% in 2014 to 23% in 2015.
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Such dramatic figures make the study of the role of the human component in
security appealing but, alas, it is a complex matter. Even without attempting to
model the human mind and its intricate processes that drive people’s choices, the
problem seems hard to grasp. A few general behavioural and cognitive principles
have been identified and can be applied in the field of security (e.g., see [55, 172, 9,
3, 183, 50, 165]), but, when people face several alternatives, it is close to impossible
to identify why one alternative is chosen over another. Furthermore, the decision-
taking process is not deterministic, and as Gilovich puts it: ‘The tiniest little change
in circumstance can have big impacts on people’s behaviour.’ [84].
Thus, attempting to model the processes that drive human behaviour in security
seems intractable, and we are left with the study of what surrounds this process:
its inputs and outputs. In other words, we study the factors that potentially influ-
ence the human behaviours that have consequences on a system’s security without
attempting to model humans.
These factors are very diverse and constitute the context, or as mentioned earlier,
the ‘circumstances’ of a user action. Some factors pertain to the user, for instance,
the user’s computer literacy, the user’s language and culture, or the state of mind
or persona that a person has when he is interacting with the system. The location
in terms of space and time as well as the interactions with the other actors are
additional factors. Besides, the system itself, its a↵ordance (the way in which the
system presents the available actions), the instructions it provides, and the signs
and symbols it uses to do so—all play a role in the user’s behaviour.
Furthermore, these factors can have a di↵erent e↵ect on the user when combined
with each other. For instance, the user’s understanding of a concept depends on the
context in which the concept is used [25]. For instance, the users’ culture can also
function as an interfering factor, and in addition to words, concepts and stereotypes
as well as symbols and signs can have di↵erent meanings and represent di↵erent
things depending on who sees them [136].
These influencing factors can potentially nudge people into behaviours harmful
to the system’s security or facilitate attacks launched by a malicious actor. For
instance, a user can misunderstand how to operate the system and commit a mis-
take; a user can bypass a system’s security mechanism because he deems that the
mechanism impinges on the system’s primary function to an extend that it decreases
performance in a way that is simply unacceptable; a user can be gullible and concede
valuable information to a social-engineer; or an attacker can exploit a loophole in
the user-context-system interactions to push a user to execute an action on the sys-
tem on his behalf. In all of these cases, we consider that a successful socio-technical
attack on a system is evidence that the system was doomed to fail, and that we
should not (necessarily) blame the user. It is likely that the blame lies largely with
the designers for failing to take properly into account the human-related factors.
Vulnerabilities in socio-technical analysis. This relation between insecure hu-
man behaviours and the factors that influence these behaviours has consequences
on what we consider as vulnerability in a system. For instance, a user can send a
recipient his private key, jeopardising the private key’s confidentiality. But in itself,
it is not a vulnerability; it is an insecure behaviour that has consequences on secu-
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rity. A (socio-technical) vulnerability arises from the fact that we call keys ‘private’
and ‘public’, and that it can cause confusion in the user’s mind, which can result in
a mistake or an insecure behaviour that harms security. Therefore, a socio-technical
vulnerability is the conjunction of a behaviour harmful for security, of a factor that
fosters this behaviour, and the system whose security is endangered.
Exploiting these socio-technical vulnerabilities. Confidence tricksters have
known for long that there are factors facilitating scams as well as about the existence
of new technology, which not only change the tools of the trade but also how victims
are approached, selected, and robbed. For instance, the Nigerian 419 advance-fee
scams are nothing new and find their roots in an older scam called the ‘Spanish
prisoner’ [170] dating back to the 16th century. In the original ‘Spanish prisoner’
scam, the confidence trickster tells the victim that the victim’s help is needed to free
a wealthy person imprisoned in Spain. The prisoner promises a reward for his release
and sometimes even the hand of his daughter. The catch is that the victim has to
provide funds before receiving any reward in order to free the fictitious prisoner.
The novelty of the contemporary ‘Spanish prisoner’, like the Nigerian 419 scams,
is that the Internet gives scammers access to a huge pool of potential victims at a
negligible cost. Hence, whereas in the past con-artists had access to few potential
victims and had to find the right incentive in order to extort money, nowadays,
scammers only have to send the same generic e-mail en masse to run their attack.
However, scammers performing 419 scams actually select people to be scammed
on the basis on their predispositions or facilitating personal factors. Indeed, for an
attacker with limited resources, being able to reach thousands of people is actually
both a blessing and a curse because people swallowing the initial bait may not follow
through the rest of the profit-yielding scam. To avoid wasted e↵orts, scammers craft
their hooks and baits carefully. It is likely that the typical 419 scam emails are poorly
written and carry all the stereotypes of this scam to repel savvy people and cherry-
pick the most gullible victims, in order to maximise profits [88]. Attackers know
from experience which factors make people worth their time, and therefore, they
have strategies to focus only on these people. Notably, it is no di↵erent when it
comes to attacking a corporate network.
Identifying and controlling these socio-technical vulnerabilities. We be-
lieve that identifying the factors that facilitate socio-technical attacks is at the heart
of the analysis of socio-technical systems, and that these factors constitute the entry-
points or the socio-technical vulnerabilities that need to be identified and controlled.
In security, there is an asymmetry between attack and defence, and socio-
technical attacks are no exception to this observed norm. Attackers have an
advantage: finding one vulnerability is easier than protecting the whole system,
which requires finding and fixing all the vulnerabilities. When an attacker is
only interested in getting the right fit for an attack, he ‘only’ has to find which
factors to exploit given the system, its users and the surrounding context. A
security researcher has a far more di cult task: identifying the potential vulnerable
combinations of people, context, and system features that could harm the system’s
security. However, this duality o↵ers the security researchers an interesting per-
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spective: they can take the intruder’s viewpoint, plan and assess socio-technical
attacks, and thereafter, change hats and take the security engineering side, this
time trying to patch the discovered vulnerabilities.
Besides, there is one underexploited aspect that we think could shift the balance
in favor of security researchers to an extent: they have access to the data. Indeed,
security researchers can keep track of attacks, launch investigations to gather ad-
ditional details about attacks, study the socio-technical vulnerabilities that made
these attacks successful, and use this knowledge to secure their systems. But while
security researchers engage in threat intelligence and sharing, we believe that some
important data related to the factors exploited by socio-technical attacks are not
identified or marked for collection, and that this undermines the e↵orts of the secu-
rity researchers.
Either way, we believe that both approaches of testing hypotheses about potential
factors, and learning from past socio-technical attacks are valuable to analysing a
socio-technical security and this thesis intends to demonstrate that.
1.2 Contributions
Making a system e↵ectively secure is a complex matter because the systems used
by people are inherently socio-technical. A system can be technically secure but
can still fail to provide e↵ective security because its users undermine its security
measures. For example, in hospitals, access controls will be violated unless designed
to fit the nomadic, interrupted, and cooperative nature of the medical work. Thus,
providing an e↵ectively secure system for such a context of work calls for diverse
strategies, solutions, and skill sets.
This diversity is an obstacle when it comes to studying the security of socio-
technical systems. For instance, the e↵ective security of a security mechanism with
a graphical user interface will require the use of both computer sciences and social
sciences methods to be tested. The security protocol that the security mechanism
implements may have to be studied through the use of formal methods, and the
graphical user interface’s usability may require to be tested through surveys or in-
lab experiments.
Having di↵erent scientists with their own methods, vocabulary, and priorities
working on di↵erent aspects of a system makes the security analysis complex and
can harm the validity of the analysis. For instance, a computer scientist may think
that it is appropriate to ask users to use passwords that are 20 characters long at
minimum, and social scientist may imagine that providing immediate feedback for
a failed password attempt is the right thing to do. However, both are problematic
from an e↵ective security point of view [10].
This thesis provides two main contributions. The first contribution is a
framework that aims at testing hypotheses about factors that can consti-
tute socio-technical vulnerabilities. The second contribution is a method-
ology that allows a security researcher to identify the factors that make
an attack successful, and to identify socio-technical vulnerabilities that
exploit these factors in a system. To do so, we bring together methodolo-
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gies and tools from multiple fields of research towards a common goal: studying and
preventing socio-technical attacks to make socio-technical systems e↵ectively secure.
Our first contribution is a framework called the Socio-TEchical Attack AnaL-
ysis (STEAL) framework that provides a common ground for an interdisciplinary
approach towards security analysis. STEAL supports the interaction between com-
puter scientists and social scientists by providing a common reference model to de-
scribe a system, potential attacks and defences, and the surrounding context in terms
of layered security ceremonies. This reference model allows for di↵erent researchers
with di↵erent backgrounds, skills, and methods to work on the same system. Com-
puter scientists use formal methods to tackle the technical aspects of security and
social scientists perform user studies and other experiments to investigate factors
pertaining to the user, the user interface or the context that could undermine the
system’s security.
Our second contribution is a methodology called the Cognitive Reliability and
Error Analysis Method for Socio-Technical security (S·CREAM), which is inspired
from the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) techniques found in the safety field. S·CREAM
supports security analysts in di↵erent tasks related to incident response and security
analysis. Indeed, S·CREAM o↵ers guidance to collect data relevant to a security
incident and as well as means to identify factors that contributed to the success of
an attack. Furthermore, S·CREAM allows the analyst to compile his findings into
a knowledge catalogue, which can be later used to test a system for socio-technical
vulnerabilities. This set of feature allows S·CREAM to tackle the security analysis
of a wide range of systems and systematically apply lessons learnt from past attacks.
The contributions of this thesis are therefore summarised as follows:
• STEAL, a framework for socio-technical security analysis (in
Part II),
• S·CREAM, a Root Cause Analysis methodology for socio-technical
security (in Part III).
Targets audiences and key objectives. The STEAL framework and the
S·CREAM methodology have di↵erent primary audiences and objectives. STEAL
intends to provide security researchers of di↵erent backgrounds with a common
ground where to formulate and answer research questions about the e↵ectiveness of
a security mechanism. It intends to be used for close and thorough inspections of
security mechanisms through the use of scientific methods and to produce results
whose quality is aligned with the researcher’s scientific rigour.
S·CREAM has a more pragmatic approach for producing results. Indeed
S·CREAM does not hassle security practitioners with a fully fledged scientific
process, and instead, builds upon an existing RCA method called Cognitive Reli-
ability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) to provide reasonable evidence on
the influence of human-related factors on a system’s security. S·CREAM intends to
match security practitioners’ needs for a tool that allows for a quick overview of the
human-related factors that lead or can lead to a security compromise.
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1.3 Thesis structure
The thesis is structured in nine chapters.
In Chapter 2, we start by examining a non-exhaustive list of research works
that, in the computer security landscape, have tried to improve computer security
methods by incorporating insights from social sciences. These works call for the
development of a framework that allows for a better collaboration between social
and computer scientists and forward a methodology to streamline the use of the
findings from social sciences and investigations of past attacks in security analysis.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the STEAL framework, a framework to study socio-
technical security. The main goal of STEAL is to provide computer scientists and
social scientists with a common ground and a similar terminology to allow for a
security analysis that draws from technical, social, and contextual elements. In
the first part of this chapter, we present the framework together with its reference
model and associated methodologies. Thereafter, we validate its relevance for social
scientists through a study on the role of context and names in the Wi-Fi selection
process. Eventually, we validate its relevance for computer scientists by a study of
the validation of identities using TLS certificates in web-browsers.
In Chapter 4, we demonstrate a user-centric approach to socio-technical security
analysis by studying Wi-Fi hotspots’ most salient security ceremonies and compiling
potential attacks and research questions about the reasons behind their success.
Thereafter, we investigate two of the previously identified research questions about
the Wi-Fi selection process: the first about the role of trust, the second about the
role of graphical cues.
In Chapter 5, we discuss the requirements for a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) for
computer security. We start by introducing RCA techniques, their origin, and use
in the safety field. Then, we identify the main di↵erences between the safety and
security fields that lead to a list of challenges to be considered when building an
RCA for security.
In Chapter 6, we present the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method
for Socio-Technical security (S·CREAM), an RCA technique for security. S·CREAM
embraces the analysis of root causes, and is hence, a tool capable of retrospective
as well as prospective socio-technical analyses. First, we introduce the technique’s
process and concepts, and then, we elaborate upon the implementation of S·CREAM
along with a companion tool: S·CREAM assistant .
In Chapter 7, we use S·CREAM on several use cases to stress its relevance to
security. The use cases are as follows: the validation of TLS certificates in web
browsers, Wi-Fi hotspots, and Yubikeys security tokens.
In Chapter 8, we discuss how well S·CREAM met the challenges we listed in
Chapter 5 and what improvements should be made to the methodology.
In Chapter 9, we sum up the thesis work and contributions, and describe how
STEAL and S·CREAM fulfil the objectives as well as how they can benefit the
di↵erent audiences. Finally, we propose some directions for future works.
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1.3.1 Publications
Parts of this thesis are revised and updated versions of full texts or parts of works
of the following authors1:
1. A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, G. Lenzini, and S. Rivas. Do Graphical
Cues E↵ectively Inform Users? - A Socio-Technical Security Study
in Accessing Wifi Networks. In HCI (22), volume 9190 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 323–334. Springer, 2015. [Best Paper Award]
2. A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. In Cyber-Space No
One Can Hear You S·CREAM - A Root Cause Analysis for Socio-
Technical Security. In STM, volume 9331 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 255–264. Springer, 2015
3. A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. Socio-technical Secu-
rity Analysis of Wireless Hotspots. In HCI (24), volume 8533 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 306–317. Springer, 2014
4. A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. A Conceptual Frame-
work to Study Socio-Technical Security. In HCI (24), volume 8533 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 318–329. Springer, 2014
5. A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, G. Lenzini, and S. Rivas. Socio-
Technical Study on the E↵ect of Trust and Context When Choosing
WiFi Names. In STM, volume 8203 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 131–143. Springer, 2013
6. A. Ferreira, R. Giustolisi, JL. Huynen, and G. Lenzini. On Tools for Socio-
Technical Security Analysis. Grande Region Security and Reliability Day,
2013
7. A. Ferreira, R. Giustolisi, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. Stud-
ies in Socio-technical Security Analysis: Authentication of Identities
with TLS Certificates. In TrustCom/ISPA/IUCC, pages 1553–1558. IEEE
Computer Society, 2013
Each chapter recalls in its preamble which papers have been used, and Table 1.1
details what contents of which papers each Chapter uses.
1Authors are ordered alphabetically.
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Table 1.1: This table details how parts of my previously published papers have been
used throughout this thesis. To sum up its content, Part II reuses a lot of materials,
whereas Parts I, III, and IV contain mostly original (and individual) content, which
we intend to publish in the near future.
Part Chapter Publications Use
I
1 All publications Parts of the introductions
2 All publications Parts of the related works
II
3
4 A revised version of most of the paper
7 A revised version of half of the paper
5 A revised version of half of the paper
6 Inspiration from the paper
4
3 A revised version of most of the paper
5 A revised version of half of the paper
1 A revised version of most of the paper
III
5 Completely original
6 2 Some paragraphs
7 Completely original
8 2 Some paragraphs
IV 9 All publications Parts of the conclusions
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There are things known and there are things unknown, and in
between are the doors of perception.
—Aldous Huxley
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In this chapter, we present and define several concepts used throughout
this thesis along with the research revolving around them. The first con-
cept to be presented is that of Socio-Technical Attack, or the attacks that
are possible because of the presence of human components in a system.
Thereafter, we present research works relevant for socio-technical security
analysis and thwarting Socio-Technical Attacks. Next, we present how
the safety field tackled the problem of incorporating human aspects into
the analysis of safety incidents, and how it could inspire us to improve
upon socio-technical security analysis. Finally, we detail the research
questions and objectives that this thesis tackles.
2.1 Socio-Technical Attacks
As stated in introduction, assuring that a system is e↵ectively secure is a complex
matter because some attacks target not only the system’s technical aspects but also
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the system’s users. We call these attacks Socio-Technical Attacks (STAs). In order
to characterise the term with precision, we need to first discuss the following related
concepts:
Definition of Attack An action that leads ‘to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal
or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of anything that has
value to the organization’ (adapted from [73]).
Definition of Threat ‘Potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result
in harm to a system or organization’ [73].
Definition of Vulnerability ‘Weakness of anything that has value to the organi-
zation or [weakness] of means of managing risk1 that can be exploited by a
threat’ [73].
Definition of Socio-Technical Attacks ‘Attacks that exploit vulnerabilities
that arise from human behaviour in conjunction with technology’ (quoted
from David et al. [47]).
The research that gravitates around STAs is rich and tackles di↵erent aspects
of the impact humans have on security through di↵erent strategies. For instance,
defences against attacks which exploit users’ misunderstandings of a system will be
radically di↵erent from defences against attacks where users willingly violate security
policies. In one case, the research should focus on usability and training, and in the
second case, the research should focus on policy compliance, user motivations, and
business processes. For this reason, we propose to present the research related to
STAs through the lens of a classification that we present below.
STA exploit the human to harm a system’s security. But humans are not nec-
essarily unaware of harming the system’s security, and hence, can be honest or
malicious. Therefore, we can classify STAs in several categories that di↵er in terms
of user intent. If the behaviour that empowers the STA is the result of the user’s
malicious intent, then the user is the attacker; however, if there is no malice in the
user, and instead, the malice is in someone else using the user as a proxy without
the user being aware of it, then we consider the user to be good intentioned. We
resume our categorisation of STAs into the following three di↵erent types of STA:
Human Error STA, in which there is no malicious intent,
Insider Threat STA, where the malicious intent lies in the user,
Social Engineering STA, where the malicious intent is extraneous to the user.
For each type of STA we give a definition, the scope of the attacker’s actions
for performing the attack, and a non-exhaustive list of examples and research works
about understanding and classifying these attacks. The di↵erent STAs are not
mutually exclusive. In Figure 2.1, we have represented the di↵erent categories of
attacks and their relation with the good/bad intention of the user. This picture
shows that Insider Threat has overlaps with the other type of STAs, albeit we
present Insider Threat only from the perspective of a malicious insider.
1‘Means of managing risk’ actually stands for ‘controls’.
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Figure 2.1: This figure shows the overlaps between the di↵erent STAs presented.
Semantic Attacks are part of Social Engineering. Deliberate Non-Compliance is
part of Human Error. Insider Threat overlaps with Social Engineering attacks and
Human Errors, and malicious users are only part of Insider Threat related research.
The ‘Well Meaning Users’ area comprehends STAs without malicious intent and
STAs with extraneous malicious intent.
2.1.1 STA without malicious intent
2.1.1.1 Human Error
Human Errors happen in every human activity and the use of computers is no ex-
ception. Lee [123] studied the publications of the (UK) Information Commissioner’s
O ce related to data breaches and found that 44.4% of data breaches mentioned in
these publications are due to Human Errors.
Definition ‘an action or decision that results in one or more unintended negative
outcomes’ (quoted from [163]).
Scope —non applicable—
Examples
• Configuration error: the user commits a configuration error. For in-
stance, an Internet service provider’s network administrator who mis-
configures the Border Gateway Protocol rules of an Internet router that
subsequently causes a massive Internet outage.
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• Bad recipient: the user sends a confidential message to a wrong recipient
by entering a wrong address in the ‘to’ field of an email.
• Send wrong key: the user mistakenly sends a message along with is private
key to a recipient, jeopardising the key’s confidentiality.
Research Research on Human Error outside of security is abundant, the most
prominent work being Reason’s Generic Error Modelling System [147]. Within
security, Miyamoto et al. [132] established a human error database for security.
Furthermore, several schema intended for describing security incidents o↵er
lists of possible human errors linked to a security incident (see for instance
VERIS [176]).
2.1.1.2 Deliberate Non-Compliance
As users can harm a system’s security, organisations set security policies to delineate
the frontier between acceptable and unacceptable use of the system. A security
policy, is ‘a statement that defines the security objectives of an organization; it
has to state what needs to be protected; it may also indicate how this is to be
done [79]’. More specifically, security policies define objectives, or ‘statement of
intent to protect identified ressources from unauthorized use’ [162]. Security policies
are organisational at a first level (‘a set a rules, laws , and practices that regulate how
an organisation [...] achieves a security policy objective’), then at a second level, they
are automated, or technically implemented as ‘a set of restrictions and properties
that specify how a computing system prevents information and computing resources
from being used to violate and organizational security policy’. Deliberate non-
compliance occurs when a user chooses to break the rules or circumvent a security
policy, with for instance, the intent to take a shortcut to a business goal.
Definition ‘Policy violations that: (1) knowingly break rules (employees violate se-
curity policies that they know exist); (2) are voluntary (actions are not forced
by other parties e.g., supervisors); (3) are intentional (employees make con-
scious decisions to engage in the actions); and (4) are non-malicious (employees
are not trying to cause damage)’ (quoted from [83]).
Scope Business processes and security policies.
Examples
• Healthcare: security policies are often circumvented in healthcare, and
in particular, with regard to the use of passwords and other door ac-
cess codes. Passwords and access codes tend to be shared between users
by taping them onto medical devices, computers, and emergency supply
rooms [115].
• Ecological consideration: a user can decide to put confidential documents
in the recycle bin against a security policy that requires shredding because
of the intention to protect the environment.
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• Personal use of a device: a user can set up a weak password to unlock
his own device for the sake of convenience, thus circumventing the organ-
isation’s security policy that rules how the organisation’s assets should
be accessed and protected from the user’s own device (Bring Your Own
Device) [92].
Research Research shows that deliberate non-compliance is often the result of
ill-designed security policies that conflict with the user’s goals [15], the or-
ganisation’s business process [72], or both. By exploring the reasons for non-
compliance, Kirlappos et al. show that security policies should reconcile the
user’s primary task with the business processes and security to provide e↵ec-
tive security [112]. Later, Kirlappos et al. show that security practitioners can
draw lessons from what they call ‘Shadow security,’ or the user’s own alter-
native to an organisation’s security policy, to build security policies that ‘fit
with the organisation’s business, rather than impede it.’ [113]
2.1.2 STA with extraneous malicious intent
2.1.2.1 Social Engineering
There is a plethora of literature that relates to Social Engineering (SE). The main
reason is that SE is closely related to influence, deception, persuasion, and other
umbrella notions that are connected with activities that are capable of influencing
human decision-making. As Mouton et al. state in their work on the definition
of the SE domain in security [134], there are a lot of di↵erent definitions for SE,
however, they all can be summed as:
Definition ‘The science of using social interaction as a means to persuade an indi-
vidual or an organisation to comply with a specific request from an attacker
where either the social interaction, the persuasion or the request involves a
computer-related entity.’ (quoted from [134])
Scope Social Engineering focuses on the Human.
Examples
• Baiting: the attacker plants a usb stick infected with a malware in the
vicinity of an organisation (e.g., its parking lot) with the hope that a user
plugs the device into one of the organisation’s computers [161].
• Phishing: masquerading as another entity, the attacker contacts a user.
This attack can be produced on numerous mediums (email, Internet Fo-
rum, SMS and the like) and usually aims at redirecting users to a mali-
cious website for acquiring credentials [70].
• Pretexting: the attacker pretends to belong to a trusted group (e.g.,
technical support) and asks the user to give away confidential information
or to perform actions that benefit the attacker. Pretexting attacks usually
aim at justifying the attacker’s physical presence in a restricted area to
later obtain credentials or network access.
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Research The most prominent work on SE is Mitnick’s seminal book [131]. Mitnick
presents several examples of SE along a generic framework for SE Attacks.
Later on, several researchers built taxonomies or schemas of SE attacks, among
which we have consulted the works of: Harley [85], Janczewski et al. [103],
Larabee [120], Ivaturi et al. [101], Tetri et al. [169], Algarni et al. [7], and
Mouton et al. [134].
There is also a host of research focused on understanding how SE Attacks,
frauds, and scam work, and what are the principles that make these success-
ful. Several taxonomies of principles are often referred to in the literature:
Cialdini’s 6 principles of persuasion [34], Stajano et al.’s 7 psychological prin-
ciples of scams [159], and Gragg’s psychological triggers [81]. Ferreira et al.
studied the overlap between these di↵erent principles and their use in phish-
ing [62].
2.1.2.2 Semantic Attacks in the User Interface
Semantic Attacks are a special kind of SE Attacks that focus on the User Interface.
The term was first proposed by Schneier in 2000 [153]. Later, Heartfield et al. [86]
proposed the following definition:
Definition ‘The manipulation of user-computer interfacing with the purpose to
breach a computer system’s information security through user deception.’
Scope Focuses on the User Interface.
Examples
• Web Pop-up: the attacker produces a pop-up while the user is navigating
on a website, thus abusing the trust that the user has on the website.
The attack usually collects information, for instance login credentials and
credit card information.
• Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points: the attacker creates a Wi-Fi access point
with the same name (SSID) as another one with the hope to bait some
user to connect to it and launch a man in the middle attack.
• Phishing: introduced earlier as an example of SE attack, phishing is also
a perfect example of Semantic Attack.
Research Several works attempted to classify Semantic Attacks. Mohd et al. [133]
built a taxonomy of SE attacks where semantic attacks are listed under the
category ‘technical-based social engineering attacks’. Heartfield et al. [86] built
a taxonomy of Semantic SE Attacks and a Survey of defence mechanisms. Sood
et al. showed how Semantic Attacks can be used to deliver malwares [156].
2.1.2.3 Semantic Attacks in Social Networks
Another definition of Semantic Attacks is tied with the spread ofmisinformation and
disinformation through social networks. Kumar et al. [116] propose the following
definition:
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Definition ‘Semantic attacks are aimed at influencing the perceptions of users with
the aim to modify their actions.’
Scope Focuses on the information perceived by the user.
Examples
• Sybil Attacks: an attacker creates several identities on a social network
to spread false information, with the goal of influencing that platform’s
users.
• Shill Attacks: several users of a social network agree to push an informa-
tion forward (or rate it higher) to give it more weightage, and in turn,
abuse the social network’s recommender system into relaying this infor-
mation to other users. Again, the attacker’s goal is to influence the chosen
social network’s users.
Research Most research related to this kind of Semantic Attacks (and their classifi-
cation) are linked to recommendation systems or to the propagation of rumors,
and hence, fall out of scope of this thesis.
2.1.3 STA with user’s malicious intent
2.1.3.1 Insider Threat
Insider Threat is2 a type of STA in which a system’s user is not exploited by an at-
tacker, but the user himself is the attacker. The user willingly chooses to misbehave
for one’s benefit (e.g., the user himself). Contrary to an external attacker, an insider
is already within the perimeter and possesses knowledge as well as credentials. His
malicious activities can hardly be distinguished from his harmless activities.
Definition ‘An insider threat is [posed by] an individual with privileges who mis-
uses them or whose access results in misuse.’ (quoted from Hunker et al. [94])
Scope Every aspect of an organisation can play a role in triggering this STA, such
as policies (e.g., security policies), organisational culture, management, user’s
predisposition, and the like.
Examples
• Disgruntled employee: a former employee who has recently been fired
may use his credentials that have not been revoked yet to take revenge.
• Whistle-blower: an employee, who has ethical issues with the organisa-
tion’s policies and activities, uses the credentials that his manager shared
with him to ease everyday work, to exfiltrate confidential data and then
leaks it to the press.
2Again, we reduce Insider Threat to STAs where the user has a malicious intent for the sake of
their introduction. But, as mentioned previously and depicted in Figure 2.1, Insider Threat is not
limited solely to this sole type of attacks.
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Research Band et al. [13] studied the psychological, technical, organisational, and
contextual factors that turn an insider intro an insider threat. Alfawaz et
al. [6] developed a framework to classify Insider Threats from the perspective
of insider’s knowledge, skills, and individual preferences. Magklaras et al.
proposed a tool to evaluate the probability of IT misuse from certain profiles
of user behaviour [126]. Gavai et al. [76] identify abnormal behaviours after
analysing online activities.
2.2 Socio-Technical Security Analysis
After having presented several types of STAs along with bodies of research that aim
at understanding and categorising them, we now move forwards and discuss works
that intend to defeat STAs. To thwart STAs one needs to identify which factors
make a human-computer interaction turn into a socio-technical vulnerability. This
leads us to our definition of Socio-Technical Security Analysis:
Definition of Socio-Technical Security Analysis ‘A security analysis that
aims at identifying vulnerabilities that arise from the human behaviour in
conjunction with technology.’
The study of socio-technical systems and their security is inherently transdisci-
plinary [185]. Indeed, scientists with di↵erent backgroundsj need to contribute or
cooperate to study the security of socio-technical systems. Social sciences, cogni-
tive sciences, computer sciences, and human-computer interactions are, for instance,
very relevant when it comes to the study of the whole spectrum of interaction be-
tween a system and its users, which can lead to the revelation of socio-technical
vulnerabilities [16].
Coming from di↵erent backgrounds, scientists naturally use di↵erent approaches
when tackling the problem of analysing the security of socio-technical systems. The
convergence of these di↵erent fields of research towards a common subject of analysis
is taking place from di↵erent perspectives one paper at a time. Computer scientists
tend to take a systemic approach with a tinge of social sciences, while other scientists
tend to apply the methods of their field to tackle immediate issues.
In the following section, we give an overview of the works that focus on socio-
technical security from the perspective of computer sciences and social sciences,
without attempting to categorising them. Eventually, we introduce the works that
propose the concepts that, we think, are the most integrated approaches from di↵er-
ent disciplines in their take on socio-technical security analysis: security ceremonies,
and the concertina model.
Kainda et al. [110] evaluate a list of usability variables (e.g., satisfaction, facility
of use, errors committed) of di↵erent protocols used to establish out-of-bound chan-
nels between human peers, and how they relate to the robustness of the protocols
against a Dolev-Yao adversary [52].
There are few works in computer sciences that aim at using formal methods to
verify human-computer interactions. For instance, Curzon, Ruksˇe˙nas and Bland-
ford’s work on this matter, first generally [45], then applied to security [149].
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Dalpiaz et al. [46] develop a Socio-Technical Security modelling language that
specifies the security and trustworthiness requirements for cross-organisational sys-
tems. Further, they develop a tool to support the language [140, 139].
Some works also analyse the security of Socio-Technical Physical Systems that
analyse the security of physical systems while incorporating human agents. For
instance, Dimkov et al. [51] create ‘Portunes’ to describe attack scenarios that span
across the physical, digital, and social domain.
Works about browser warnings conclude that users do not look at browsers’
cues or security indicators, and that they are led to incorrect decisions 40% of the
time [50]. Sunshine et al. [165] further conclude that even custom/improved warn-
ings are not enough, and ideally, security designers should avoid them altogether.
Research on warnings is still ongoing and is very active. The most prominent work
appears to be Felt et al.’s work on Google Chrome’s warnings [4, 61].
Usability is also a field of research that is investigated when it comes to the
analysis of socio-technical security [10]. Kainda et al. [111] study how methods used
in Human Computer Interaction (HCI) to improve users’ e↵ectiveness, e ciency,
or satisfaction can be used while still preventing the introduction of potential new
vulnerabilities through their use. Further, they create a threat model for usable
security. One prominent subject of research for usability of security systems is
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP): Whitten first studied the (un)-usability of its most
used client in 1999 [184], Ruoti et al. update this research by studying modern PGP
clients [150], concluding that ‘PGP is still unusable for the masses.’
The way users accept security mechanisms and policies is also a subject of re-
search. For instance, Zhang et al. investigate the impact of passwords expiration
and replacement [192] and confirm what Adams and Sasse identified in 1999 [3]:
expiring passwords is a questionable practice because users tend to generate new
passwords from the old ones, weakening the system’s security. Another study was
conducted in laboratory experiments on password generation strategies [173], which
observed that people are not good at generating unpredictable passwords, and that
additional research should be conducted to fix this problem.
Psychology is studied, in particular, to study the user susceptibility to attacks.
For instance Downs et al. [54, 53], Sheng et al. [155], and Bowen et al. [23] study
users’ susceptibility to phishing attacks.
Cranor et al. [12, 42] propose a framework to understand how security failures
happen when users misbehave because of flawed human-computer communications.
This framework is a sequence of generic steps a designer follows to identify potential
failure points for each technical function of the system in which the user partici-
pates. The designer needs to mitigate those failures, either by eliminating user’s
intervention altogether, if possible, or by improving user interaction.
Conti et al. [40] research on visualisation systems that typically include the hu-
man in the decision-making loop and present a visual taxonomy to identify attacks.
Falk et al. [59] examine the prevalence of user-visible security design flaws in finan-
cial websites with high security requirements, and present a methodology for testing
these issues by selecting the five most common security user-visible flaws of website
design and identifying them in a set of websites.
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Camp et al. [28] study how mental models associated with the perception of risk
could help the user to be more robust against STAs. Volkamer et al. review how
mental models could be used to ‘design security solutions and interactions more
e↵ectively.’ [178]
In the last 15 years, several works have contributed to extending the scope of the
analysis of security protocols in order to incorporate what was until now considered
as out-of-band: the human component. It started with Blaze in 2004 with the
notion of ‘Human-scale security protocol’ [20], and Ellison in 2007 with the idea of
ceremonies in which not only technical agents but humans could also be a part of
the analysis [56].
Then Bella and Coles-Kemp [16] created the ceremony concertina, which models
human-technology interactions as a set of layers encompassing, for instance, the
network, the operating system’s processes, the User Interface, the user’s persona,
and ultimately, the society. Each layer can be folded or unfolded to focus on some
part of the interaction. As Bella et al. state in [17]: ‘The ceremony concertina model
o↵ers anyone from a range of disciplines, who wants to investigate socio-technical
aspects of security and privacy, a canvas on which to paint their findings.’ In other
words, the ceremony concertina o↵ers a model through which scientists can express
their problems, hypotheses, and use their own methods.
To sum up, security ceremonies expand the study of security protocols to include
the humans and ceremony concertina provides a reference model to study all the ele-
ments between users and technology. This allows for the study of the human aspects
of a security protocol with social sciences methods concurrently or subsequently to
a traditional formal analysis of this protocol, within the same reference model. This
property of security ceremonies and ceremony concertina hint that they could be a
useful starting point for a framework to study the social and technical aspects of
socio-technical security analysis.
2.3 Di↵erent audiences with di↵erent goals
We identified two communities of professionals that are interested into thwarting
STAs or reusing the knowledge gained from the previously presented research works:
security researchers, and security practitioners. Alas, they may have di↵erent goals,
constraints, and skill sets.
For instance, security researchers abide by scientific rigour and use scientific
methods to produce results that are meant to answer specific research questions as
truly and extensively as possible. Security researchers can choose an issue, inves-
tigate their hypothesis regarding the issue, and go to great lengths to ensure the
significance of their results.
Security practitioners, on the other end, intend to solve a very di↵erent problem.
They can, for instance, be in charge of securing the operations of a whole company,
or investigate a security incident that occurred in a complex environment. Fur-
thermore, security practitioners establish security on a budget and are constantly
trading o↵ security for cost optimisation. They may not be interested in answering a
research question extensively, rather they are likely to be satisfied to produce results
that are ‘good enough’ to e↵ectively secure businesses’ operations.
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These di↵erences in goals and constraints between security researchers and se-
curity practitioners hint that di↵erent methods should be produced to fulfil their
respective needs. Whereas security practitioners can be more interested in a tool
that can e↵ectively identify potential STA, security researchers need a framework
in which they can produce reliable results to advance their understanding of STAs.
2.4 Inspiration from the safety field
There are the following two main research fields in safety: Human Factors (HF),
which is a synonym for ergonomics3, and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) which
is the predictive and retrospective study of human errors. HRA gives ground to
Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) by identifying what can go wrong and how an
event can unfold depending on human performance, thereafter, PRA quantifies the
likelihood of failure and of the potential aftermath.
Safety is a field of research from which security borrows a host of methods and
concepts. For instance, most of the methods used for testing usability (e.g., cognitive
walkthrough, focus groups, think aloud protocol, et cetera) are borrowed from the
HF field of research4. This is because the safety field realised more the 60 years ago
that a system could not be safe without encompassing the human component in its
analysis, and thereby, created methods and techniques to do so [32].
However, the resemblance does not stop here. Indeed, we can draw a parallel
between safety HF’s field of research and works that take a social sciences approach
to security analysis, as both these research works draw on psychology and empirical
methods to improve human performance. In the same manner, we can relate HRA,
which draws on system design and engineering, to the works that take a computer
sciences approach to security analysis. For instance, PRA techniques use event-trees
and fault-trees, which inspired the security field into creating attack-trees [128].
Another parallel is the struggle both the fields have to go through to utilise social
sciences’ methods and findings when analysing the security or the safety of systems.
In a retrospective paper [21], Boring contemplates the di↵erent trajectories HF and
HRA have taken in the course of the last 50 years, and how they are interconnected.
While both fields stand upon psychology, HRA is aligned with reliability engineering
and uses generalised empirical data (i.e., error modes, performance shaping factors,
et cetera) to operate, whereas, HF embraces empirical studies and is used primar-
ily in system design. Thus, HF tends to be more up-to-date in terms of findings
on human performance, and it constitutes readily available insights on human per-
formance for HRA. We argue that the relation between the social and technical
studies of security is the same, albeit the generalised form of social sciences findings
regarding socio-technical security is yet to be defined.
Indeed, most of the research works that we presented in Section 2.2 rely on
literature reviews to identify which aspects pertaining to the user should be consid-
ered before undertaking their technical work (for instance, Carlos et al. with [30]
and [29]). The field needs a methodology that creates a pipeline, which align social
3Also called HFE for HF and Ergonomics.
4Which, to be fair, borrowed a lot from psychology.
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sciences findings with consequences on a system’s security, just as HRA is doing for
systems’ safety in reliability engineering. Furthermore, we reckon, the field will face
the same struggle that HRA and HF have been facing for 50 years. The analysis of
socio-technical systems will need a way to keep insights from social sciences up to
date.
2.5 Research Questions and Objectives
In Section 2.1, we saw that STAs are diverse, and that this diversity is reflected in
the literature related to the classification and explanations of these attacks. Some
STAs, such as phishing, are well-known and have been investigated thoroughly, while
others, such as the exploitation of human error, are acknowledged but remain mainly
out-of-scope in security research.
Thereafter, we highlighted di↵erent research works that explore the same prob-
lem, i.e., how to deter STAs. These works question di↵erent aspects of these attacks.
For instance, some research works focus on how the communication between the sys-
tem and its users fails to convey e↵ectively a message critical for the system’s security
(i.e., [12, 42, 4, 61, 50, 165]) while others focus on psychological aspects that could
undermine security (i.e., [54, 53, 155, 23]). We propose to tackle the problem of
deterring STAs and of identifying socio-technical vulnerabilities through the study
of three research questions.
Research Questions
RQ1 How can we detect a socio-technical vulnerability in a system?
RQ2 How can we identify in the interactions between a system and its users,
the human behaviours that can harm this system’s security?
RQ3 How can we identify the factors that foster human behaviours that are
harmful to a system’s security?
The first research question, RQ1, is the main crux of the thesis. It is the outcome
of a successful socio-technical security analysis. RQ1 aims at providing a unified way
to identify the factors that could foster the human behaviours that are harmful for
a system’s security, and to identify which factors should be considered when adding
a human element to a system. The study of this first research question leads to
the study of the second and the third. To detect socio-technical vulnerabilities, one
first needs to identify the human behaviours that have adverse consequences for the
system’s security (RQ2), and then determine which are the factors that foster these
behaviours (RQ3).
We stated in Section 2.3 that we can identify two di↵erent communities that
have reasons to be interested in studying and thwarting STAs: security researchers
and security practitioners. For each community, we identify an objective that this
thesis aims at fulfilling as its contributions:
Objectives
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O1 What form should a framework that intends to identify harmful behaviours
for security, and to investigate the factors that foster their occurrence
take?
O2 What form should a semi-automatic, or tool-assisted methodology for the
security analysis of socio-technical systems take?
The objective O1 aims at supporting security researchers in the study of these re-
search questions. As explained in this chapter, the study of these research questions
poses methodological challenges. Indeed, being able to predict the consequences of
the addition of a human component to a system requires knowledge and methods
from both computers sciences and social sciences. Computer sciences are needed
to ponder upon the consequences of a behaviour, and social sciences to identify
what factors in this system could trigger this behaviour. Bella and Coles-Kemp’s
concertina model [16] constitutes the canvas on which we draw our answer to O1.
We create a framework that works as a common ground for socio-technical security
analysis. This framework supports the resolution of RQ2 and RQ3 by providing
ways of identifying security-critical behaviours as well as ways of investigating the
factors that foster their occurrences.
The objective O2 aims at supporting security practitioners and providing an
answer to the first research question RQ1. Inspired from HRA methods in safety,
the methodology we propose to answer O2 is a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) technique
tailored for socio-technical security analysis. This method will support the resolution
of RQ1 by generalizing results from social sciences studies and reusing these results
into socio-technical security analyses.
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Toutes les voies sont barre´es, il faut pourtant agir. Alors nous
essayons de changer le monde, c’est-a`-dire de le vivre comme si
les rapports des choses a` leurs potentialite´s n’e´taient pas re´gle´s
par des processus de´terministes, mais par la magie.
—Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Esquisse d’une the´orie de l’e´motion’
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In this chapter, we introduce STEAL, a framework to study socio-
technical security. The main goal of STEAL is to provide computer
scientists and social scientists with a common ground and a similar
terminology to allow for a security analysis that comprises technical,
social and contextual elements. In the first part of this chapter, we
present the framework, its reference model and associated methodolo-
gies. Then, we move on validating its relevance as common ground for
socio-technical security analysis through two studies: the validation of
TLS certificates in modern web browsers, and the selection of Wi-Fi
networks. Part of the content of this chapter appears in three papers:
‘A Conceptual Framework to Study Socio-Technical Security’ by Ana
Ferreira, Jean-Louis Huynen, Vincent Koenig and Gabriele Lenzini
published in the Proceedings of the second International Conference
on Human Aspects of Security 2014, (HAS 2014, Heraklion, Crete,
Greece) [65]; ‘Studies in Socio-technical Security Analysis: Authenti-
cation of Identities with TLS Certificates’ by Ana Ferreira, Rosario
Giustolisi, Jean-Louis Huynen, Vincent Koenig and Gabriele Lenzini
published in the Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (Trust-
Com 2013, Melbourne, Australia) [63]; ‘Socio-Technical Study on the
E↵ect of Trust and Context When Choosing WiFi Names’ by Ana
Ferreira, Jean-Louis Huynen, Vincent Koenig, Gabriele Lenzini and
Salvador Rivas published in the Proceedings of the 9th International
Workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM 2013, Egham,
UK) [68]; and ‘On Tools for Socio-Technical Security Analysis’ by Ana
Ferreira, Rosario Giustolisi, Jean-Louis Huynen, and Gabriele Lenzini
presented at the Grande Region Security and Reliability Day (GSRD
2013, Luxembourg) [64]. The research presented in Section 3.4 was
originally completed by Rosario Giustolisi and reported on in two papers
I have co-authored with him where these results are linked to the STEAL
framework (see [64] and [63]). The aforementioned work also appears in
Dr. Giustolisi’s PhD thesis.
3.1 Introduction
Systems that are secure even when used by humans —a property that we call ef-
fective security— are hard to validate and evaluate. A system can embed technical
mechanisms that make it technically secure, such as encryption protocols, but those
mechanisms can fail if users bypass or misuse them. Such failures are common since
humans do not perceive security as a primary goal [183] [187] and do not properly
assess risks when using information communication technology [171, 117].
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There is more: as explained in the previous chapter computer system designers,
with a few exceptions [142] [111] [42] [29], are not accustomed to count human
cognitive and behavioural traits as risk factors in the security requirements. Thus,
even systems that have been validated as technically secure, may still be insecure
against STAs (e.g., social engineering).
How can we achieve a better e↵ective security? There is no once-and-for-all
solution. E↵ective security is a complex quality to achieve. It is inherently socio-
technical (it depends on how human and technical aspects integrate) and it may
be context and culture (including education) dependent [168, 179]. For example,
in hospitals, access control solutions cannot be e↵ective unless designed to fit the
nomadic, interrupted, and cooperative nature of the medical work [14]. But, the
same access control solutions would be judged di↵erently in a context such as a
bank, where employees work mostly alone and where security requirements must
consider, for example, threats coming from hackers (e.g., see [182]).
To make a system e↵ectively secure in di↵erent scenarios, it likely requires diverse
strategies and solutions. However, it is possible to refer to a common framework
of analysis. Such a framework should help computer security designers and social
scientists to collaborate by providing an operational guideline for an interdisciplinary
approach in studying a system’s security, as well as tools and methodologies for
questioning security at both the technical and the social layers.
Outline. This chapter proposes and describes a common framework for socio-
technical security analysis that we call STEAL (Socio-TEchnical Attack AnaLysis).
First we introduce STEAL, its reference model and the methodologies that it sup-
ports. Then, we assess STEAL’s relevance by investigating: if (1) STEAL’s reference
model is adequate for supporting both social and technical analyses of systems, and
if (2) STEAL’s methodologies and operational guidelines can be instantiated and
are relevant in studying socio-technical security. We investigate these research ques-
tions by studying two use cases: the selection of Wi-Fi networks and the validation
of TLS certificates in web browsers. The first use case (Wi-Fi) focuses on validat-
ing the practicality of performing social analyses of security and the relevance of
STEAL’s reference model. The second use case (TLS) focuses on validating the
use of technical analyses for socio-technical security. Eventually we discuss STEAL
achievements and limitations.
3.2 The STEAL framework
3.2.1 A socio-technical security conceptual framework
By a socio-technical security conceptual framework, we mean an operational guide-
line for a systematic approach in modelling and analysing a system’s security in its
technical and social perspectives. Past research in security validation shows that
important elements of such a framework are (I) a reference model and (II) a set of
procedural methodologies. (I) is to describe, at a suitable level of abstraction, the
elements of the system that we intend to analyse. (II) is to have tools for a technical
and a social experimental analysis of security.
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Figure 3.1: STEAL Conceptual Framework. O are possible attacks, and  are
possible defences. The attacker can strike in the context, and in every layer between
the user and the network.
STEAL, our framework, includes them both (see Figure 3.1). Its reference model
(see Section 3.2.1.1) suggests a system composed by interacting elements/actors
(human, interfaces, processes, and context). Its set of methodologies (see Sec-
tion 3.2.1.2) includes security validation procedures coming from the formal analysis
of security protocols and from the applied cognitive sciences and usability research.
3.2.1.1 STEAL: reference model
The reference model is a variant of the Bella et al.’s [16] concertina model (Figure 3.1,
upper part). A socio-technical system is abstractly seen as layered, each layer made
of communicating/interacting elements. There is at least a human persona, say
Alice (PA), and the technology she is using. This is further composed by at least a
human interface (UI A) and some software processes (pA). Processes can, through a
network, communicate with other processes (pB), behind which may stay one or more
humans, say Bob (PB), who are in turn interfaced to human interfaces (UIB). Layers
can be folded, with the e↵ect that not all elements need to be necessarily in place.
Representing our system in this way helps the analyst to select the key components
for analysis, and to distinguish between the technical, the human components and
the context.
STEAL extends this model by adding the context (CA), and attack and defence
models. Context is the physical or social environment where the interactions for
‘Alice’ take place. CA influences how A’s self (SA, in Figure 3.1) expresses into PA’s,
the way PA interacts with the interface, and the software, which can be context-
dependent. CB does the same on B’s side, not shown in the figure.
This simple reference model fits many scenarios. For example, in an ATM
machine scenario, Alice (PA) is the client, the user interface (UI A) is the ATM’s
set, and pA is the software executing the client instruction that connects the ATM
with the bank (pB). The context (CA) is where the ATM is located, a street or
the interior of a bank’s hall. In a scenario where Alice is accessing a protected web
page, the web interface is (UI A), the browser is the process pA that runs a protocol
with the web server hosting the page, which is process (pB). The context CA can
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be Alice in her o ce, or in an airport’s hall. In a scenario with a few persons
collaboratively editing a file in the cloud, the persons are the Alices and Bobs, their
screens and keyboards the human-computer interfaces; the software they use to
edit and to browse are the processes. The communication happens via the cloud
service. The context can be where those persons are, at work, at home, the latter
being not only the location but also social environments.
Attack and defence models. STEAL comes also with an attack and with a de-
fence model. They are both relevant for the security analysis, as security is always
evaluated with respect to an attacker with specific capabilities (respectively, a de-
fender with specific capabilities). The icons O (attacks) and  (defences) indicate
where the model assume attacks can strike and where defences can act.
Whatever the nature of the channels and the messages they carry, an attacker
can intercept, modify and inject messages in any of those channels. These are
typical abilities ascribed to a Dolev-Yao intruder [52]. However, di↵erently from
classical Dolev-Yao, in STEAL, the attacker controls not only the network but also
the interactions between the application, the user’s interfaces, the persona, and the
context. Therefore, an attack may be technical and or a social engineering kind of
attack.
Defences also act by interfering with the communication channels. This includes
the channels with the user. In our framework, users can participate to improve
security, a substantial di↵erence between our and other works [42].
Other assumptions. Our reference model assume that the observable behaviour
of the system’s elements under analysis is (at least at the level of abstraction chosen)
known. However, it does not assume, and does not depend on, the reasons, or the
logic, behind this behaving be necessarily understood. This assumption endorses a
computational approach. A component (whatever it is, human, interface, agent or
context) is an entity (an automaton) that behaves according to a certain control
logic that determines its input, output and internal actions depending on its state
and on its (previous) inputs.
For example, a user at an ATM machine, behaves according to some beliefs,
desires and intentions that he/she has (withdraw money) which, according to his/her
state of mind (I have inserted a pin and wait for the money to come out), determine
the actions he/she does (taking the money once out). In its turn the ATM machine’s
logic is its software code, its state is the machine’s state (pin inserted, now checking
it), and its actions (display selection of banknotes).
In practice, we may not be able to define precisely a component’s control logic, or
to list the full set of actions it can ever perform, or to know the component’s state in
time. But, to build a su ciently consistent picture (i.e., model) of the component’s
observable behaviour, one can apply indirect methods to inquire properties about
an element’s state and to test propositions about it, or by observing the actions it
does. For example, we can build a model of a browser by looking at its code. In
this case we know fully how it works. If the code is proprietary, we may not be able
to fully know its logic but we can build a consistent model by walking through its
behaviour. Similarly, we can observe a user interacting with our browser, but we
may not be able to observe him changing his mental state (e.g., cognitive process),
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nor knowing why users behave in certain ways. We can only observe and ask him
(e.g., questionnaire/interview).
This assumption is also motivated by the tools of analysis we are going to have:
tools for a formal analysis such as model checkers, for the technical security, and
human computer interactions methodologies, as those used in usability laboratories,
for the social security.
3.2.1.2 Methodologies for socio-technical security analysis
STEAL has two methodologies for security analysis. One allows to understand the
security properties without considering a complex model of user behaviour. The
other allows to question hypotheses on human behaviour and on security properties
with the human in the loop.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the two methodologies, together, make the socio-
technical analysis possible. The technical analysis helps, against specific threats,
discovering if attacks are possible. However, their e↵ectiveness may depend on some
user’s decisions, exactly as it happens with TLS authentication (see Section 3.4),
where a user may decide to proceed despite a warning flashing that the certificate
is invalid. The experimental analysis answers whether those attack would be
successful with real users and factual behavioural patterns. The outcomes of the
social-oriented analysis also enlighten us on what factors influence critical decisions
that may lead to attacks. Such outcomes may therefore suggest defences which,
in turn, can be implemented at a technical or a social level or as a combination
of them, and understanding their e↵ectiveness triggers another round of analysis.
Moreover, it is also possible to perform a security analysis against attacks purely
against the human, like social engineering. At the current status of research there
is not a stable theory able to model such attacks in a formal model way, thus to
study their e↵ect is again done experimentally. This can change in the near future.
To test hypothesis of user’s behaviour under social attacks, we may need to
launch such attacks and harvest data for analysis. This requires an authorisation
from an ethical committee and a compliance with a legal framework, assurances that
must strictly comply with ethical requirements. In certain situations this may be
hard to achieve.
Technical focus. This methodology helps discovering whether an attack is
present, within the defined threat model, and mostly with technical interactions
and a simple user model. The technical security analysis is applied to elements
from UI A till pA and possibly pB till UIB, including the context(s). PA is modelled
as a non-deterministic process i.e., interacting with process UI A in every possible
way [19, 18, 63]. The technical analysis, can use formal tools of protocol analysis
(e.g., model checking [38]), with the only di↵erence that communications are now
multi-layered. In a simple case, the analysis can be pursued informally.
Analysing security in this focus means to verify whether specific security prop-
erties remain valid despite an intruder. The technical analysis may reveal vulner-
abilities due to a faulty integration between the technical and the human layers,
like it happens when a system does not o↵er users to change a password, when it
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Figure 3.2: Operational guideline to use Technical and Social Analyses in a pipeline.
should (e.g., [16]). The output of the technical analysis gives ground for a successive
security analysis with social-focus, as it provides information about what attacks
should be considered there.
Social focus. This methodology helps discovering security failures in the human
interactions, when a predefined threat model is present, or in presence of specific
attacks revealed by the technical analysis. The social analysis focuses on human
behaviour and choices, therefore from elements SA till UI A and possibly their human-
to-human interaction with SB via UIB, including the context(s). The social analysis
uses the hypothetico-deductive model from empirical social sciences research [78]
and Human Computer Interactions [121] (see Social Analysis ’s operation block in
Figure 3.2).
Briefly, the process starts with the initial definition of research questions to be
tested. These usually come from previous literature review, insights either observed
or hinted by human computer interactions, or from the technical security analysis
itself. The process continues with the definition of the most appropriate research
methodology/ies (i.e., laboratory experiments, interviews, surveys) to answer the re-
search question. Here we also decide on the appropriate threat model and the layers
that can be impacted in the reference model. This process is similar if we are testing
defences. The next step is to design and implement the selected methodology(ies)
with the goal of making this process reproducible over a series of experimental tests.
After all is set and ready to start, the experiment is run and output data is collected
and further analysed. Usually, data can be analysed using both quantitative (statis-
tical tools can be used to analyse data and test previous defined research questions,
and show how significant these are) and qualitative methods (qualitative data gath-
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Figure 3.3: Reference model for WiFi connection to the Internet.
ered from the participants can be correlated with results obtained from statistical
analysis and also provide insight or explanation on user’s behaviour).
In the next section, we illustrate the use of STEAL through the study of the
selection of Wi-Fi networks. The example shows how this scenario can be described
in the STEAL’s reference model, and how the socio-technical security analysis can
be done by performing technical and social analysis in a pipeline.
3.2.2 Illustrating the use of STEAL: Wi-Fi networks selec-
tion
We describe how STEAL works with a scenario of a visitor at the Univ. of Luxem-
bourg trying to get WiFi Internet access by choosing an open SSID name from the
list he is presented by his device’s network manager.
3.2.2.1 Reference model
STEAL reference model highlights the elements of the scenario (Figure 3.3), com-
prising the network manager and all the network communication protocols (pA), the
interface on the user’s mobile device (UIA) and the user trying to select a wireless
network name to connect to the Internet (PA). The premises of the University of
Luxembourg, the place where all is happening, is the context CA.
About the interactions, express would be the expression of all the human traits
of a persona into how PA takes security decisions when interacting with a human-
computer interface in that particular scenario. (We are not able to model those
expressions, but we may want to consider them in the analysis). Then, interaction
are the actions performed by the user, to access the wireless network manager’s
list and select an SSID name to connect; events are the communications exchanged
between the user’s interface on the mobile device and the wireless network manager
application and the wireless access point, which manages calls to its network; protocol
are the network protocols and messages exchanged between the wireless network
manager application and wireless access point, which manages all accesses to the
services that its network provides.
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3.2.2.2 Socio-technical security analysis
Technical analysis. We model the technical layers in a UML diagram. It il-
lustrates the sequence of actions between those elements during an attack in this
scenario (Figure 3.4). In theory it is possible to run a formal analysis against a
Dolev-Yao attacker. Here, it is immediately evident that an intruder can open a
rogue wireless access point because the SSID is not authenticated.
The success of the attack relies only on the user’s choice, precisely on whether a
user will actually choose the rogue access point or not. This cannot be understood
with this technical analysis only. However, we elaborate more on the attack before
passing to the social analysis. We hypothesise that the context plays a very impor-
tant role in this scenario as the attacker can use the University’s visual identity –and
all that is connected with it such as knowledge, reputation, etc– to lure a victim to
choose a rogue but meaningful name, such as “uni.lu”, over the University’s o cial
SSID names (actually “uni-visitor” and “eduroam”). The attacker can also set up
a second SSID, “secure AP”, a name recalling “security” and test which name has
more appeal for the user. Figure 3.4 shows the attack.
Social analysis. To apply the hypothetico-deductive model for this analysis we
devised the following stages: (1) Research question: do context and trust influence
users’ choice of a wireless network name? do names reminding security influence
that choice? (2) Methodology : online survey with two di↵erent groups of questions
(one relating to context and the other to trust) each together with open questions to
provide further explanation of the participant’s selection. The groups of questions
must be answered by two di↵erent groups of participants (in a between subjects
design) regarding wireless network names preferences and graded using a Likert
scale (1 - less trusted/less preferred to 5 - highly trusted/preferred); (3) Design and
implement the experiment : the survey included a list of 12 wireless network names
is compiled based on: they exist in the region where the study was conducted,
non-existing, evocative of security or freeness and location/context-specific. The
participants should be randomly associated with either the first or the second group
of questions (between subjects design); (4) Run the experiment : send an email to
the sta↵ of the University of Luxembourg; (5) Analysis : Data is collected through
on online survey, then analysed using R statistical tool. Basic descriptive statistics
were applied followed by t-test and wilcoxon rank test.
We actually run such an experiment and report on parts of it in this thesis (the
full details are to be found in [68]). Details on the influence of context are presented
in Section 3.3 and used to validate STEAL’s support for social sciences methods, and
the relevance of the addition of the context to STEAL’s reference model; details on
the influence of trust are presented in Section 4.3.1.1 to illustrate the use of STEAL
(in Chapter 4).
Main results : The social analysis confirms the hypothesis that SSID names re-
minding the context influence choices, but when users are unaware, or have not been
instructed to use the o cial SSIDs. However, the study refutes the hypothesis that
users trust names recalling “security”.
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Figure 3.4: Technical Focus: the UML sequence diagram for the WiFi connection
to the Internet with an intruder attacking the network.
3.2.2.3 Adding defences
After having identified possible attacks, we may devise possible defences. We sketch
some of them in the reminder of this paragraph. Defences can act at the technical
layers or at the social layers. For example, if all wireless access points were strongly
authenticated by the user’s device, then the identified attack would not occur. This
is likely the case with the new Hotspot 2.0, where the device’s SIM card embeds
the certificate of proprietary access points. The network manager, pA, can be pro-
grammed to disable the ‘join()’ action on all networks that have not been vouched
by the university’s system administrator ( 4, Figure 3.3). Another technical de-
fence can be implemented at the Network layer by monitoring the live SSIDs, and
spot whether some new SSID is trying to use the name of the context (e.g., the
“uni.lu” SSID). Technically it is possible to disrupt the joining process to newcomer
SSID by sending spoofed deauth packets. This action has the e↵ect of disabling the
‘join()’ function ( 5). This defence is sometimes labelled “Rogue Containment” and
is implemented in number of wireless network products (see [36] for instance).
If no technical solution is feasible, defences can be applied at the social layers
or to the context. For example, stickers can be left all over the University campus,
advertising the legitimate access point of the University ( 1). This may likely
increase user’s awareness. The University can give training to its employees to help
them recognise rogue SSIDs ( 2). The network manager and the user interface can
have a trust indicator displayed aside each SSID ( 3).
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Whether these defences are e↵ective in successfully decreasing the number of
people that fall victim of the attack herein described, is a research question that
should be tested by new runs of our framework.
3.2.3 Summary
STEAL comprises a model of a socio-technical scenario and suggests methodologies
to analyse and test the same scenario for its security. It helps modelling socio-
technical attack scenarios too. At the moment, the methodologies for both technical
and social security analysis are working in a pipeline, and allows more runs of
analysis. The technical analysis justifies the presence of technical attacks, and the
social analysis give ground to evaluate the e↵ectiveness when user’s decisions are
in place with those attacks. The technical analysis cannot, at the moment, help
with attacks of purely social nature, because there is no model able to express and
simulate them. The same relates to mature human behaviour: there are no stable
human behavioural models that can be used within an automatic security validation
tool.
It is not a primary goal of STEAL to build a model for understanding why users
behave the way they do. However, it is possible to use STEAL to design and perform
experiments that focus on understanding why some users fall victims of a specific
socio-technical attack, by following some behavioural patterns. Such findings may
inspire defences, whose e↵ectiveness can be tested in STEAL.
To validate STEAL reference model, operational guideline, and methodologies,
we now study two use cases. The first one (see Section 3.3) aims at proving that
STEAL’s reference model is fine-grained enough to describe scenarios where an at-
tack stems from the interplay of di↵erent actors, and that social sciences’ methodolo-
gies can be successfully instantiated to investigate hypothesis regarding the success
of such attacks. As we are in particular interested into the validity of the addition of
the context into the reference model, the use case focuses on the role of the context
into the selection of Wi-Fi networks. The second use case aims at showing that
technical analyses of socio-technical systems can be performed through the use of
model checking.
3.3 STEAL validation: social focus
In this section, we study STEAL’s support of analysis focused on the social layers
of a system (see Figure 3.5). In particular, we investigate if STEAL’s reference
model is fined-grained enough to be used to describe attacks that stem from the
interactions between the attacker, the context, and the user.
Furthermore, we challenge the addition of the context’s relevance into STEAL’s
reference model. The following study intends to prove experimentally that the
context indeed explains part of the user’s insecure behaviour in the running example
used previously (see Figure 3.3) and that the presence of the context in STEAL’s
reference model is justified.
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Figure 3.5: The multi-layered security and threat model used in this section.
3.3.1 Introducing the study
User do not know what behaviour to expect from a network before interacting with
it. For instance, a Wi-Fi hotspot can provide access to the Internet immediately
after the user has joined the network or it can redirect the user to a captive portal.
To add further confusion, captive portals have no pre-defined behaviours before they
provide access to the Internet; some only ask for the acceptance of conditions of use,
some ask the user to enter personal information, and others require the payment of a
fee or the provision of credentials. In these initial interactions, even tech-savvy users
that protect their privacy by using end-to-end encryption while using open Wi-Fi
networks can be at risk because before accessing the Internet end-to-end encryption
is not active yet (unless users bypass the network’s restrictions by tunneling IP over
DNS for instance, but this is a technical action that not all users can take.)
In this setting, users have to rely on their knowledge and beliefs to define various
heuristics to select a network that appears to fit their expectations. We stipulate
that the SSID and its relation with the surrounding context may be factors in the
user’s choices, and that understanding how these factors influence the user’s choices
can improve the e↵ective security of Wi-Fi networks.
We imagine the mind-set of an attacker who intends to set-up a fake WiFi access
point and who speculates on the best strategy to name it to “phish” people. A good
strategy could be to choose names that relate to the context.
Context, is the physical or the social space where actions and decisions occur
(e.g., in a laboratory, at work, at home). By addressing context we are interested
in understanding whether this factor has an e↵ect on people’s choices of names. If
that is true, an attacker can be more e↵ective by contextualising his/her attack or
by fooling users to be in a context favourable to him/her. However, this brings new
ideas on how to contain these context-exploiting attacks, for example by securing
the access to the context (cf. Section 3.3.5).
In summary, the aim of this section is to present a study that investigates the
e↵ect that the context has on users when choosing wireless network names. Our
study relates to decisions that do not require complex probabilities, balancing risks,
or evaluating security with respect to goals: in such complex scenarios, user choices
are ruled by principles of mental economics [9, 3], out-of-scope here.
This study also investigates the role of trust in the selection of Wi-Fi names, but
we don’t report these results in the present section to focus on the relevance of the
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Table 3.1: Existing/nonexistent wireless names and their grouping in relation to
security and context. Security: (G1-existing; G2-nonexistent; G3-nonexistent and
related to security; G4-nonexistent and not related to security). Context: (L1-
existing and expected in the context; L2-existing and not expected in the context;
L3-nonexistent and expected in the context; L4-nonexistent and not expected in the
context).
G1 G2 G3 G4 L1 L2 L3 L4 L1 L2 L3 L4 L1 L2 L3 L4 L1 L2 L3 L4
eduroam
uni0visitor
uni0student
wifi_unilu
hotcity
Hotel_le_Place_D’Armes
Cafe_de_Paris
secured_hotspot
secure_wifi_BelleEtoile
free_wifi_BelleEtoile
Maroquinerie_Kirchberg
free_AP
University CityJCenter Shopping Hospital
context in STEAL’s reference model. The investigations on user’s trust are detailed
the next chapter.
3.3.2 Use Case Scenario
Our hypothetical use case scenario consists of a set of wireless network names
(SSIDs), various locations, and a user. The user is expected to scan and choose
an SSID from a list of names that his/her device detects to get Internet access. This
can happen in four di↵erent well known locations: the university, a shopping mall
(a specific one), the city center, and a hospital (a specific one).
On the other hand, our scenario imagines an attacker whose intent is to deploy a
dishonest WiFi base station. This station’s name will appear in the list of available
SSIDs that the user can browse from its device. The attacker seeks to maximise
the number of victims, so s/he looks for alluring names that takes advantage of the
location to inspire legitimacy with names such as ‘wifi unilu’. Table 3.1 shows a
comprehensive view of the 12 SSIDs used in this study, including those existing and
those made up. The SSIDs have been carefully compiled: they may or may not
exist in the region where the study was conducted, evoke security or free use, or be
location-specific.
Research Question. The research question we intend to answer regarding pref-
erences in wireless network names is (Context RQ): Does context a↵ect participants’
preferences?
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3.3.3 The Survey
For reasons of feasibility and ethics we opted for a survey rather than an experimen-
tal setup, the latter being e.g., the setup of a ‘malicious’ access point airing di↵erent
SSIDs. Our survey asks respondents to rate a list of SSIDs according to their prefer-
ences while excluding technical aspects such as signal strength or protected access.
Our survey relies on an online questionnaire rather than a paper-pencil version that
would have required a large logistical e↵ort to field and to encode, while not o↵ering
the same level of convenience to the respondent. The questionnaire was structured
into three parts: (1) the socio-demographics part that surveys respondents about
their age, gender, education, IT skills and comfort using IT; (2) the ‘general pref-
erences’ part that lists 12 SSIDs the respondents are asked to rate with regard to
their general preferences based on a 5 point Likert scale (i.e., 1-Not at all preferred,
2-Not very preferred, 3-Neutral, 4-Preferred, 5-Most preferred), respectively; (3) the
‘context’ part consists of 4 specific and familiar locations, each of these locations list-
ing the same 12 SSIDs, asking respondents to rate them regarding specific contexts
when connecting/avoiding them (same Likert scale as for the general preferences).
The instructions provided to the respondents have been translated from En-
glish to German and French in order to accommodate the multilingual population
of Luxembourg and surrounding areas. As mentioned earlier, a research question
about trust is also investigated in this survey, so, in reality the respondents were
randomly associated with one of two conditions. From the point of view of the
participant assigned to the context condition the survey was presented as follows:
socio-demographic ! general preference ! context. We recruited participants by
sending an invitation via email to students and sta↵ from the University of Luxem-
bourg.
Data were collected within a MySql database and exported to a CSV file format.
Statistical analyses were done using the R statistical analysis software [144]. The
collected data were analysed using basic descriptive statistics, followed by specific
analysis of variance tests (t-tests [124] and Wilcoxon rank [186] tests) in order to
assess the significant di↵erences and between general preferences and the context. In
order to apply t-tests on data derived from Likert scales, we systematically verified
its normal distribution and also employed the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to further
support t-test results. We also included open questions (analysed manually) that
allowed respondents to provide the rationale for their ratings.
A total of 235 participants took part in our study; however our analysis focuses
on the 99 completed cases (136 cases have not been fully completed and thus have
not been considered for analysis), and 40 participants were assigned to the context
condition. As shown in Table 3.2 our sample is rather balanced with regard to gen-
der. On average our respondents are rather young (age 26), mostly highly educated
(over 75% have a bachelor degree or higher), very IT literate and highly skilled
(75%).
Next, we present the results obtained for the trust condition. Whenever possi-
ble, we proceed by first describing general tendencies as visualized through graphical
representations, followed by more specific analyses whose results are presented as
tables. Di↵erences between repeated measures have systematically been computed
as follows: measure 2   measure 1. Negative di↵erences suggest than on average
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Table 3.2: Sociodemographics for the population of the survey for the context con-
dition, and to whole survey
Demographics
Condition
context
Total
(n = 40) (n = 99)
Female 58% 45%
Male 42% 55%
Age (average) 25% 26%
High School 28% 22%
Bachelor Degree 50% 49%
Master Degree 7% 15%
PhD 13% 11%
Very comfortable using IT 73% 70%
Somewhat comfortable using IT 25% 26%
Very good IT skills 23% 29%
Good IT skills 60% 46%
Average IT skills 15% 21%
Table 3.3: Statistical significance for the di↵erences between general preferences and
the contexts (in this case, there is no statistical significance for the context “city
center”).
Di↵erence (Context preference-generic preference)
University Shopping Mall Hospital
Whole sample -0.15⇤] - -
Females - -0.23⇤] -0.33⇤]
> 24 years old - - -0.27⇤]
> bachelor degree - -0.32⇤ -0.37⇤]
Legend: For all tables superscripts have the following meaning: t-test result: ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001.
Wilcoxon result: ]p < 0.05; ]]p < 0.01; ]]]p < 0.001.
measure 1 > measure 2 and positive values suggest measure 2 > measure 1. More
precisely, a negative value indicates a decrease in preferences and conversely a pos-
itive value suggests an increase in preference. The statistical tests inform us on the
significance of these di↵erences.
3.3.4 Context
Fig. 3.6 displays the SSID preference ratings for only 4 of the 12 names that show
some change throughout the contexts (i.e., University, City Center, Shopping Mall
and Hospital) as compared to the general and non-context dependent situation,
which is labeled “generic” in the figure.
Table 3.3 shows the significant results about the e↵ect that context awareness
has on respondent’s names preference ratings.
Significant results in the context condition indicate a decrease in preference rat-
ings when respondents are made aware of specific contexts. This applies to the
University context where the e↵ect is demonstrated for the entire sample of respon-
dents and, only for specific sample groups in the shopping mall and hospital context.
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Figure 3.6: Selection made for eduroam, Hotel le Place d’Armes, se-
cure wifi BelleEtoile and free-wifi BelleEtoile within the four contexts by all
participants of condition 2.
The shopping mall indeed seems to demonstrate an e↵ect specifically for female re-
spondents and for those who are more educated. This is also true for the hospital
context, the results indicate an e↵ect for respondents aged more than 24 years old.
These e↵ects indicate that these respondents may be more aware when choosing a
name for those three contexts.
We completed our analysis by a specific name grouping, illustrated in Table 3.1.
Fig. 3.7 compares between general preferences and the four groups (L1-L4) for all
the contexts. Participants rate higher the SSIDs for L1 - existing and are expected
within the university and the city center while in the other two contexts (e.g., shop-
ping mall and the hospital) participants rate higher the names for L2 - existing but
are not expected in that context. The figure also shows a tendency for participants
to rate higher nonexistent wireless network names but which may be expected in
the context (L3) (e.g., for the university, shopping mall and hospital contexts).
Table 3.4 provides an overview of the e↵ects that the University context has
on user’s preferences. Group L1 of “existing names and expected in the context”,
are all a↵ected by the university context in the sense that these names are rated
higher, respondents thus being more cautious when context-aware. In contrast,
group L2 of “existing names but not expected in the context”, have been rated
lower when awareness about the context was included, except for male respondents.
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Figure 3.7: General preferences in the 4 groups (L1-L4) for all the contexts.
Table 3.4: Statistical significance for the di↵erences between general preferences and
the context of the University.
Di↵erences
(L*   generic )
L1 L2 L3 L4
Whole sample 1.00⇤⇤⇤]]] -0.40⇤⇤⇤]]] -0.10] -0.47⇤⇤⇤]]]
Males 0.86⇤⇤⇤]]] - - -0.48⇤⇤]]]
Females 1.10⇤⇤⇤]]] -0.50⇤⇤⇤]]] - -0.46⇤⇤⇤]]]
 24 years old 0.99⇤⇤⇤]]] -0.37⇤⇤]] -0.22] -0.43⇤⇤⇤]]]
> 24 years old 1.03⇤⇤⇤]]] -0.47⇤⇤]] - -0.55⇤⇤]]
 Bachelor Degree 1.01⇤⇤⇤]]] -0.35⇤⇤]] -0.18] -0.40⇤⇤⇤]]]
> Bachelor Degree 0.95⇤⇤] -0.60⇤⇤] - -0.71⇤]
 Good IT skills 1.02⇤⇤⇤]]] -1.41⇤⇤⇤]]] - -0.46⇤⇤⇤]]]
> Good IT skills 0.94⇤⇤⇤]] -0.39⇤] -0.22⇤⇤⇤] -0.50⇤]
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Table 3.5: Statistical significance for the di↵erences between general preferences and
the context for: (a) Shopping Mall, and (b) the Hospital.
Di↵erences
(L*   generic )
L3 L4
Whole sample 0.29⇤ -0.36⇤⇤]]]
Male 0.43⇤] -0.48⇤⇤⇤]]]
Female
 24 years old 0.43⇤⇤] -0.32⇤]
> 24 years old - -0.44⇤⇤]]
 Bachelor Degree 0.38⇤⇤] -0.30⇤]]
> Bachelor Degree - -0.56⇤⇤]
 Good IT skills 0.40⇤⇤] -0.43⇤⇤]]]
Di↵erences
(L*   generic )
L1 L3 L4
Whole sample - -0.19] -0.28⇤]
Males 0.69⇤ - -
Females -0.49⇤⇤]] - -0.44⇤⇤⇤]]]
 24 years old - - -0.22]
> 24 years old - - -0.40⇤⇤]]
 Bachelor Degree - - -0.22]
> Bachelor Degree - - -0.49⇤⇤]
 Good IT skills - - -0.32⇤]]
(a) (b)
Table 3.6: Most common reasons for general preferences and each context.
General
pref.
University City
Center
Shopping
Mall
Hospital
Do not use other networks 34 11 7 3 2
Do not know other networks 15 8 7 - -
Easy Access 9 7 5 2 3
Security 5 1 3 3 1
Place where I am - - 9 10 2
The “nonexistent and not expected names in the context” (L4) have systematically
been rated lower. Finally, the “nonexistent and expected” names (L3) show a weaker
e↵ect on the entire sample and higher e↵ects for subgroups of respondents younger
than 24 years, with less than a bachelor degree, or proficient with IT.
Table 3.5.(a) provides an overview of the e↵ects that the shopping mall context
has on user’s preferences. This context seems to be associated with a less pronounced
e↵ect on user response patterns as there is no significant di↵erence for groups L1
and L2. However, there is a series of e↵ects indicating a rating increase in subgroup
L3 and a general decrease in ratings for L4.
Table 3.5(b) provides an overview of the e↵ects that the hospital context has on
user’s preferences. This context is associated with few significant e↵ects. Results
for L1 indicate positive ratings for males while the opposite for female respondents.
There is also a decrease in ratings for the whole respondent sample in L3. And
finally, consistent with results in Table 3.5(a), L4 names are systematically rated
lower, except for male respondents.
Table 3.6 shows the results for the open questions relating to context. Again,
the most common reasons relate to the use and knowledge of the network names,
and that they provide easy access. To note that outside the University context, the
most common reason states clearly that the place where the participants are, can
greatly influence their choices.
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3.3.5 Security Discussion
In our scenario the attacker pondered the best strategy for naming his malicious
SSID to “hook” the most people to choose it when accessing the Internet.
Fig. 3.6 shows that people prefer a network that communicates a context-specific
meaning. For example, the made-up ‘free wifi BelleEtoile’ rated higher in the shop-
ping mall context than in general (Belle Etoile is an existing shopping mall, where
there is no existing SSID reminding of that name). This can appear obvious, but
Fig. 3.7, which shows the results for groups gives more useful insights. In the context
“Shopping Mall” the increment is positive for all the made-up networks that refer
to it (e.g., cf. Table 3.5.(a) first row, first column); but in context “University” this
does not happen. Here, made-up names referring to the context (group L3, which
includes ‘wifi unilu’ for example) rated less on average (cf. Table 3.4 first row, third
column)1.
Our sample, mostly students and employees of the university, know better what
network is available at the university. They do not expect networks to appear
without notice. Thus, the strategy of contextualizing names has less impact at the
university, at least for the possible victims who regularly frequent the university, as
our population. However, it may work for guests or visitors, who may not be so
aware of what access point exists.
In fact, in contexts like the shopping mall, the same strategy of contextualizing
made-up names works nicely: those names out-rate the existing ones. An attacker
targeting public places can thus increase odds by including the context in the name
of a dishonest base station. Conferences, for example, are sites where such an attack
could work very well.
What could be a recommendation to prevent such kinds of attacks? One sugges-
tion, which could be tested for e cacy, would be to advertise the names of legitimate
networks, for example by deploying stickers informing visitors about the legitimate
access points. (An attacker can do the same, but this requires him to work and
expose himself more). Another defence consists in avoiding to leave unused names
which are related to the context. For example, a hotel should re-name SSID with
the hotel’s name. Such simple action is usually disregarded: it is common to see
WiFi with the name of the router (e.g., ‘linksys01’) or with that of the network
provider (e.g., ‘Numericable 6A85’).
3.3.6 Conclusion
Our result shows that, in unfamiliar contexts the choice of even expert people is
biased towards names reminding of the context.
These results suggest severe socio-technical attacks that can be easily launched
by interfering with user’s knowledge of the context. Furthermore, these finding
shows that STEAL’s reference model is relevant for studying the social layers of
security analysis. Indeed, the socio-technical analysis of this system would not be
1We got a similar despite weaker result for the context “Hospital” but with a di↵erent ex-
planation. The contextualized name ‘maroquinerie Kirchberg’ is ambiguous because Kirchberg is
also the name of a large zone of the city where the hospital and many other o ces stand, while
Maroquinerie is out-of-context.
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possible without the addition of the context, as part of the explanation for user’s
insecure behaviours would stay out of reach.
The study carried on in this section has some limitations. We did not have
a larger and more diversified population, as we had permission to broadcast our
survey only within the university. The small sample sise did not allow for more
complex multivariate statistical analyses. Also, not many participants filled the
open questions. We think it would also be useful to analyse in more detail each
wireless network name separately and verify its statistical significance. It may be
that one or two names have more meaning than others and can in themselves be
used to improve or mitigate socio-technical attacks.
We would have liked to set up attacks with real WiFi access points in real places;
however launching such actions and harvesting the data for the analysis requires an
authorisation from an ethical committee and a compliance with our legal framework,
assurances that were not ready for this study.
Following this use case, we can conclude that STEAL’s reference model, and its
inclusion of a context component is crucial in the study of the interactions that occur
between the users, the Wi-Fi networks, and the context. Furthermore, the full social
analysis was completed as an hypothesis was successfully expressed, an experiment
successfully designed and ran, and conclusive results regarding the socio-technical
security of Wi-Fi networks obtained.
3.4 STEAL validation: technical focus
In this section, we position our analysis on the technical layers (see Figure 3.8) to
verify that STEAL allows for the use of computer sciences methods and that their
outputs can be used as inputs for investigating the further the social layers (see
Figure 3.2). We aim in particular at showing how the reference model can be used
to describe the technical aspects of the interactions between a system and its users,
and how a model of these interactions can checked for subtle flaws.
humanz }| { computerz }| { networkz }| {
H
SA express PA interaction UIA events pA protocol pB
Figure 3.8: The multi-layered security and threat model used in this section. There
is no context. The intruder is a man-in-the-middle represetented by the inverted
triangle.
For this investigation, we part from the Wi-Fi selection use case used previously.
Indeed, Wi-Fi selection is too trivial for needing a technical study that visits all
traces within possible interactions. Instead, we propose to study the authentication
of identities with TLS certificates in modern Web Browsers. The diversity of imple-
mentations of TLS certificates’ validation calls for the use of verification methods
to find subtle cases where the browser-user interaction threatens security.
We study how STEAL supports the technical identification of insecure inter-
actions between users and Web Browsers. First we introduce the use case, then
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we study the interactions between the technical and the social layers to identify
problematic interaction traces.
3.4.1 Introduction
Let us assume you are meeting a person that is expected to do some job for you.
You know nothing about him except a few things such as his name and a liation.
How can you trust a stranger introducing himself and claiming to be that person?
This “are you a friend or a foe?” problem boils down to assessing the validity of
an identity. Plenty of solutions have been proposed to solve it; a few require sharing
passwords beforehand (which is feasible only rarely) and the majority requiring a
certain degree of trust. For example, trust is required when the stranger shows a
document vouching his identity, because you need to trust the authority that has
issued the document you are given. This problem of assessing someone’s identity
is exactly that which, on the Internet, a browser faces when it asks a server to
authenticate itself. Here, the proof has the form of a Transport Layer Security
(TLS) certificate, which, to be valid, should be ultimately signed by an authority
that the browser recognises as trustworthy. Indeed, if all certificates were signed by
world-wide known and unquestionably honest authorities the role of trust would be
negligible: no trust is required when there is full knowledge and control of events.
Such a situation is unrealistic for TLS-based authentication (e.g., see [107]), and
therefore, someone, somewhere, has to decide whether to trust an entity to be honest
or not. But users do not usually have the understanding and security knowledge to
take secure decisions. In TLS certificate validation users can be asked to take such
decisions, for instance, when a server presents a self-signed certificate.
A self-signed certificate is issued and signed by the server itself. Thus, to trust a
self-signed certificate one should trust the server already, which is a useless circular
reasoning. What solutions are available that help security with self-signed TLS? The
protocol that is responsible for the validation of certificates does not give answers:
for TLS, self-signed certificates are technically unverifiable and thus “MUST either
notify the user (clients MAY give the user the opportunity to continue with the
connection in any case) or terminate the connections” [148]. This recommendation
has been picked up by browsers that implement it in various ways; but since so many
Internet frauds still happen, a reliable standard solution seems yet to be found.
Fraud can happen when users are involved in security decisions as, these can
be very complex to explain and understand. Preferably users should better not
take such decisions, as suggested in [42], [50], and [30], but for the problem of
validating an identity on the Internet this seems not possible: in particular the
question whether to trust a self-signed certificate is a process that is inherently socio-
technical, for it is made of interactions between users, user interfaces, browsers, and
even servers. Its security should be analysed by considering all those components
and their interaction.
TLS technical security has been intensively studied (e.g., see [108, 77]), as well
its usability (e.g., [151, 58, 165])) but until STEAL, there was no framework for a
combined socio-technical security analysis.
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We now apply STEAL, on a relevant problem with TLS certificate validation and
self-signed certificates: the analysis of the interaction ceremonies between users and
the most famous browsers in the market. The next Section describes the security
analysis applied from the “Computer” to the “Network” layer.
3.4.2 Study
From Section 3.4.1 we recall that a necessary condition for a server’s identity to be
authenticated is that the browser verifies the server’s TLS certificate. If it cannot,
because, for example, the certificate is self signed, the success of authentication may
depend on the user: a browser can ask him to decide whether to proceed or abort
the session. Thus, TLS certificate validation is a socio-technical procedure made of
communicating processes (the browser engine and the server), user interfaces (the
browser’s window and the options o↵ered thereon), and a persona (the user).
In this study we analysed four of the most popular browsers – Chrome, Firefox,
Internet Explorer, and Opera Mini – and how they interact with users when they
encounter a self-signed certificate. Since the four browsers run di↵erent engines (i.e.,
pA) and ceremonies with users (i.e., interactions between PA and UI A), the analysis
of the structure of the dialogue browser-user is rich in possibilities.
This analysis (cf. Figure 3.8) is about the layers that span from pB (server) to
PA (user). In fact, we modelled a server, a browser, an abstraction of the interface,
and a simple model of a user who chooses non-deterministically among the options
that are o↵ered to him. Context is not necessary here, for the simple model of users
is context-independent.
We tried di↵erent formalisms to model the entities in agreement with our multi-
layered security model. We first used flow charts but, although intuitive, this for-
malism was not the best to model multi-layered interactions, aside from the fact
that they lack formal semantics, a limitation that precludes any formal analysis.
We thus chose UML activity diagrams, a fortunate choice for three reasons. They
fit well with the layered representation, they give immediately an easy reading of
TLS sessions (i.e., a quick glance at the diagrams of the browsers under study shows
clearly their di↵erent validation mechanisms), and they can be easily translated
into a formal language. We built the diagrams of Chrome and Firefox by looking
at their o cial documentation and code. Internet Explorer and Opera Mini are
closed-source, so we studied them empirically.
The pictures show a combination of mechanisms: Chrome complies with HTTP
Strict Transport Security (HSTS) policy –a policy whereby a web server announces
using only HTTPS–, Internet Explorer uses warnings extensively, Firefox is the most
complete having a complex engine and elaborate user interactions, and Opera Mini
clearly aims at being lightweight (as is designed for mobile platforms).
While modelling them in UML, we did not describe their full functionalities
but limited them to how each browser treats certificate validation. Chrome dia-
gram is shown in Figure 3.9). Our diagrams have four columns each representing
communicating elements. Three are entities: User, Browser, and Server. Browser
distinguishes two standard sub-entities: User Interface and Engine. Entities have
a begin circle that points to their first activity. Thick arrows depict the flow of
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Figure 3.9: Activity diagram for TLS certificate validation in Chrome
activities among di↵erent entities, while thin arrows stand for the internal entity
flow. Arrow labels define the objects that are exchanged between activities. Some
activities need to access data-stores, which are linked to activities via dashed arrows.
Most activities are self-explanatory and common to all browser diagrams, such as
Display Webpage and Type/Click URL. To keep the focus on the browser, the server
activities are reduced to Init.TLS, whereby the server starts the TLS handshake on
its side, and Finish TLS, where it concludes the handshake. There is no room to
describe in further detail the diagram, but it can be easily understood with a basic
UML background.
To carry on the analysis we coded the UML diagram in a variant of CSP (Com-
municating Sequential Processes) [90] called CSP#; however, a prototyped tool that
translates UML activity diagrams in CSP will be available soon [2], a tool we would
like to test in the future. We also modelled an intruder, a Dolev-Yao controlling the
network, and the user. Capturing the complexities of user behaviour by a formal
model is a challenging open issue. As explained in the introduction, we modelled
the user as a non-deterministic process: this is the weakest assumption about the
user skills: a ceremony that is secure for a non-deterministic user, is also secure for
any user.
The last step of our prototype methodology consisted in defining relevant security
properties. We identified four socio-technical properties that bind TLS session,
validation mechanisms, and user choices. We expressed them in linear temporal
logic. One property is meant to evaluate the user involvement: it assesses whether
the browser always warns the user when certificate validation fails. Two properties
aim to evaluate whether the mechanisms that browsers adopt to manage failed
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certificate validations protect users from man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks (e.g., if
browsers can prevent users accessing a page controlled by the intruder). The last
property is about informing the user that a MIM attack might have occurred in
previous TLS sessions.
We verified the properties with the PAT (Process Analysis Toolkit) model
checker [164]. The most interesting results regard Firefox. PAT reports a trace
showing that Firefox does not warn the user when a certificate validation fails. This
is due to the drawbacks of storing server certificates permanently, which Firefox
allows its users to do. Moreover, it is worth noting that no browser keeps records
of past warnings, exposing users to vulnerabilities when they bootstrap with MIM.
This finding suggests a novel, more secure, strategy for browsers. Browsers should
maintain a cache of invalid certificate hashes. In doing so, it would be possible for
browsers to warn users when a di↵erent invalid certificate is presented by a server
with which the browser has communicated in the past. Looking into this strategy
is a matter of future work.
3.4.3 Related Work
In this section we present some related work that has also focused on the security
analysis and usability of browser security warnings and, in particular, of TLS certifi-
cates. There is much work available on the analysis of the TLS protocol but we only
refer to two recent works which summarise most security problems. SSL/TLS cer-
tificate validation has many implementation vulnerabilities specially in e-commerce
websites [77]. This section analyses SSL/TLS certificate validation in non-browser
applications. In addition, little attention is paid to the problem of correctly authen-
ticating the service provider by the users. Josang’s et al. work [108] tries to develop a
framework to provide for user authentication assurance. However, these researchers
do not focus on the fact that a user authenticating the service provider will provide
more ways to perform socio-technical attacks. Attackers will probably focus even
more on social engineering to implement successful attacks. These authors’ main
conclusion is that it is essential to integrate user and server authentication in the
same framework. So to devise a platform where both socio and technical aspects of
TLS security can be developed and implemented together. We also share this view.
3.4.4 Conclusion
The tools selected to perform TLS certificate validation (i.e., UML, PAT, CSP) were
adequate and helpful in expressing and evaluating in detail the security analysis
and properties of the di↵erent browsers in study. STEAL’s reference model helped
us to identify, not only the events and protocols between computer and network
components, but also the interactions between the human user (PA) and the user
interface (UI A). With the obtained expressiveness it is easier and quicker to identify
inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in the security properties which can be further
corrected.
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3.5 Discussion
After having introduced STEAL in Section 3.2 and illustrated its use for social
analysis through the selection of Wi-Fi names in Section 3.3, and its use for technical
analysis by the validation of TLS certificates in Section 3.4, we now discuss whether
or not STEAL meets our expectations.
3.5.1 Reference Model
The first issue to be discussed concerns STEAL’s reference model. We based
STEAL’s reference model on a Bella et al.’s concertina model [16] and added the
concepts of attacks, defences and context.
Attacks and defences are needed in order to describe how the attacker strikes and
how the analyst may attempt to thwart his attack. With theWi-Fi selection use case,
we used STEAL to investigate the role of the context and proved, by demonstrating
that the context explains part of the user behaviour in the Wi-Fi selection, that
the context is needed to describe STAs that make use of it. Investigating the social
aspects of this interaction would have not been possible without the addition of the
context to the framework’s reference model. Consequently, the additions we made
to the concertina model appear justified and allow to study attacks that rely on the
complex interplay of the users their environment.
Furthermore, in Section 3.4, we used STEAL to describe the interactions that
take place between Web-Browsers and their users while validating identities with
TLS certificate, and we identified some subtle inconsistencies within these interac-
tions that can undermine security.
3.5.2 Support to social and computer sciences methods for
security analysis
As shown in the previous sections, one can analyse both technical and social layers
of system’s security through the lens of STEAL.
The study performed in Section 3.4 shows that technical security analysis can be
applied generically once all components of a socio-technical system, together with
its interactions, are modelled as suggested.
The study we report on in Section 3.3, successfully investigate an hypothesis
related human decision of selecting a Wi-Fi network through the use of an on-line
survey, which is commonly used in social sciences.
But, the main issue to consider is if STEAL can help to generalise this analysis for
a large set of scenarios. We believe that the methodology used for the social analysis
(hypothetico-deductive experimental model) is generic enough to be applied in the
design and implementation of user related experiments for socio-technical systems.
In order to perform the security analysis, all the steps of that process need to
be clearly and objectively defined. It may be the case that we can only test one
interaction, and therefore, one hypothesis at a time. Still, its analysis uses methods
that either confirm or dismiss that hypothesis. Once we know this answer we can
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step to the next question or generate some conclusion. This is still generic and prone
to be adapted to di↵erent socio-technical scenarios.
Both use cases were chosen for their propensity to stress particular aspects of
the framework but were not studied on the whole spectrum of analysis. Indeed,
we did not use formal methods in the Wi-Fi use case for finding security-harming
interactions being trivial, and we did not complement the TLS validation use case for
the demonstration of a social analysis had already been done in the Wi-Fi use case.
Therefore, the operational guideline that allows to use technical and social analyses
in a pipeline as pictured in Figure 3.2 has not been tested. The next chapter fills
this gap by describing in detail the identification of critical action point (where the
user’s action can harm a security property) in a system through a technical analysis
of the system, and the investigation of research questions related to these points
throught on-line experiment. Albeit the next chapter demonstrating the use of the
operational guideline in the next chapter, we complement the TLS use case with a
social analysis in Annex A for the sake of completeness.
3.6 Conclusion
We presented a framework for analysing socio-technical security of systems, and
applied it to study the role of the context in the selection of Wi-Fi networks, and
the TLS certificate validation and self-signed certificates. The multi-layered security
and threat analysis model presented in this chapter can express and integrate socio-
technical interactions for all components within the system in analysis together with
the context where that system is set. As is common knowledge, security can include
several layers, and if we miss one of them, we can be opening vulnerability doors
where those layers can be compromised. If we are able to see the whole picture and
include the whole system (both human and technical) in the security analysis, it
will help us find and tackle more vulnerabilities between all the involved elements.
Regarding the study of Wi-Fi names and context, the same multi-layered model
helped us to identify where attacks and defences could be applied for both generic
socio-technical attacks as well as socio-technical attacks for the described scenario.
By focusing the security analysis within the interactions between (PA) and (UI A)
and the context where they are set, a common attack was easy to define. In addition,
some defence that can be used to tackle those attacks was also introduced. Of
course this is still theoretical, but using the HCI research process where we base
our socio-technical studies, this defence can be evaluated in practice with real user
experiments. Again UML was useful to express this socio-technical security analysis.
An important contribution of STEAL is that it introduces the concept of con-
text, which is many times ignored in security analysis as is usually hard to define.
However, within socio-technical security analysis, the context is a very important
component which cannot be ignored because it can influence the user’s set of mind
when he is taking security decisions [157]. The context is external to the system
components’ interactions but can interfere with all of them, and so is even more rel-
evant to be included in system security analysis. For socio-technical vulnerabilities,
attackers use many times the context where the system is set to influence or press
the user into falling for their attack. In the same way, our research can be used
52
3.6. Conclusion
to find out if defences can similarly use the context to influence and help the user
identifying and avoiding such attacks.
Regarding the study of the validation of TLS certificates, STEAL was useful
to clearly model the flow of interaction between the di↵erent social and technical
layers, and ultimately to find subtle inconsistencies that can render some security
properties vulnerable. Thus, STEAL can help identifying where the system fails to
interact properly with its users, dooming them to endanger security.
We believe that STEAL is a good first step in the integration of socio-technical
security analysis by a multidisciplinary team. Nevertheless, there is the need to
apply STEAL to model and analyse more socio-technical scenarios. Only this way
will it be possible to improve STEAL and enrich its flexibility and generalisation.
In the next chapter we use STEAL on the whole spectrum of a use case, identi-
fying in the use of Wi-Fi hotspots where security properties can be harmed by the
users, and then testing hypothesis about the factors that could lead them to do so.
We show how to identify points of interest in a system, and then how to draw and
investigate research questions about why a user would harm the system’s security
at these points.
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No man is an island entire of itself.
—John Donne
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In this chapter, we perform a socio-technical security analysis of Wi-Fi
hotspots’ most salient security ceremonies. We start by identifying crit-
ical actions points, compiling potential attacks and research questions
about the reasons of their success. Then, we investigate two of these re-
search questions related to the selection of Wi-Fi networks: the first about
the role of trust, and the second about the role of graphical cues. Part of
the content of this chapter appears in three papers: “Socio-technical Secu-
rity Analysis of Wireless Hotspots” by Ana Ferreira, Jean-Louis Huynen,
Vincent Koenig and Gabriele Lenzini published in the Proceedings of the
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second International Conference on Human Aspects of Security 2014,
(HAS 2014, Heraklion, Crete, Greece) [66]; “Socio-Technical Study on
the E↵ect of Trust and Context When Choosing WiFi Names” by Ana
Ferreira, the author, Vincent Koenig, Gabriele Lenzini and Salvador Ri-
vas published in the Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on
Security and Trust Management (STM 2013, Egham, UK) [68]; and
“Do Graphical Cues E↵ectively Inform Users? - A Socio-Technical Se-
curity Study in Accessing Wifi Networks” published in the Proceedings of
the third International Conference on Human Aspects of Security 2015,
(HAS 2015, Los Angeles, CA, USA) [Best paper award] [69].
4.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, we perform a socio-technical security analysis of Wi-Fi Hotspots
with a user-centric approach. First, we use STEAL to informally analyse Wi-Fi
Hotspots’ most salient security ceremonies and pinpoint the critical action points,
or the crucial points where the user can harm a security property. Then we discuss
the potential factors that could push the user to behave insecurely at these points,
and what experiments could be conducted to investigate their influence. Eventually,
we perform two online studies to investigate the role of two potential influencing
factors in the selection of Wi-Fi networks: trust, and the graphical cues displayed
with the network names to illustrate the networks characteristics.
The study of Wi-Fi Hotspots is interesting because they o↵er very diverse con-
texts of use, and modalities of access. Indeed, the increasing demand for WiFi
Internet access is pushing several public spaces, such as hotels and airports, to o↵er
Hotspots. These are open, unencrypted WiFi networks that may redirect mobile
users to web sites where they have to pay a fee or accept some policy before being
allowed to navigate the Internet. Hotspots are spreading fast for they are believed
to be a solution to the overwhelming demand of high-bandwidth services which is
presently saturating mobile networks. Unfortunately, current Hotspots o↵er little or
no security [33][160], therefore Mobile Network Operators are hailing the newcomer
Hotspot 2.0 [8]; this is expected to rely on a better technology [97], able to over-
come present vulnerabilities by encrypting every interaction and isolating all client
sessions.
Hotspot 2.0 main functionalities are twofold: (1) the seamless roaming enables
Mobile Network Operators to steer some tra c o↵ the 3G and 4G networks to WiFi
networks without user intervention and (2) access points will be able to display
information about their current load and available services before the user gains
access to the network. The latter being surely useful for venues like a stadium facing
very high demand in bandwidth due to some specific uses, like instant replays; the
network could block unicast streaming tra c on the network and advertise the use
of a multicast streaming service directly from the user’s connection manager [24].
Hotspot 2.0 is thus advertised as a progress, with better security and better user
experience.
However, despite its superior technical security, the e↵ective security of this new
technology will depend on how people will make use of it. This aspect is crucial as
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it has been proved that security mechanisms are rarely used by users as technically
intended [114]. For instance, users may not trust Hotspot 2.0’s new technology. Or
users can accept it but the new acquired sense of security is no more justified if
they switch back to conventional Hotspot, a situation that is possible since the old
technology will continue to exist for some time, confusing users on what security
risks can be present.
As introduced in Chapter 3, analysing security issues with people in the loop
demands for a socio-technical approach. This implies to look at the technical
and the human protocols and to consider them together as complex layered cer-
emonies [16][68][63]. There is no such study for Hotspot and Hotspot 2.0, neither
comparatively nor separately.
Outline. This chapter covers this gap by describing Hotspot and Hotspot 2.0’s
most salient ceremonies and by studying their security with a user-centric approach.
Its main goal is twofold: (1) raise future research questions and priorities about
factors and mechanisms (e.g., user awareness, context, perception of security, trust)
that may influence a more or less secure user behaviour in Hotspot’s WiFi cere-
monies, and (2) investigate two of the research questions identified in (1).
4.2 Raising Research Questions on critical actions
To devise research questions about the factors that can influence the user behaviour
in Wi-Fi hotspots’ ceremonies, we worked on four use cases that cover most of their
diversity. In the following sections, we first model the use cases without any attacker
(Section 4.2.2) and then perform a security analysis (Section 4.2.3). At the end of
this section (Section 4.2.4), we outline the setup of experiments allowing to answer
the research questions that have emerged throughout this study.
4.2.1 Methods
We use STEAL (see Chapter 3.2) to analyse the socio-technical security of each use
case. We perform an informal technical security analysis by modeling the interac-
tions between the di↵erent players of the ceremony with UML sequence diagrams
and by systematically devising the possible attacks when these interactions are ex-
posed to threats according to a pre-defined threat model.
Modeling. We model ceremonies with UML sequence diagrams, a formalism that
was successfully applied in socio-technical security analysis of TLS certificates (see
Section 3.4, and [19]; it visually expresses all the sequential interactions (both
Human-Computer and Computer-Computer) run by the players in the ceremony.
This modelling is crucial for it defines the sets of interactions that can be analysed
individually, in group, or at di↵erent levels of inter-dependency.
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In order to get an objective analysis of the di↵erent use cases, we divide the
Hotspot ceremonies in common phases in which we identify one or more actions.
Each action is the result of a decision, taken with or without user involvement.
Prior is the action that happens before the user enters the ceremony; this is
an optional pre-requisite (e.g., getting a SIM card by mail for instance); Entry is
the entry point of the user, where he performs his initial action (e.g., open a url);
Selection is the phase where the wireless network to be used is chosen from the
list of available networks; Access is the action needed to successfully connect to the
Hotspot (e.g., pay a fee); Use is where the user will actually use the network (e.g.,
performs again the action he tried in the Entry phase).
Informal Technical Security Analysis. Our analysis takes the user’s point of
view in the possible presence of an attacker who interferes with the user at critical
decision points. These critical decision points are decision points from which the
user can lose data confidentiality and integrity if the attack succeeds. For example,
sending sensitive data should only take place when the WiFi is honest or the com-
munication is encrypted. But, at this given critical decision point (choosing to send
or not sensitive data on a communication channel), the attacker may push the user
towards the insecure behaviour, the critical action of sending the data. We first
define the feasibility of the attacks through the following threat model and assump-
tions ; then we identify the ceremonies’ critical actions by assessing the user’s risk
in the security-analysis (Section 4.2.3).
Threat model: we consider two threats:
1. a Local Attacker (LA) that can read & write in the ether; it means in partic-
ular that it can bring up dishonest Access Points and listen to unencrypted
messages;
2. a Distant Attacker (DA) that can read & write messages on the Internet; an
attacker that provides a phishing link to the user falls in this category. LA
and DA can also cooperate.
Assumptions: we have 2 assumptions:
1. we assume that all interactions are taking place during the Prior phase are
honest,
2. we assume perfect encryption, meaning that the only way to decrypt encrypted
information is by knowledge of the key. Under this assumption, HTTPS pro-
vides an unbreakable encryption and the honest server exposes a valid, verifi-
able certificate.
Risk assessment: the risk is described on a four-level scale:
null no attack is possible;
low the confidentiality or the integrity of user’s action is threatened (e.g., when
the attacker can listen to user’s actions);
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medium confidentiality of user’s data threatened (e.g., when the attacker can listen to
user’s data);
high confidentiality and integrity of user’s data threatened (e.g., when the attacker
can tamper with the user’s data).
Critical actions: are the actions for which the risk is at least medium, and
also all other actions that are necessary for them to occur.
Results: we summarise the result of the analysis in tables. For each row –
corresponding to a phase of the ceremony– we consider the following information in
the columns:
1st column the information conveyed to the user,
2nd column the actions that the user can perform,
3rd column the attacks associated with this action,
4th column the security property impacted by these attacks,
5th column a graphical representation of of the resulting risk level.
The findings are further discussed in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.2 Use cases
We choose four use cases that we think cover a large variety of situations. We
concentrate on main di↵erences like the automation (or lack of), the selection and
access phases, the di↵erent types of actors (e.g., persons, service providers), the need
to pay during the access phase, the changes made to the encryption over time, and
the information load and quality. We only consider a few types of authentication
for the sake of space.
The first two use cases relate to the Hotspot technology in use (abbreviated as
HS1.1 and HS1.2) while the two last ones relate to the Hostpot technology users
will encounter in the near future (abbreviated as HS2.1 and HS2.2).
HS1.1: Pay-per-use Hotspot. Fig. 4.1a shows the UML diagram for the pay-
per-use ceremony of a typical captive portal Hotspot1. The players are a user, a
browser, a connection manager, a wireless network provider and a payment platform.
The entry point is a user who wants to browse the Internet; lacking of Internet
connectivity, he proceeds to the selection phase where he scans for available networks
and connects to the pay-per-use unencrypted wireless network. In the access phase,
the user is redirected to the payment platform to pay the fee. The browser runs an
HTTPS session, which often carries the usual HTTPS browser cues ( ), to execute
the payment. After this step, the user is then free to use the (unencrypted) wireless
network to browse the Internet. After having paid the fee, the security of the
1Captive portal : the user only has access to the Local Area Network until he pays a fee to be
freed.
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Figure 4.-1: (a) UML diagram depicting user’s interaction when joining a pay-per-
use Hotspot. Components are at the top of each line, arrows represent exchanged
messages: a plain line is used when a component initiates a message and a dotted line
when a component replies to a message. The blue tunnels represent the messages
communicated within an encrypted tunnel with HTTPS. (b) UML diagram depicting
user’s interaction when Roaming on a Hotspot 2.0 Hotspot. Components are at the
top of each line, arrows represent exchanged messages: a plain line is used when
a component initiates a message and a dotted line when a component replies to a
message. The blue tunnels represent the messages encrypted using WPA2 protocol
or communicated within an encrypted tunnel with HTTPS.
underlying protocol decreases (e.g., HTTPS is no longer provided) and most common
browsers do not e↵ectively communicate this change to the user.
HS1.2: Internet Service Provider’s Homespot. This use case is what is com-
monly called a Homespot. This is a residential router provided by an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) that reserves most of its bandwidth for the customer who owns the
device, but o↵ers part of its capacity to the passer-by customers. The players are the
(passing-by customer) user, his device’s connection manager, the wireless network
and the ISP. In the prior phase, the pre-requisites are that the user receives infor-
mation (among these, the SSID) and his credentials. Using the same entry phase as
HS1.1, the user then proceeds to the selection phase where he uses his connection
manager to list the available Networks, and clicks on the one o↵ered by the ISP. In
the access phase, the browser is redirected to the ISP’s online website, over HTTPS,
where the user enters his credentials. As these are valid, the user gets a feedback
from the webpage that he is now free to use the (unencrypted) wireless network
HS2.1: Mobile Network Operator’s partner Hotspot. Fig. 4.1b shows the
UML diagram for the ceremony of a user connecting to a Hotspot 2.0 through his/her
mobile phone. This requires no user interactions except the entry phase as the device
will follow a pre-defined policy called ANDSF [1] to decide what network to join, and
will use its SIM card to authenticate to the Hotspot. The ANDSF policy comprises
user’s preferences (e.g., always prefer user’s home network), the Mobile Network
Operator (MNO) preferences (e.g., roaming partners), the application requirements
(e.g., steering tra c from VOIP to WiFi) and the Hotspot’s conditions (e.g., the
device should not switch to an overloaded Access Point). The pre-requisites (prior
phase) are: the user gets the device pre-configured by his MNO, and sets some
ANDSF preferences. The players are the user, the browser, an application, the
connection manager, the wireless network and the MNO. In the entry phase the
user opens a url in the browser which points to the content that requires the use
of the application. The connection manager computes the policy bound to this
application and concludes that it needs to connect to a WiFi wireless network. As
a result, the connection manager automatically proceeds to the selection and access
phases where it authenticates the user to the MNO. Once the connection is ready,
the user is notified and, (use phase), the tra c corresponding to the content he
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requested is steered to the wireless network (encrypted with WPA2 Enterprise).
Eventually this content is displayed to the user in the corresponding application.
HS2.2: The future of Hotspots. This use case focuses on the cohabitation of
conventional Hotspots with Hotspot 2.0 with services support2, when the automatic
selection is disabled or impossible. The players are the user, the browser, the con-
nection manager and the wireless network. The user’s entry action is browsing the
Internet; as there is no internet connectivity, he asks the connection manager to
scan for available networks in the selection phase. The connection manager brings
back results of: (1) conventional Hotspots with their SSID and signal strength;
(2) Hotspot 2.0 networks with their SSID, signal strength, venue name, roaming
partners, current load, WAN bandwidth, allowed ports; and eventually (3) services
described by an icon and a url. The user then connects to one of the di↵erent can-
didates from the information at hand. Selecting (1) redirects the user to a use case
like HS1.1; selecting (2) or (3) sends the user to the access phase where the network
automatically provisions him an account. As a consequence, all following interac-
tions are encrypted with WPA2 Enterprise and the connection manager notifies the
user that he joined the network. The use phase is di↵erent for (2) and (3): in (2) the
user browses the Internet, in (3) the user’s browser is redirected to the url specified
by the service.
4.2.3 Informal Technical Security Analysis
Our technical security analysis is user-centric, as such, its purpose is to pinpoint the
critical actions prone to socio-technical attacks. Ultimately this leads to identifying
upcoming research questions and possible laboratory experiments with users to be
investigated in a subsequent social security analysis.
HS1.1: Pay-per-use Hotspot. Table 4.1 describes the security analysis of the
HS1.1 use case. In the first phase of interaction the user scans for open networks.
As this interaction is not encrypted, it can be eavesdropped by a Local Attacker
(LA) so, according to our risk assessment procedure described in Section 4.2.1, the
risk is set as low. In the selection phase, the user picks a dishonest network from
the list. By this action, the attacker only knows that his network has been picked;
the risk is low. The access phase is protected by HTTPS, which by assumption sets
the risk to null. In the last phase, use, the user decides now to use the network, here
the user can give away a lot of possibly valuable information to an eavesdropper and
the attacker can even tamper with subsequent actions if the user formerly selected
the attacker’s network, so the risk is high. The selection and use phases comprise
critical action points and will be further discussed in Section 4.2.4.
HS1.2: Internet Service Provider’s Homespot. In the Homespot use case,
the situation is closely related to HS1.1 as the user selects the attacker’s network in
the selection phase (again we set the risk as low). The attacker impersonates the
ISP’s wireless network but he can not (from assumption) tamper with the access
2We assume the use of the existing CISCO’s implementation of Hotspot 2.0 services, called
MSAP; see chapter 12 of [35] for additional information.
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Table 4.1: Socio-technical security analysis of the classic pay as you go captive portal
Phase Information Actions
Associated
Attacks
Security
properties
impacted
Risk
Entry
No
connectivity.
scan()
Eavesdropping
scanning
action.
Confidentiality.
Selection
List of
available
networks.
connect(dishonest)
Eavesdropping
picking
action.
Authentication
of the AP.
Access
Webpage ask-
ing for a fee.
HTTPS cues.
enter(credit
card details)
- -
Use
Network
ready.
open(url)
Eavesdropping
information.
Tampering.
Confidentiality.
Integrity.
phase, as the connection to the ISP relies on the HTTPS protocol (the risk is null).
The attacker lets the user authenticate to the ISP, like he would do on a legitimate
Homespot. In the use phase, the user takes the decision to browse the Internet on
this connection, similar to the previous use case. The risk is high as the user might
lose confidentiality and integrity of his data. Selection and use comprise critical
actions and will be discussed in Section 4.2.4.
HS2.1: Mobile Network Operator’s partner Hotspot. Table 4.2 describes
the security analysis of this use case. In the prior phase, setting a ANDSF policy
does not pose any risk. In the entry phase, opening a url is considered as low
risk because a DA can write a url in the Internet that, when clicked by the user,
triggers the network discovery. The selection phase’s actions are performed by the
connection manager following the ANDSF policy (which has been altered by the
user). The user can set a preference in the prior phase to rate unauthenticated, free
Hotspot higher than the authenticated MNO’s partners; this can be exploited by a
LA which would provide a Hotspot 2.0 with corresponding characteristics. The risk
would be high as the LA could eavesdrop and tamper with the user’s data. LA and
DA can also cooperate: LA can set an appealing hotspot while DA triggers network
discovery. Both critical actions–setting a loose ANDSF policy and using a dishonest
network–will be discussed in Section 4.2.4.
HS2.2: The future of Hotspots. This use case focuses on the selection phase
when the automatic selection of a Hotspot is disabled. The user has to deal with
di↵erent information emanating from di↵erent networks. The risk of connecting to
a dishonest network that exposes appealing properties is high as it would lead the
user to compromise his data confidentiality and integrity in the last phase of the
ceremony. The risk of selecting a dishonest service is even worse as the user would
be automatically redirected to the url set by the LA. The factors that can influence
this critical decision will be discussed in Section 4.2.4.
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Table 4.2: Socio-technical security analysis of an automatic roaming to a Hotspot
2.0 through an ANDSF policy
Phase Information Actions
Associated
Attacks
Security
properties
impacted
Risk
Prior
SIM card.
MNO infor-
mation.
User sets its
ANSDF
preferences.
- -
Entry url.
open(dishonnest
url)
Trigger
Network
Discovery.
Authentication
of source
action.
Selection - -
Appealing
Hotspot 2.0.
Authentication
of AP.
Access - - - -
Use
Network
Ready.
open(url)
Eavesdropping.
Tampering.
Confidentiality.
Data In-
tegrity.
4.2.4 Discussion
For each critical action pointed out in the previous section, we elaborate on the
following items: (a) research questions emerging from the critical actions about
what factors (e.g., user’s perception of security and trust, or user’s awareness) a↵ect
the user’s critical decisions; (b) experiments that need to be conducted to answer
these questions.
HS1.1: Pay-per-use Hotspot
Selection phase: the user connects to a dishonest Hotspot As the only informa-
tion conveyed to the user at this point is a list of available WiFi networks along
with the usual visual cues displayed by network managers, the research question
is: (a) what is the influence of the context, the signal strength and the likeliness
of the name on the user’s preferences? (b) In-vivo experiments based on deception
(under strict compliance with ethical requirements like those of American Psycholo-
gists’ Association - APA) followed by a survey are relevant to assess the importance
of these di↵erent factors. Surveys and laboratory experiments where participants
would have to choose from a network list to fulfil a high-stake task are relevant to re-
fine our findings. Also, contrasting self-reported behaviour (surveys) with observed
behaviour (e.g. lab experiments) would be useful to investigate users’ awareness.
Use phase: the user uses a dishonest Hotspot As the user just pays a fee through
an HTTPS connection before this critical action, we focus on the perceived changes
of the security properties. (a) Are users aware that security properties change over
the course of this ceremony and that after a successful payment, subsequent cere-
monies are done in an open/unencrypted connection? If users are aware, what is
their degree of awareness and how does that a↵ect their subsequent actions? If users
are not aware, do they feel the same sense of security during the whole ceremony
or does it change at di↵erent stages? Do they perceive the signal and cues that can
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trigger user awareness for the change? Is there any more adequate contextual infor-
mation that could improve users’ perception of this change? (b) The main challenge
here is to investigate how HCI factors impact the awareness and responses to secu-
rity properties. Laboratory experiments can be set up, e.g., using di↵erent security
properties as di↵erent conditions ideally in a between subjects design. Comparing
user behaviour across the conditions would provide strong indicators that could be
further understood through interview techniques.
HS1.2: Internet Service Provider’s Homespot
Use phase: the user uses a dishonest Homespot We focus here on the impact of
an unauthenticated and authenticated interaction with the ISP. (a) Does imperson-
ating an ISP tend to foster a trust relationship with the network? Does interacting
with the ISP through a secured-connection foster a trust relationship with the net-
work? Is this true for any player representing authority? (b) Those questions can be
investigated with laboratory experiments or online surveys: users would be placed
in scenarios where they have to perform critical activities (e.g., e-banking) through
di↵erent networks–some impersonating ISPs, some authenticated as ISPs. Compar-
ing user behaviour across these di↵erent conditions provides indicators that could
be further understood through interviewing techniques. One important aspect in
these experiments consists in reliably simulating the “risk” without compromising
ethical requirements.
HS2.1: Mobile Network Operator’s partner Hotspot
Prior phase: the user sets a loose ANDSF policy This decision can be linked
to economic considerations, as the MNOs will sign many roaming agreements with
di↵erent partners, they may keep track of the amount of data consumed by their
customers when roaming on WiFi network. If this roaming is not free, users will
be tempted to prioritise roaming on free Hotspots whenever they can. (a) How
much money are users ready to pay to use the safe roaming partners of their
ISP? Are they aware that free Hotspot may be free for dishonest reasons? (b) A
laboratory experiment where people would have to do a trade-o↵ between security
and money would be relevant to further investigate this question. This could be
achieved through a setup where di↵erent test conditions require di↵erent fees to
pay. An alternative approach could consist in having experiment participants match
di↵erent usage scenarios with di↵erent MNO fees and free hotspots. Indeed, various
approaches could be set up here or even combined.
Use phase: the user uses a dishonest Hotspot 2.0 The network is chosen auto-
matically by the device (a) Are users aware of which policy rule lead them to use
this network? Are users aware of the cost of such a use? Are users aware of the
modality of this connection (e.g., 3G/4G/WiFi)? Do users trust a connection after
having been notified of its occurrence without having asked for it ? Do users trust
their connection on their MNO’s network through a third-party as much as a direct
connection? What is the e↵ect of the presence of a seam on the user’s trust? (b)
These usages are new and the technology supporting them is not widely available
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yet, therefore the experiments can not be easily built on existing “usage” standards.
Interviews can be performed either in vivo or in a laboratory setup, with people who
just experienced some of these situations, to understand what they are aware of in
terms of security.
HS2.2: The future of Hotspots
Selection phase: the user connects to a dishonest Hotspot (a) Does adding more
information about the networks help users to select honest WiFi networks? What is
the phishing potential of those new information and services? Are users capable of
searching for a network to fulfil a task and end up choosing a service instead? (b)
Laboratory experiments where participants would have to choose a wireless network
to fulfil a high-stake task are relevant to answer these questions. Networks would
expose a range of technical qualities; services would be more or less appealing and
related to the task.
4.2.5 Conclusion
This section presents a detailed informal technical security analysis of hotspots.
From this analysis, it is possible to identify the various phases of a scenario where
the user may a↵ect security. It allows for a better understanding of how each phase
may a↵ect the security of subsequent phases or actions.
There are also limitations to our work. The analysis was constrained by the
specifications of the documentation that was available at the moment that is was
performed. Event though Hotspot 2.0 is considered superior with regard to security,
our contribution shows such a system can be attacked and further research is needed.
This on the other hand is made di cult by the relative lack of documentation
on Hotspot 2.0 at this stage. Moreover, our proposed research questions do not
represent a comprehensive list and are rather a selection of questions we consider
important to tackle next. There may be other relevant questions to address once we
start answering the proposed ones.
4.3 Investigating Research Questions
In the previous Section (see Section 4.2), we studied the human-computer inter-
actions in hypothetical situations where users select one out of several hotspots
o↵ering access to Wi-Fi networks. Motivated to discover where security can fail, we
highlighted the points in the user-interaction protocol where users opt for an open
(insecure) network even for tasks that require security, and despite the presence of
visual indicators (called cues) reminding the insecurity of the choice.
However, to improve the security of those interactions one should rather under-
stand why users decide insecurely. Indeed, having a better understanding of the
way people take decisions at these critical action points may help us to pinpoint the
factors that needs to be tackled to lessen the likeliness of users behaving insecurely.
Furthermore, understanding the relative importance of the di↵erent factors (e.g.,
user understanding of the visual cues) that can influence the choice of an Access
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Point is interesting because it opens paths for improvements. Identifying factors
that are irrelevant to security can help designing remediations to their influence.
Furthermore, observing discrepancies between user understanding of the cues and
user actions can help designing better cues. Finally, adjusting for irrelevant factors
that are considered by users in their choice helps quantifying the real value they give
to the encryption between their device and an Access Point. In short, such studies
help determining where organization should focus their e↵orts by providing evidence
about whether the priority should be given to the user education, to the enforcement
of security policies, to the providing of tunneling tools, or to the improvement of
network manager’s user interface et cetera.
Thus, this section’s goal is to investigate this “why” question by proving whether
or not the factors we hypothesise previously as influencing the user selection and
use of Wi-Fi networks. From the di↵erent hypotheses we raised in Section 4.2, we
choose to investigate two of them:
The first hypothesis is that an attacker can exploit the concept of trust in the
Wi-Fi selection phase by claiming legitimacy or by priming users with the word
‘trust’.
The second hypothesis is that the graphical cues that network managers present
to the user along with the Wi-Fi networks’ names influence the outcome of the users’
selection. In particular, we test whether users consider the message carried by the
security cues, and if so, we ponder the importance of the user’s understanding of the
meaning of these cues compared to other factors (e.g., the task users are performing).
4.3.1 The influence of trust in the selection of Wi-Fi net-
works.
In this section, we report on the investigations regarding the influence of words
related to trust in Wi-Fi selection. This work presents and discusses the results re-
garding trust yielded from the experimental setup (survey) described in Section 3.3.
4.3.1.1 Introduction
As already pointed out in the previous section, trust is a catalyst factor in many
indirect/remote interactions as the ones daily happening over the Internet (e.g.,
[75, 31]). Trust, when is is well-founded is essential to e↵ective interactions, but when
it is ill-founded, i.e. ascribed to an untrustworthy entity, can be very dangerous.
Trust is a concept that have several connotations and that can be easily mis-
understood. Therefore, we explicitly choose to adopt Gambetta’s definition [74] of
trust: ‘Trust is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both
before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able
to monitor it) and in a context in which it a↵ects his own action.’ We are interested
in the factors that drive the confidence users have that the network they select will
be reliable and behave according to their expectations.
In this context, we consider that trust based solely on the name of a network is
ill-founded because a network name is irrelevant when assessing the trustworthiness
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Table 4.3: Sociodemographics for the population of the survey for the trust condi-
tion, and to whole survey
Demographics
Condition
trust
Total
(n = 59) (n = 99)
Female 36% 45%
Male 64% 55%
Age (average) 27% 26%
High School 19% 22%
Bachelor Degree 49% 49%
Master Degree 20% 15%
PhD 10% 11%
Very comfortable using IT 69% 70%
Somewhat comfortable using IT 27% 26%
Very good IT skills 34% 29%
Good IT skills 37% 46%
Average IT skills 25% 21%
of the network. Therefore, we are interested in understanding whether users use the
network name as a trust indicator when choosing a network, and if it is possible
for an attacker to influence people’s preferences for his network by nudging them to
think about trust.
Research Question. (Trust RQ): Does thinking about trust a↵ect participants’
preferences?
Experimental setup. As already explained in Chapter 3, our survey relies on
an online questionnaire. From the point of view of a participant assigned to the
trust condition, the questionnaire was structured into three parts: (1) the socio-
demographics; (2) the ‘general preferences’ part; and the (3) the ‘trust’ part that
lists the 12 SSIDs and asks respondents to rate them with special regard to trust
when connecting/avoiding them (i.e., 1-Not at all trusted, 2-Not very trusted, 3-
Neutral, 4-Trusted, 5-Highly trusted). The data collection and statistical analysis
are identical to the one used to investigate the influence of the context. That is to
say that the collected data were analysed using basic descriptive statistics, followed
by specific analysis of variance tests (t-tests [124] and Wilcoxon rank [186] tests) in
order to assess the significant di↵erences and between general preferences and the
trust condition.
4.3.1.2 Results
As shown in Table 4.3, 59 participants from the on-line survey were assigned to
this the investigation of the influence of trust. Figure 4.0 displays general prefer-
ence and trust results side-by-side for all 12 SSIDs. In general we find a tendency
towards higher preference ratings when invoking trust (except for eduroam). This
is illustrated by a systematic change in the extremes of the Likert scores, shown in
Figure 4.0, change that happens regardless of the name’s properties (existing, open,
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Figure 4.0: General preferences vs. trust. in condition 1 for each SSID.
secure, etc.). A large proportion of the respondents report a neutral preference for
each of the wireless network names.
Table 4.4: Statistical significance for the di↵erences between: (a) general preferences
and trust; (b) general preferences and trust but for groups G1-G4 (G1-existing; G2-
nonexistent; G3-nonexistent and related to security; G4-nonexistent and not related
to security).
Di↵.
(trust pref.)
Whole sample 0.38⇤⇤]
Male 0.32⇤]
 24 years old 0.49⇤⇤]
> 24 years old -
 Bachelor Degree 0.40⇤]
> Bachelor Degree -
 Good IT skills 0.50⇤⇤]
Di↵. (trust pref. Gx)
G1 G2 G3 G4
Whole sample 0.32⇤⇤⇤]]] 0.45⇤ 0.47⇤ 0.44⇤
Males 0.30⇤⇤]]] - - -
 24 years old 0.40⇤⇤]] 0.59⇤ 0.70⇤ 0.53⇤
> 24 years old 0.23⇤ - - -
 Bachelor Degree 0.31⇤⇤]] 0.49⇤ - 0.47⇤
> Bachelor Degree 0.34⇤]] - - -
 Good IT skills 0.40⇤⇤]] 0.59⇤ 0.62⇤ 0.58⇤
(a) (b)
Legend: For all tables superscripts have the following meaning: t-test result: ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001.
Wilcoxon result: ]p < 0.05; ]]p < 0.01; ]]]p < 0.001.
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Figure 4.1: General preferences vs. trust for groups G1-G4.
Table 4.4.(a) shows the significant results for the whole sample, indicating that
on average the shift from general preferences to trust was towards a more discerning
preference (higher positive values).
A similar pattern is shown for the other socio-demographic sub-groups. We
also studied more specifically what subgroups of our sample might be particularly
a↵ected by this e↵ect. Test results indicate this is true for male participants, for
those who are aged 24 years or less, for those who have successfully finished a
bachelor degree or less, and for those who consider themselves not very IT literate.
Conversely, this means that participants who are not part of these subgroups tend
to be more cautious with their ratings in the condition of trust-awareness; our
results suggest that age, general education and IT skills contribute to shaping these
attitudes.
In addition to the preceding person-centric analysis, we analysed the data more
closely under the perspective of wireless network names, allowing us e.g., to better
understand whether the formerly described e↵ects apply to all SSIDs or to subsets
only. To this end, we grouped wireless network names with regard to our objectives
of including them in our study.
Figure 4.1 presents the results between general preferences and trust for the four
groups G1-G4 (cf. Table 3.1). Table 4.4.(b) shows the t-test results for the di↵erence
in ratings between general preferences and trust, for each of the 4 groups.
The results suggest a strong and systematic e↵ect of trust for G1, for the entire
sample, except those participants who describe themselves to be very IT literate.
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Table 4.5: Most common reasons related to general preferences (G) and trust (T) for
all choices, choices that change to nonexistent names (CPTUN), or to nonexistent
names related to security (CPTSN), and that do not change from general preferences
to trust.
All choices CPTUNCPTSNNo change
(n =53) (n =11) (n =10) (n =18)
G T G T G T G T
Do not use other networks 30 6 4   3   7 2
Do not know other networks 22 26 2 1 4 1 5 1
Security 13 3 3 1 - - 2 2
Easy Access 8 - - - - - 2 -
Trust 3 10 - 3 - 1 - 1
Regarding fake SSIDs (G2), there is still an e↵ect noticeable both for the entire
sample and more specifically for subgroups of lower age, lower education and lower
IT literacy. This pattern is almost identical for G3 (fake names related to security)
and G4 (fake names not related to security). The e↵ects demonstrated for G2,
G3 and G4 require further attention as they especially indicate potentially insecure
user behaviour. It should be noted that participants who think themselves very IT
literate do not demonstrate any e↵ect of trust awareness and it might well be that
these participants are aware of trust issues already when considering SSIDs.
Table 4.5 shows the results of the analysis of the open questions. The two most
common reasons for participants’ preferences are the fact that they use the networks
or they know them, not necessarily because they consider them trusted or secured.
4.3.1.3 Security Discussion
Let us look at Figure 4.0. It compares the preferences before and after for the entire
sample. Let us focus on the two highest ratings, “very preferred” and “somewhat
preferred”: when taken together they indicate a positive preference.
For all network names, with the puzzling exception of “eduroam” (commented
in the next paragraph) the preference of a network has increased after people have
been asked to think about trust. This seems to indicate that an attacker can gain
people’s trust by suggesting trust in the name, at least if he uses names similar
to the ones we use in our study. Figure 4.1 shows, in fact, that the increment
in preference is almost the same regardless whether the network name exists or
not. We therefore conclude that an attacker would be more e↵ective by suggesting
or including the word “trust” in the network name itself. If this hypothesis were
true, names that hint “trust” should rate better than those suggesting “security” or
“freeness”; proving or disproving this claim is left as future work.
We comment now the small drop in trust regarding ‘eduroam’. From the analysis
of the open answers it emerges that people said to prefer ‘eduroam’ because they
know the network (= have been told to use it); however they said to trust ‘eduroam’
only indirectly (or better comparatively), that is they do not know whether to trust
the other networks. Therefore there is reason to believe that people chose ‘eduroam’
by habit, which is a known principle of mental economics. It would be interesting
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to test whether people would still use ‘eduroam’ (by habit) in contexts outside the
University (i.e., the Shopping Mall), where this network has no reason to exist. This
would be an attack to implement with little e↵ort.
4.3.2 The influence of graphical cues in the selection of Wi-
Fi networks.
In this section, we investigate the role of the graphical cues that network managers
usually display along with the network names. There is little research on graphical
cues in relation to the security and to the understanding of symbols that network
managers rely on. The closest is the research done by Jeske et al. who argue that the
padlock and signal strength unintentionally nudge people to insecure choices [104];
however they do not explain why this happens: are these visual cues unclear and
misleading the users? Are they ambiguous and leading users to ignore them? Or
are they clear in their messages, but are users choosing insecurely for other reasons
extraneous to the cues?
These three questions motivate the work presented in this section. Generally
speaking, we could think that users and interfaces are engaged into a sort of visual
conversation and so it is legitimate to expect it to follow the same principles that
rule a constructive and clear conversation. P. Grice, who studied this topic in the
philosophy of language, calls them cooperative conversation and lists those principles
as follows [82]: quantity (state what is informative, no more and no less than that);
quality (don’t state what is false, don’t state what lacks evidence); relation (be
relevant); manner (avoid obscurity, ambiguity, verbosity, and be orderly).
To clarify whether cues are ‘cooperative’ in the sense given above leads to an
interesting approach to answer ‘why do users choose insecurely?’ in the presence of
cues. The approach consists of separating what can be explained as being due to
‘ine↵ective’ cues from what instead is due to informed choice by the user.
The section describes the particular scenario in which a user chooses a Wi-Fi
network. We question whether the common visual cues employed in this task —the
padlock and the bars that indicate the signal strength— succeed in communicating
their intended message, and we contribute to understanding why.
In the case of Wi-Fi networks, visual cues seem to have been designed with little
consideration of the impact they have on user’s behaviour. Indeed, the padlock sign
and the signal strength indicators have complex meanings: the padlock sign carries
the conflated meaning of encryption and authentication, and the signal strength
indicator carries the conflated meaning of reliability and speed of the connection.
Therefore, it is not straightforward to understand the impact these visual cues have
on the user behaviour and, if the visual cues are ‘cooperative’ for users.
Other authors have studied related questions. As noted earlier, Jeske et al. [104]
observe that convenience-oriented students behave as if the padlock is a barrier to
secure choices. They have however not investigated why users behave this way.
Several key questions thus remain unanswered: does a user behave so because they
misunderstand the padlock or rather because they overlook the padlock due to
accompanying factors that force di↵erent meanings?
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The di↵erence between behaving and understanding is key for us. A user may
(a) understand but ignore the cues, and this is after all an informed decision. Or
they can (b) understand a di↵erent message and so take a misinformed decision, or
they can (c) ignore completely the cue so prefer an uninformed decision.
Case (a) suggests that the cue works fine. But (b) suggests that the cue fails and
needs a revision, whereas in case (c) the cue is irrelevant, and thus useless. Moreover,
in (a) one can still decide insecurely, as well as one can still behave securely in (b)
or (c). But, in any of those situations, what nudges the user’s behaviour should
not only be searched for in the cue itself, but also in other factors, such as in the
presence of other indicators, which influence a cue’s message, or in the task a user
is performing, or in the user.
Therefore, this work’s main research questions are the following: Are the pad-
lock and the signal strength and their relative importance responsible for a user’s
informed, misinformed, or uninformed decision? Which cues are the most influen-
tial in causing that di↵erence, if any? Are the user’s background and di↵erent Wi-fi
scenarios also a↵ecting the user’s behaviour?
This study builds on observed behaviour of about 1000 participants.
4.3.2.1 Methods and experimental setup
To distinguish the situations where people take informed, misinformed, and unin-
formed decisions, we need to compare people’s understanding of the Wi-Fi networks’
properties and visual cues relative to the choices they make. Therefore, we conduct
a study where we ask participants the following: first, to read the description of
a specific scenario setting, a given context and a specific task to perform; second,
to choose between di↵erent Wi-Fi networks to achieve the task; third, to answer
questions about the meaning of the visual cues they encountered; and finally, to
answer questions about their knowledge regarding Wi-Fi networks.
What we investigate is whether the choice of a Wi-Fi network depends on the
properties of the Wi-Fi network itself and on the specific task to be undertaken.
Thus, more precisely, the dependent variable we investigate is the participants’ Wi-
Fi choice, a dichotomous (i.e., 0/1, wrong/right) variable. As main independent
variables we choose the presence/absence of the padlock sign ( ) —supposed to
indicate secure communication, technically the presence of encryption— and the
presence of one of the two signal strength signs ( or ) —supposed to indicate
quality of connectivity, technically the strength of the received Wi-Fi signal. These
are in fact the properties of Wi-Fi networks typically communicated to the user. In
our study we thus display one of the four possible combinations: ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘
’, or ‘ ’. In the remainder of this document, for sake of conciseness, we use the
terms ‘Encryption’ for secure communication and ‘QoS’ for good connectivity.
‘Encryption’ (i.e., secure communication) and ‘QoS’ (i.e., good connectivity) rep-
resent also the two meaning dimensions that we assess from our participants in
relation to how they understand the cues. We measure how much the participants
think a cue means ‘Encryption’ or ‘QoS’, and this is driven by the task a user is
involved in; we consider four tasks designed to evoke a need for ‘Encryption’ and
‘QoS’ through context description.
74
4.3. Investigating Research Questions
Moreover, to ensure that participants do not avoid networks presented along
with a sign because they do not have a password, we provide a password to half of
the sample, aleatorily. This additional independent variable controls the bias that
could be induced by the complex meaning that the sign carries (encryption and
authentication), and let us focus on the ‘Encryption’ dimension.
However, one may argue that using the ‘Possession of a Password’ independent
variable to this role is limiting and that we could use it to investigate the ‘authen-
tication’ meaning dimension of the sign. We argue that, this experiment setup is
not suitable to do so. Indeed, a treatment where participants are provided a pass-
word that works with every network has little to do with authentication and more
to do with a ‘magic key’. Therefore, despite the fact that participants are randomly
assigned to the di↵erent treatments and that we could observe an e↵ect, the e↵ect of
possessing a password, drawing conclusions regarding the ‘authentication’ meaning
dimension of the sign from such e↵ect would be incorrect. This is also the main
rationale behind the choice of not assessing how the participants understand the
sign along the ‘authentication’ dimension as we could not compare the assessed
meaning with the user behaviour.
Besides, we are aware that being provided a password without knowing to which
network it corresponds is not a situation that participants can encounter in the real
world. However, we argue that, as any treatment, if the ‘Possession of a Password’
treatment leads to a change in the dependent variables, then it is justified to conclude
that the change observed is caused by the treatment itself and not by another
variable, independently from its real-world potentiality. Therefore, we control for
the influence of this variable in the analysis before focusing on the others, and we
later avoid to draw real-world conclusions from its observed e↵ects.
Additional independent variables that we consider to be important factors to
control for are the following: the order of the Wi-Fi network names; speed of ap-
pearance over time, i.e., how quickly or slowly the network is listed by the network
manager; and the participant’s social and personal background, i.e., tech-savvy vs
non-tech-savvy users.
To investigate those factors, while maximizing internal validity, we chose an in-
between subject study design. Participants were presented only one scenario to
avoid security priming of one scenario on the others.
While interviews would be the best option for investigating the understanding
users have of the meaning of the visual cues, it is not a good option to investigate
the e↵ect of several factors. Indeed, investigating several factors and their relative
importance call for the recruitment of an important number of participants that we
could reach in-lab. Therefore, the study was conducted online, and extra care has
been taken to guarantee the study’s internal validity.
The flow of the study design comprised a socio-demographic questionnaire; the
description of a scenario with instructions to select a Wi-Fi network from a given
list; several rounds of network selections; an assessment of the understanding par-
ticipants have for the given cues; and a follow-up questionnaire to assess further
attitudes and beliefs about ICT security (e.g., misconceptions and beliefs regarding
Wi-Fi networks). In each scenario, we describe for the participant a character they
implicitly inhabit and ask him/her what network s/he would select given the context
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Figure 4.2: Rounds of choices.
and task to be accomplished. Participants were assigned to respond to 1 scenario
out of 4 possible ones; thus the probability of assignment was of .25. Each scenario
di↵ered in terms of the requirements the Wi-Fi network should have to complete
the task (i.e., combination of ‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’). Participants had five rounds
of choices; each round presented a list of 4 Wi-Fi networks, ordered randomly, each
displaying a randomly generated name, a signal strength indicator ( or ), with
or without a padlock sign ( ). Figure 4.2 shows the Wi-Fi networks for the four
rounds. To test for consistency we added a fifth round, not shown in the figure: it
is one of the presented 4 rounds, randomly chosen.
In the present work, we focus on and describe only the results associated with
the third round of network choices. We focus on the graphical cues and their under-
standing by Wi-Fi networks’ users and leave as future work how the delay, and/or
the timing, of the listing of network names a↵ect the Wi-Fi network choices; and
also how the sequential order of the Wi-Fi networks makes a di↵erence.
To assess whether users associate the right intended meaning to the cues (‘En-
cryption’ for the padlock, and ‘QoS’ for the signal strength bar) we ask the par-
ticipants to express their understanding, using a 4-points Likert scale (Not at all,
Partially, Mostly, Completely), of the extent to which they agree that each of the 2
visual cues ( and ) corroborate in meaning with 4 words related to ‘Encryption’
(confidential, protected, encrypted, and private), and 4 related to ‘QoS’ (good signal
strength, high-bandwidth, high-speed, and fast).
As mentioned above, we complement the study with additional attitude and be-
lief questions regarding the participants’ use of Wi-Fi networks. For instance we
ask such things as their thoughts about whether the padlock sign means ‘locked
out’, and whether they tend to make choices out of convenience. To be clear, our
convenience variable is a composite of three questions (Cronbach’s ↵ = 0.76) and is
used as such in our analyses. Additional questions are used to measure ICT skills:
these are split into 2 separate variables, stated ICT skills (s.ICT) reflecting the par-
ticipants’ stated ICT skills, and measured ICT skills (m.ICT) reflecting how well the
participants answered the technical questions. We collected a host of other variables
thought to be associated with the Wi-Fi network choice that are not reported on
here.
Choosing the tool for our online survey. We aimed to have a large number
of participants and among a population larger than the one we could reach if we
had run our experiment within our University quarters. Therefore, we opted for
Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk), a market place for online work which however
o↵ers readily available and substantially large samples of participants. The use of
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mturk as a tool for social experiments is debated; we are aware of it and of mturk’s
potential limitations (e.g., [145]) that can harm internal validity. For this reason we
took several countermeasures to maximise as much as we could the quality of the
collected data. We implemented several quality checks to detect that participants
provide answers simply by clicking randomly. Namely, we implemented attention
checks, for instance we added choices like: ‘I answer randomly and I should not be
paid: Yes or No’; we repeated questions several times and we presented them with
di↵erent wordings; we measured the time participants took to answer each question
to detect unusually fast answering which can potentially indicate a low quality of
data; we also prevented a participant from participating more than once.
On the positive side, however, mturk allows us to recruit participants world-
widely, and in the specific case of the US (and we admitted only participants from
this country, see later in this paragraph) it is thought to be better representative of
the general population than those commonly recruited via university settings [141].
Moreover, evidence suggests that self-reported behaviours gathered with mturk are
comparable to observed behaviours in laboratory studies [44]. To make our analy-
ses and interpretation of our results easier, we choose to recruit only participants
located in the US, where the majority of mturk workers do not use the tool as their
primary source of income. We ran the study by batch of 100 participants at di↵erent
times of the day, during workdays and week-ends. Following the guide edited by a
community [181] of mturk workers, we took great care to guarantee workers’ rights
of information and privacy, and we paid USD 0.90 for an average of 5 minutes of
participation. We collected their age, gender, how comfortable they feel with ICT
and their occupation. Occupation categories are organised following the US Bureau
of Labor statistic’s classification major groups [174]. Optionally, participants can
communicate ethnicity related information that follow the US census’ interviewing
manual guidelines [175].
The pilot study. Another issue, not related to mturk, but that could potentially
challenge the reliability of the data and the internal validity of the study is whether
the participants in fact understand correctly what they are presented. In particular,
because in theory there is an infinite number of scenarios we could have used to
convey and elicit a need for certain Wi-Fi network properties, we had to take special
care to pilot test several possible scenarios to identify the ones we ultimately used in
our study. For instance, to evoke a task that does not need secure communications
or good connectivity, we can ask the participants to picture themselves waiting at
a bus stop (no time pressure) searching for a Wi-Fi network to browse the Internet
(no need for security), but this scenario could be understood di↵erently by men and
women. To guarantee unambiguity in understanding the scenarios, we ran a pilot
study using the same tools and settings as the main study that aimed at finding
the most intelligible and less biased scenarios. We built 3 di↵erent ‘vignettes’ [71],
or candidates, for each scenario, and asked 156 participants to rate how much the
task mentioned in the vignettes should comply with several properties. There were
6 properties related to ‘secure communications’ (confidential, protected, encrypted,
secret, masked, and private), and 6 related to the ‘good connectivity’ (good signal
strength, high-bandwidth, high-speed, first-class, responsive, and fast). We analysed
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Table 4.6: Chosen vignettes to convey the need for ‘Encryption’ or ‘QoS’ and their
limitations.
Scenario
Intended
meaning Displayed text Limitations
Encryp. QoS
S0-0 0 0 I am sitting in a co↵ee shop with
some friends. As they want to go
for dinner later, I use my smart-
phone to check for a good restau-
rant. Unfortunately, there is no
3G/4G network available, so I have
to use an available Wi-Fi network
instead.
QoS is not signif-
icantly perceived
as needed or not
needed, males sig-
nificantly perceive it
as not-needed.
S0-1 0 1 I am a graphic designer intending
to show my latest work to some
of my friends. Since the 3G/4G
connection is failing to retrieve the
files, which are rather big, I decide
to try an available Wi-Fi network
to get some connectivity.
No limitation.
S1-0 1 0 I am waiting at a bus stop and I
need to verify whether the check
I deposited yesterday has been
cleared. I need to use the bank’s
application on my smartphone to
check the bank account’s bal-
ance, but unfortunately there is
no 3G/4G. I thus decide to try
an available Wi-Fi network to get
some connectivity.
QoS significantly
tends to be per-
ceived as needed
whereas we in-
tend to convey the
converse meaning.
S1-1 1 1 I am a government o cial staying
at an hotel. I scheduled an interna-
tional online meeting. I planned to
use the hotel’s Wi-Fi network but
the hotel´s Wi-Fi proved unreliable
when I called my family earlier to
test the connection. There is no
3G/4G network, so I decide to go
somewhere else to find an available
Wi-Fi network.
No limitation.
78
4.3. Investigating Research Questions
Table 4.7: Sociodemographics profile by scenario.
S0-0 S0-1 S1-0 S1-1 Total
Gender: Female 41 % 43.4 % 36.1 % 41.2 % 40.4 %
Gender: Male 59 % 56.6 % 63.9 % 58.8 % 59.6 %
Highest ed: High-School 47 % 41 % 42.9 % 40.8 % 42.9 %
Highest ed: Bachelor Degree 41.7 % 48 % 46.4 % 44.6 % 45.2 %
Highest ed: Master Degree 7.9 % 8.2 % 8.7 % 12 % 9.2 %
Comfortable in IT: Not at all 3 % 6.2 % 2.8 % 3.9 % 4 %
Comfortable in IT: Not Very 18.8 % 13.7 % 16.7 % 18.5 % 16.9 %
Comfortable in IT: Somewhat 55.3 % 58.2 % 59.5 % 57.5 % 57.6 %
Comfortable in IT: Very 22.9 % 21.9 % 21 % 20.2 % 21.5 %
Total counts 266 256 252 233 1007
the results of the pilot study with the R statistical software [144] and performed
Wilcoxon rank tests [186] to discriminate the vignettes with the best psychometrical
discrimination while checking for gender, age, and other social background variable
e↵ects. Table 4.6 shows for each scenario: the technical property that it intends to
convey (‘Encryption’ or ‘QoS’), the selected vignette, and the limitations we need
to be aware of when using it.
In summary, we model the dichotomous outcome (dependent variable) using
Logistic Regression [129]: we estimate the conditional probability of choosing the
target response option ‘clicking on the network with a and a ’ net of important
independent variables. Our statistical modelling approach is relatively straightfor-
ward: firstly, we investigate the e↵ect of the password because we expect it to be an
important and significant control; we in fact find evidence of this and thus include
it in all subsequent models. Secondly, we investigate the question of whether par-
ticipants make an informed decision relative to each scenario, and then whether the
participants’ answers reflect, in a consistent way, their expressed choice relative to
the meaning they attribute to the and cues. Finally, we investigate whether the
respondents’ choices vary significantly by several basic socio-demographic variables.
4.3.2.2 Results
A total of 1090 participants took part in our study. Of these 83 failed the post-
hoc data quality and integrity checks, and we remained with 1007 consistent cases.
As shown in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.3, our sample is rather balanced with regard
to gender. The age distribution has a wide range (56 years). Table 4.8 shows the
frequency of clicks (counts) and percentages for the round under investigation in this
manuscript, the 3rd. Only 7 participants chose a network with a ; since this gives
a too low variability, we excluded those 7 cases and proceeded with our statistical
analysis on the 1000 remaining cases that display a .
Varying ‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’ (independent variables) in order to measure WiFi
selection outcomes (dependent variable) may give biased results, because choosing
or avoiding network selections marked with a can occur as an e↵ect of our inde-
pendent variables or as an e↵ect of simply having a password available or not. In
order to control this potential bias, we provided half of the sample with a password.
Performing a logistic regression allows to determine if the password is a significant
predictor of the outcome ‘clicking on the network with a ’ and to what extent it
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Figure 4.3: Age and Occupation distribution for Males and Females
is an e↵ect based on our independent variables. With a password, odds of clicking
on the target are 2.1 times higher (exponentiated coe cient (expcoe↵)=2.1 with p
< 0.001). Tested in each scenario, the password e↵ect is significant in S0-0 (expco-
e↵=3.22, p < 0.001), and S0-1 (expcoe↵=4.7, p < 0.001).
Table 4.8: Counts and frequencies
for the third round of the study.
counts frequencies
5 0.5 %
688 68.3 %
2 0.2 %
312 31 %
Table 4.9: Trimmed results of the logistic
regression of network selection on pass-
word + scenario. (S0-0 reference cate-
gory)
Password S0-1 S1-0 S1-1
p < 0.001 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.001
expcoe↵ 2.2 2.0 1.9 4.2
As the scenarios evoke the need for ‘Encryption’ and/or for ‘QoS’, we first analyze
if the scenario is a predictor of the outcome i.e. ‘clicking on the network with a ’
while adjusting for password. If people understand the meaning of the cues correctly,
using S0-0 as intercept: S0-1 (‘QoS’ needed) should not increase the odds of clicking
on the target, and S1-0 (‘Encryption’ needed) and S1-1 should increase the odds
in the same proportion. The results shown in Table 4.9 prove that scenarios S0-0
and S1-1 increase the odds in the same proportion and that S1-1 nearly increases
the odds twice as much. To investigate this result further and to determine if the
participants took an ‘informed’ decision, we consider the meaning the respondents
associated with their responses. That is to say, we include an interaction term
(meaning ⇥ scenario) and checked the resulting model fit statistics (LR test).
Table 4.10 shows that while the main e↵ects of the meaning dimensions are by
large significant, with the exception of the encryption for the symbol, the LR
tests show lack of improvement in model fit by including the interaction terms.
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Table 4.10: Exponentiated coe cients of the logistic regressions for the main e↵ect
of “Encryption” and “QoS” while controlling for password and scenario. LR tests
compare models with and without interaction terms.
Cue Dimension
Main e↵ect LR Tests
expcoe↵ p p
Encryption 0.823 < 0.01 NS
QoS 0.727 < 0.001 NS
Encryption 0.860 NS < 0.05
QoS 0.826 < 0.01 NS
Table 4.11: Logistic regression results. Tests are perfmormed between the current
model and the previous one. AIC is evaluated as well. (⇤ < .05; ⇤⇤ < .01; ⇤⇤⇤ < .001)
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Model fit
LR Tests AIC
Password 2.2 ⇤⇤⇤ 2.4 ⇤⇤⇤ 2.4 ⇤⇤⇤ 2.4 ⇤⇤⇤ - 1171.88
S0-1 2.0 ⇤⇤ NS NS NS - 1171.88
S1-0 1.9 ⇤⇤ 1.8 ⇤ 1.8 ⇤ 1.8 ⇤ - 1171.88
S1-1 4.2 ⇤⇤⇤ 4.5 ⇤⇤⇤ 4.6 ⇤⇤⇤ 4.7 ⇤⇤⇤ - 1171.88
Convenience - 0.10 ⇤⇤⇤ 0.11 ⇤⇤⇤ 0.11 ⇤⇤⇤ < 0.001 1000.87
m.ICT Not significant, not added.
= Enc. Not significant, not added.
= QoS - - 0.91 ⇤⇤ 0.91 ⇤⇤ < 0.01 993.25
= Enc. Not significant, not added.
= QoS Not significant, not added.
age - - - 1.0 ⇤⇤ < 0.01 986.72
gender Not significant, not added.
occupation Not significant, not added.
s.ICT Not significant, not added.
Ethicity Not significant, not added.
n = 1000 986.72
This suggests that the e↵ects of the meaning dimensions do not vary significantly
per scenario.
Then we turn our attention to the socio-demographic e↵ects. Age has a signifi-
cant e↵ect (p < .001) as increasing age by 1 multiplies the odds of clicking on the
target by expcoe↵=1.026. Having good measured IT skills multiplies the odds
of clicking on the target by expcoe↵=1.389 (p < 0.05). Convenience-driven par-
ticipants are expcoe↵=0.104 (p < 0.001) times less likely of clicking on the target.
Interactions of convenience with the scenarios are not significant.
Gender, occupation, ethnicity and stated ICT skills don’t have significant e↵ects.
To investigate the predictive power of the independent variables in our model,
we conducted a series of logistical regressions in a stepwise fashion. We start with
an adjusted model that includes password and scenario, then we add: the conve-
nience, the measured ICT skills, the meaning dimensions, and the socio-demographic
variables. Results are presented in Table 4.11 and discussed in the section below.
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4.3.2.3 Security Discussion
Previous research shows that the can act as a barrier for the user to choose a
secure network [104]. This suggests that users are taking a ‘misinformed’ decision,
misunderstanding the meaning of that cue. This is actually the case because Ta-
ble 4.11 shows that when is misunderstood as meaning ‘QoS’, users are less likely
to choose the encrypted network.
Our results support that is the cue that interferes the most with the other
cues. That is to say, we were unable to perform any substantive statistical analysis
on this particular issue because only 7 participants out of 1007 chose a network with
a : participants avoided the sign without any regard for the other cues it was
associated with or any other contextual factors. We can’t discuss further the weight
of its meaning in the decision without statistical evidences, but as participants
massively rated as being the least related to ‘QoS’ we can infer that they took
‘informed’ decisions.
Table 4.11 lists the results of our regression modelling approach and shows the
e↵ect of adding other factors one by one. ‘Convenience’ is the most powerful pre-
dictor of Wi-Fi network selection. We find that being convenience-driven lowers
the probability of choosing the encrypted network by 89%. In fact, when we in-
clude ‘Convenience’ in our model, it cancels-out the e↵ect of scenario S0-1 (‘QoS’
needed); this e↵ect suggests that the choices made for that scenario are explained
by the convenience factor rather than the scenario itself.
‘Scenario’ is the second most powerful predictor. For instance, in the final model
(Step 4), participants are 4.7 times more likely to choose the encrypted network
in S1-1 (‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’ needed) than in the S0-0 scenario, which is the
reference point. But the results also reveal an unexpected behaviour: participants
are, almost equally, more likely to choose the encrypted network in both S0-1 (‘QoS’
needed) and S1-0 (‘Encryption’ needed). In S1-0 (‘Encryption’ needed), we can
interpret that the participants seek for ‘Encryption’ (still ‘QoS’ can interfere because
of the limitations, see Table 4.6), but in S0-1 (‘QoS’ needed) only the need for ‘QoS’
can foster the choice of the encrypted network. Furthermore, still relatively to S0-
0, change in odds in S1-1 are more than double than those for S1-0 (‘Encryption’
needed)– this di↵erence suggests that participants confuse ‘QoS’ and ‘Encryption’;
and that needing ‘QoS’ contributes to the choice of the encrypted network. Finally,
we already observed that the introduction of ‘Convenience’ in Step 2 cancels out
the e↵ect of S0-1 (‘QoS’ needed), but this inclusion has a limited e↵ect on S1-1 and
S1-0 (‘Encryption’ needed). This suggests that the choice of an encrypted network
that is only nudged by the need of ‘QoS’ is fragile; the same choice performed in a
scenario needing ‘Encryption’ is stronger. That is to say, even convenience-driven
people tend to adopt secure behaviour when the situation calls for it.
We cannot say definitively whether or not the participants’ understanding of the
meaning of the cues is the cause of the discrepancies we observe in Step 1’s odds of
choosing the secure network for S1-0 (‘Encryption’ needed) and S1-1. As shown in
Table 4.11 this is an important factor, but Table 4.10 shows that it does not interact
with the scenario and therefore it is not the cause of those discrepancies.
The third most powerful predictor is the ‘Possession of a Password’: participants
with a password are 2.4 times more likely to choose the encrypted network (see final
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step in model). But the e↵ect interacts with the scenario: in a scenario needing
‘Encryption’ participants tend to choose the encrypted network, ignoring whether
they have a password or not; but when the scenario does not require ‘Encryption’
it appears that they do not look for an encrypted network, unless we provide them
with a password.
The ICT skills that we asked our participants about did not result in significant
e↵ects as shown in Table 4.11. Furthermore, we found evidence that knowing what
a cue means in terms of the dimensions we asked about, has very little impact on
the participant’ decisions. Thus, taking ‘informed’ decisions does not foster a secure
behaviour and computer literacy seems to play little role in the decision process.
The last significant factor is age, but its e↵ect ends up being nonsignificant.
4.4 Conclusion
In the previous sections, we studied the socio-technical security of Wi-Fi Hotspots.
We followed STEAL’s operational guidelines, starting by performing a informal tech-
nical security analysis to identify critical action points that lay in the interactions
between a Hotspot and its users, given a specific Threat Model. We then produced
potential research questions and imagined experiments to explore the social layers
of Wi-Fi Hotspots’ security. Finally, we selected and investigated two research ques-
tions: first about user trust, then about the graphical cues displayed by network
managers.
We tested how people are biased to choose WiFi access point names when we
o↵er them a pool of names among which there are names of real WiFi networks,
names that remind security and trust. Regarding trust, the take away from this
study is that networks that use words related to trust may have higher chances of
being chosen.
We also explained why people choose Wi-Fi networks by investigating how the
cues ( , and ) displayed by Wi-Fi network managers a↵ect Wi-Fi network selec-
tion. Using a sample of 1000 participants, collected through the Amazon mechanical
turk, we analyzed through a series of logistic regressions the relative importance of
the various factors associated with the participant’s choice of Wi-Fi network. We
shed light on whether users understand and use the padlock and the signal strength
visual cues to decide which Wi-Fi network to connect to: they blankly avoid the
networks displaying because they understand that it is a sign of bad connec-
tivity, but the decision is more subtle when and are competing. The
choice of a network displaying a is subject to more influences: users who are
not convenience-driven tend to pick an encrypted network if they are provided a
password or if the task undertaken calls for “QoS”; when needing “Encryption”, all
users tend to choose encrypted networks. But our analysis shows that the meaning
our participants attribute to the cues and other socio-demographic variables does
not explain why our participants choose encrypted networks when the task asks for
“QoS”, or even “Encryption”. These results suggest that beliefs and circumstances
(i.e., context) are the real motivators behind our participants’ choices, and that
even if they take ill-informed decisions regarding the meaning of the cues, they take
“informed”decisions with regard to other factors.
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In future work, we will seek to confirm our findings reported in this manuscript
relative to the other rounds of data collected in our study. We will further investigate
how the expressed beliefs of our participants regarding Wi-Fi networks a↵ect their
network choices. Moreover, we will investigate more closely the socio-demographic
profiles of those who we have identified as being convenience-driven.
Additionally, further study should be conducted to verify the external validity —
or real world applicability— of this study. In-lab experiments with users of existing
Wi-Fi networks could investigate whether users tend to behave insecurely when
facing particular settings. In particular, scenarios where users are given a password
to use a particular —trusted— network (e.g., eduroam).
Regarding Wi-Fi hotspot, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. With the im-
plementation of Hotspot 2.0, we recommend that it needs to be better tested for
socio-technical security. Although technical security has improved in comparison
with the previous hotspot version, many issues still need addressing before its full
deployment and usage in parallel with that previous version (which will not quickly
disappear). We have provided a series of research questions and experiments to face
some of the encountered security problems that industry and research will have to
deal with and started to tackle two of these.
Regarding the use of STEAL, we believe that it is important to analyse security
of socio-technical systems, but instantiating the whole process takes time and relies
heavily on the skills on the analyst. This is particularly true regarding the analysis
of social layers. We only investigated 2 factors that could undermine Hotspot’s
security and we are far from reaching the end of the list of potential user-related
issues. Furthermore, STEAL does not provide a way to systematically reuse the
discoveries made on one system on another.
We question whether there is another way to study the socio-technical security
of a system. A technique that could help us understanding what makes a user fall
or not for a STA and devise appropriate defences; but with the additional features
being more systematic in the way it links the factors pertaining to the user with
adverse e↵ects on a system’s security, and that allows to build a body of knowledge
on STAs to improve subsequent analyses.
In the next chapter, we lay the foundations of the development of an RCA
methodology for computer security. A methodology that could complement or sup-
plement STEAL with a systematic identification of socio-technical vulnerabilities in
a system.
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When I was a kid, they had a saying, ‘to err is human but to
really fuck it up takes a computer.’
—Benjamin R. Smith, ‘Atlas’
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In this chapter, we discuss the requirements for a Root Cause Analysis
for security. We start by introducing RCA techniques, their origin and
use in the safety field. Then, we identify the main di↵erences between
the safety and security fields that lead to a list of challenges that one
should consider when building an RCA for security.
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we presented a framework—STEAL—that supports the security anal-
ysis of socio-technical systems; then in Chapter 4, we used this framework on a use
case and identified several caveats. The first caveat is that running STEAL analyses
of systems is an expensive process that relies a lot on the analyst’s skills and his
capacity to formulate and test relevant hypotheses. Furthermore, STEAL does not
provide any way to use the findings made on a system to ease the analysis of another.
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The quest for a systematic methodology for the security analysis of socio-technical
systems is still open; we believe that we can take inspiration from the safety field
because it faced the exact same challenge decades ago, and it has developed methods
to tackle those.
Indeed, accounting for the role of a user in a system’s safety incident is a complex
matter, and in safety this role is usually studied by applying analysis techniques
such as the RCA [27]. RCA helps understanding the real reasons for a safety-
critical incident/accident occurring in a system operated by humans. Starting from
an observed failure that only superficially seems due to human error, RCA guides
the analyst to find the reasons for the failure beyond its appearance; it does so
by looking for error-inducing technology hosted by the system, poorly designed
interfaces and cumbersome interactions with users, and environmental factors that
may have a↵ected how users operate the system.
When RCA is used in security, the focus is on the technical details that lead to a
security incident; the user’s actions are acknowledged but never investigated. Thus,
the analysis of a security failure in systems that interact with humans often ends by
pointing out users as culprits and the weakest security links [152].
Such conclusions are short-sighted. Even when exploiting humans as back-
doors—we recognise that there are indeed users that execute security critical ac-
tions, such as clicking on an infected attachment—attackers also rely upon other
factors that they can control. For instance, attackers often exploit cognitive biases,
use social engineering and persuasion techniques [62], take advantage of ill-designed
usability and systems, abuse social norms, or interfere with the social environment
by adding noise and exerting psychological pressure. These untangled factors are
pre-conditions for the attacker’s ability to trigger what only superficially can be
dismissed as ‘human errors’. Understanding the role of these factors and how they
can be manipulated by an attacker provides insights on why the security incident
occurred in the first place. This is what an informative security analysis should do.
Motivation. We want to study security incidents to understand the role of human-
related factors in them and we aim to understand how such factors have been (but
also, can be) manipulated by an attacker to produce the cascade of events that
leads to the success of user-mediated attacks. Besides, we believe that such factors
can be understood by using strategies inspired by the RCA practice followed in
safety, and that these strategies can help in producing a technique free of STEAL’s
limitations. By looking at the ‘human error’ not as a conclusion but as a start and
by considering it a symptom calling for an investigation of its ‘root causes’, we think
we can retrieve causes that are more informative in their explanations of why and
how security fails in the presence of humans and more useful in helping us find ways
to enhance security.
The time seems ripe for this kind of investigation. Today, computer security
experts acknowledge that systems, users, their environment and their interactions
should all be considered together in the security problem [96], and they recognise
that users are not always the primary reason for a security failure although they
can be involved in it [50]. This statement is supported by research that proves
that vulnerabilities may arise when the security design completely misunderstands
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the role of users, ignoring basic principles about how people think, reason, and
behave/interact with technology [3].
Related works have been done, for instance Cranor et al.’s work on security-
related communications [42], Curzon et al.’s Cognitive Framework [45], Carlos et
al.’s proposal of a taxonomy of human-protocol weaknesses [30], and Kirlappos et
al.’s findings on users circumventing security policies and controls [113]. All these
discuss the role of users in security and, from di↵erent perspectives, explain how
human aspects may a↵ect security. Our work can be seen as a re-elaboration of
these discussions, extended and integrated in our methodology of analysis for the
search of the root cause in security, towards a unified mean to address human-related
factors in security.
Computer security still misses a strategy of analysis like the RCA in safety where
blame is considered the enemy and human error is considered as a symptom, not
a cause. This chapter studies what benefits an RCA will bring into the security
analysis practices, and what it should achieve. Furthermore, it comments on a list
of associated challenges that one needs to tackle when building such a technique for
computer security.
5.2 RCA in Safety and Security: Di↵erences and
Challenges
Before elaborating on the details about RCA in safety and security, it is worth
mentioning that the common role of RCA is to provide insights about a complex
situation that leads to an adverse event. The primary objective of the RCA method
is to identify the root cause of such an undesirable event. This root cause, if removed,
prevents the event from occurring. However, sometimes several factors concurrently
cause the event, and it would not be justified to point out one of them as the ultimate
culprit. Whichever the case, the knowledge gained from an RCA should enable the
analyst to write guidelines or rules that implementers can follow to control identified
factors and avoid the recurrence of the said event.
To identify these factors and produce controls, an RCA methods usually follows
a four-step process (see Fig. 5.1):
Data collection and investigation The data collection phase is where an analyst
gathers factual information about an incident. The collection and investigation
are done objectively and their results should not be dependent on the analyst.
The outcome of this phase is a description of the incident.
Retrospective Analysis The goal of the retrospective analysis is to determine the
causes of the incident. Depending on the RCA method used, this phase can be
more or less depend on the analyst’s knowledge and experiences. The outcome
of this phase is a set of root causes without which the incident could not have
occurred.
Recommendations generation In this phase, the analyst determines a set of
recommendations to prevent the analysed event from recurring. Whatever the
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method, this phase is analyst-dependent because he needs to understand the
outcome of the analysis and generate sound remediations about what should
be done.
Implementation of recommendations This is the ultimate phase of a Root
Cause Analysis, where the analyst’s recommendations are implemented to
prevent additional occurrences of the incident from happening. The outcome
is a system freed of its identified caveats.
Figure 5.1: The process usually used for a Root Cause Analysis.
5.2.1 RCA in Safety
In safety, RCA has been motivated by the colossal costs in human lives and envi-
ronmental damages resulting for instance from transportation disasters or nuclear
accidents. Such events engendered the development of RCA methods to prevent
such horrendous events from recurring, and to make safety-critical systems error-
resilient. Even events that are supposedly caused by a ‘human error’ are investigated
thoroughly to find out what should be altered or documented in the complex inter-
play among the human, the system, and the context, in order to prevent the event
from happening again.
Indeed, in his accident causation model, Reason [147] shows that ‘human errors’
are active failures that, when combined with latent failures, can transform a simple
hazard into an accident. Reason’s model metaphorically describes a system as a
Swiss cheese: each slice or layer is a system’s defence against failure and the holes
on the slices are the flaws that, when ‘aligned’, create a hazard (Fig. 5.2). A person
responsible for an accident is not to be blamed alone, but it is the system as a whole
that needs to be investigated because it hosts the fertile ground for the ‘human
error’ that caused the accident. Consequently, when searching for the root causes
of an accident, one must seek for all the contributing factors and consider ‘human
errors’ as manifestations of additional factors that one must also identify.
Figure 5.2: Reason’s Swiss cheese model
A common illustration of the contribution of RCA in pointing out design failures
that drove humans to provoke disasters is the case of the B-17 Flying fortress, a plane
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that was used extensively during WWII. The flying fortresses would sometimes crash
because co-pilots retracted the landing gear by mistake while taxiing the plane on
the runway. Chapanis [32] found several contributing factors surrounding the taxiing
procedure of this aircraft that, in war time, could cause this ‘human error’ to happen,
namely:
Operational – actions of the aircraft’s controls follow a fixed procedure that could
foster mistakes (e.g., before landing: extend the landing gears then lower the
wing flaps; after landing: raise the wing flaps [125]);
Technological – switches and levers could be confused, since they had all the same
shape and were located closely together;
Environmental – visibility and light conditions could be suboptimal, since mis-
sions could take place at any time of the day, and smoke can be present in the
cockpit if the aircraft has been damaged.
Human – crew can be stressed, tired or in physical pain, since they were in a war
mission.
A root cause analysis of the B-17’s crashes demanded first to identify what
factors one can control to avoid accidents from reoccurring. Since nothing could be
done to control the environmental conditions, not much to reduce the stress due to
the war, and very little to change how to operate the aircraft, the analysis focused
on the technological factors. They seemed to be the factors one could control and
change. B-17’s switches and levers used to control wing flaps, and landing gears
were redesigned to avoid confusion. Nowadays, this new design is enforced by the
FAA Regulations that state that the landing gear control must be designed in the
shape of a wheel and the wing flaps control in the shape of a wing, and they have
to be put further apart from each other [60].
This example enlightens a key aspect of RCA: the findings must allow for actual
design of controls that fix the problem. For instance, pointing out that ‘the weather’
is the root cause of an aircraft’s crash is not a suitable answer because there is
nothing one can do against bad weather. The root causes of such a crash are to be
found in the socio-technical system in which the aircraft operates (i.e., the aircraft,
the crew, the people on the ground, et cetera) that should be designed to cope with
bad weather conditions.
5.2.2 From RCA to prediction
While RCA is used to understand how an event has developed, the safety field
also make use of techniques to predict the performance of a system that contains
a human component. So instead of working from the observed consequences to the
root causes, the prediction aims at showing how a scenario—a system failure—may
develop depending on human performances, and at computing the probability of
recovering from this failure.
Predicting how an event can unfold is highly dependent on the description of
the context, tasks, and failure modes. Potential paths that an actual event can
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follow are usually represented in binary trees called event trees (see THERP for
instance [167]), where branches represent what happens when an event (a leaf) is a
success or a failure. Eventually, probabilities are computed for each outcome and
recommendations are produced to enhance the reliability of the system.
This prospective approach is used in Human Reliability Assessment. It relies
‘heavily on process expertise to identify problems and HRA methods themselves
or expert estimation for quantification’ [21]. The overall process for a prospective
analysis follows the same process introduced earlier for an RCA (see Fig. 5.1),
except for the analysis.
5.2.3 RCA in Safety and Security: Di↵erences
The RCA methods in safety that helped engineers create almost defect-free opera-
tions of planes and nuclear plants have come at the price of analyses of past events.
In support of these activities, regulations and laws have been set to enforce the use
of good practices and protocols.
Security seems running behind in this matter. It is only recently that the con-
science for the life-threatening dimension of security incidents and other dramatic
consequences they may have seems to have arisen in the security field. Data col-
lection, incident response, and forensics are, at the time of writing (February 2016)
slowly getting imposed by law [39], but these practices are still mostly embraced on
a voluntary basis.
There are a few key di↵erences between an RCA approach in safety and an
RCA approach in security that emerges preponderantly. Such di↵erences (see the
next sections) make migrating RCA from safety to security be not a straightforward
task; they indeed bring up several challenges that need to be addressed and resolved
before we can set a framework of analysis. We have identified a non-exhaustive list
of eleven di↵erences that we think are the most relevant for our approach. They
appear at di↵erent steps of the RCA process introduced in Section 5.2:
5.2.3.1 Data collection and investigation
(D1) In safety, there is an established process to collect structured evidence to be
used for root cause analysis. In security, this process is not well-established
and data are often unstructured.
To track back the root cause of an event, one needs to get the relevant data. In
safety, for example in aeronautics, to achieve the collection of these data, aircrafts are
monitored in-flight by the Air Tra c Control through the measurement (e.g., radar)
and communication (e.g., ADB-S, ACARS) of di↵erent parameters. Additional data
(e.g., voices and screen contents) are recorded into ‘black boxes’ (i.e., Cockpit Voice
Recorder and Flight Data Recorder) to enable the forensics after an accident. When
an event occurs, investigations are supported by the use of taxonomies (e.g., the
Accident/Incident Data Reporting taxonomy (ADREP-2000)[98]) where sub-events,
and observed human behaviours are coded.
In security, corporate networks have the same kinds of data collection and pro-
tection in place: Intrusion Detection Systems and Anti Viruses look for Indices of
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Compromise—or, ‘any piece of information that can be used to search for or iden-
tify potentially compromised systems’ [57]—to trigger an Incident Response when
a live attack is detected, and logs are collected for a later forensic investigation if
an intrusion is detected after it occurs. But, while the data that constitute Indica-
tors of Compromise are well-defined for sheer technical attacks (e.g., IP addresses
reached, signature of binaries, registry keys changed, et cetera see OpenIOC [127]),
information about STAs are less structured and often described in text. Some tax-
onomies that consider the human exist though, the Vocabulary for Event Recording
and Incident Sharing (VERIS)[177] taxonomy is used to structure information about
security incidents. It contains, among numerous others, fields about human actions
(and errors), demographics, social engineering techniques used, and root causes of
events. These kinds of taxonomies do not intend to describe observed human be-
haviour and environment in detail to support an analysis but to describe the result
of an expert’s analysis.
(D2) In safety, there are no malicious actors and incidents happen because of general
malfunctioning. In security, incidents are caused by attackers whose skills and
capabilities may be subtle and even unknown.
In safety, there is no such role as an attacker: safety-critical accidents are not
triggered maliciously and are usually coincidental events1. In contrast, a security
incident (i.e., an attack) comes from the attacker’s intention to benefit from the
system. Concepts like Attacker’s goal, Asset, Threat, and Vulnerabilities are absent
from the safety vocabulary and some destinations of the data collected in security
are completely alien to the safety field. Such destination is Threat Intelligence [105]
that consists of organisations sharing data about current and past attacks to enhance
their situational awareness (e.g., Malware Information Sharing Platform [130] or the
VERIS Community Database [176]). Therefore, in addition to supporting the anal-
ysis of past events, data collection destined to an RCA for security should support
Threat Intelligence, and foster the dissemination of concrete observable artifacts of
user-mediated attacks. These sophisticated indicators would enable the surveillance
of networks, systems and users for known patterns of attacks that exploit the human
component of a system.
(D3) In safety, accidents to be investigated usually take place in well-known and
well-defined settings. In security, we face much more heterogeneous contexts.
In safety, there is usually an operator performing a task (e.g., manipulating a
lever) that is part of a procedure (e.g., checklist), in a fixed technological environ-
ment (e.g., hardware and Human–Computer Interaction), and a known operational
context (e.g., time of the day). When investigating an accident, an analyst knows
1This tends to change though, as explained in Chapter 2, there is a growing interdependency
between both domains with security growing in safety requirement and, maybe also vice-versa.
Safety gradually becomes more and more dependent to the security of IT infrastructures, to the
point that security becomes a requirement for safety. Indeed, as stated by Kuntze et al. in [118]:
‘Safety incidents are accidental, not malicious, in nature. We agree that security incidents are
mainly malicious. Therefore, because security incidents are now are probable cause of safety
incidents, safety incidents can no longer only be classified as accidents’.
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what the operator was doing at the moment of the accident, what was the ‘pre-
scribed behaviour’ (i.e., what behaviour was expected from the operator) and what
was the expected ‘performance’ for this task. Finding the root cause of an accident
can then often be reduced to sort out the factors that caused a ‘deviation from the
prescribed behaviour’ or a ‘degradation in the performance’, and the remedy can be
implemented by redesigning the human-machine interface or revising the procedure.
In security, depending on the attack under scrutiny, this information may not be
available to support the investigations. Indeed, an RCA for security will face a much
more heterogeneous set of contexts, ranging from investigations on attacks on indus-
trial systems where information is available, to investigations on web-applications
with little data to support the analysis. Furthermore, where in safety investigations
can encompass interviews and on-site collection of evidences, the security field is
not used to perform this kind of investigation for security incidents. Most data are
machine generated and almost no contact occurs with the end-user (although this
tends to change, see for instance Slack’s anomaly detection system [93]).
5.2.3.2 Analysis
(D4) In safety, RCA techniques are widely used and the human component is a
central part of practices. In security, the use of RCA methods is often advocated
but lacks human-related insights.
Information Security Management frameworks such as COBIT [99] and ITIL [11],
like other information security best practices, already advocate the use of RCA to
find out what went wrong with a system after an incident. Techniques such as the 5
Whys [122] used in combination with Ishikawa diagrams [100] or Event and Causal
Factors Analysis diagrams are advised, but they have several shortcomings. The
main such shortcomings being the lack of objectivity and diversity of the analyses.
Indeed, as these techniques o↵er little guidance, their results are limited to the
analyst’s knowledge and are di↵erent from analyst to analyst. These techniques
lack the support to help the analysts to explore causes that they could not think
about. In this regard, Verizon’s Data Breach Investigation Report [26] that advises
to perform 5 Whys analyses, is careful when it comes to mentioning root causes
and prefers the term of ‘victim’s critical omissions’ because ‘even with a detailed
technical report, the actual root cause typically boils down to process and human
decision making’. Thus, the RCA methods used in security acknowledge human
actions in their investigations but fail to examine the causes and factors driving
these actions.
(D5) In safety, a ‘human error’ is a well defined concept that can be the starting
point of an analysis. In security, ‘human error’ is considered a system’s failure
mode that does not call for investigations. Considering every user’s negative
impacts on the system’s security—including those resulting from an attack—as
‘Human Error’ to use safety methods is debatable.
One can argue that safety’s ‘human error’ and the techniques used to understand
it are irrelevant in security because the behaviours that caused an attack to succeed
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are not ‘human errors’, but the result of the attack or a deception. We choose to
adopt Strauch’s definition of ‘Human Error’[163]; a ‘human error’ is ‘an action or
decision that results in one or more unintended negative outcomes’. Thus, in a secu-
rity analysis setting, these negative outcomes are the loss of some security properties.
As we will see later, we consider the loss of security through user exploitations as
system failures; moreover, we consider that we can use safety-inspired techniques to
tackle such failures. In this setting, the attacker is no di↵erent from the wind for an
aircraft’s pilot: an additional element that the user has to cope with and that can
lead the user to err, and commit actions that lead to adverse events. Thus, safety’s
retrospective analysis methods can be used to identify the contributors to ‘human
errors’ in security.
The conclusion is not the same for a prospective analysis though. Security practi-
tioners are used to consider the attacker’s point of view to find likely attacks. Indeed,
they often find possible attacks by posing hypotheses about attacks, and potential
factors that could be manipulated to build a path towards a goal. This usually leads
to the construction of Proof of Concepts—or in STEAL, experiments—in which
potential attacks, and the exploitation of identified factors are demonstrated. As
explained in Section 5.2.2, in safety, these ‘what if’ scenarios are analysed through
prospective analyses to predict the consequences of a random event, and the prob-
abilities of di↵erent outcomes depending on human performance. But in security,
there is no gain in knowing how an event will unfold or what is the probability of an
outcome, because an attack’s success is a terminal failure from a security point of
view, and it can not be recovered, no matter how the user performs afterwards. Con-
versely, identifying socio-technical vulnerabilities in a system—what are the entry
points to an adverse outcome—is a success. This di↵erence in the consideration of
‘Human Errors’ makes prospective analysis for security, or the study of the forward
propagation of a ‘human error’ in the system straightforward. Indeed, we are not
interested in predicting the probability of occurrence of an adverse event; predicting
its potentiality along with its contributors and pre-conditions is enough. The main
rationale behing this is that if a ‘human error’ aligns with an attacker’s goal, there
is a potential threat that needs to be contained.
Furthermore, where in security, the distance to the attacker’s goal constitutes an
heuristic to traverse a tree of possible consequences of an event, in safety, the duty
of cutting branches of the tree of possibilities is left to the expertise of the analyst.
Consequently, without proper heuristics or an expert guiding the analysis, safety’s
prospective analyses lead to combinatorial explosions of outcomes for an event.
This di↵erences between RCA in safety and in security hint that retrospective
analysis can easily ported from safety to security, whereas prospective analysis may
need a di↵erent approach altogether.
(D6) In safety, there is always some root cause that can be isolated for an incident.
In security, the root cause of the success of an attack is always the attacker.
If we keep in mind that a root cause is the one cause that, if removed, prevents
an incident from happening, then for a security incident the root cause is always
the attacker. Thus, an RCA for security does not search for a root cause, but for
contributors—or factors that the attacker could have manipulated to produce the
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adverse event. This property of the RCA contributes to avoiding the stereotypical
blaming putting all contributors (e.g., environmental, technological, psychological,
et cetera) on the same level of importance. We expect this choice to broaden the
scope of the search for contributors and foster the analyst’s objectivity. Indeed,
an RCA methodology that operates this way could prevent the confirmation bias
that is a threat for any analyst-based analysis (see for instance Heuer’s work on
psychological factors’ influence in intelligence analysis [89]).
(D7) In safety, an analysis begins from the terminal point of failure: the observable
incident. In security, an attack/incident can be an intermediate step leading to
other attacks/incidents. Therefore we might not be able to observe the factual
consequences of an attack/incident on a system.
In safety, an incident can be combined or followed by other incidents to create the
final incident that calls for an investigation by RCA. This last incident of the chain
is the final state of the system, the system failure state. In security, an incident can
actually be an attack’s step and open paths to further attacks, including the user or
not. Indeed, the e↵ect obtained on a system by the attacker can provide him with
new capabilities that could help him to further gain privileges or harm the system’s
security. While this does not imply anything on the RCA per se, it has implications
on the results of the RCA: the results need to enable computer security techniques
to investigate the implications of these new capabilities.
5.2.3.3 Recommendations generation
(D8) In safety, removing the root cause prevents the incident from reoccurring. In
security, where the root cause is the attacker (see (D6)), technical controls can
be applied on the attacker to reduce its capabilities, and socio-technical controls
can be applied on the other contributors.
Where RCA in safety follows Reason’s Swiss cheese metaphor (see Section 5.2.1),
computer security utilises a derived notion of ‘defence in depth’ strategy [135], where
a threat is contained by several layers of barriers. An attacker who successfully
performs an attack on a system breaks through all these layers, and when this
attack is a socio-technical attack, it breaks through social layers. As introduced
earlier, human-related factors in safety were extensively studied for decades [32],
and methods have been created to use the knowledge gained over the years [167].
In security, human-related factors are only studied for roughly 15 years [184], with
little progresses [150], and no systematic methods to solve human-related issues are
available. Thus, in the case of a STA, an attacker traverses social layers that are
well-studied by the safety field, and technical ones that are well-studied in computer
security.
Considering that an attacker performs a STA by manipulating the contributors
to an adverse event, we are interested in producing recommendations to control these
contributors and prevent the attack from being repeated. But as explained earlier,
producing recommendations for computer security is a complex matter, because
the attacker strikes on several layers and, depending on the layer, the means to
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thwart the attack is completely di↵erent. For instance, on the technical side, formal
methods can be used to prove that, given a Threat Model, certain security properties
are met on a system; while education can be delivered to the end users to cover the
social side. We argue that the added value of an RCA for socio-technical security is
to complement existing computer security methods. Thus, we are not interested in
finding contributors and producing recommendations related to the technical layers,
but in the social layer, and its interactions with the technical ones. Thus, where in
safety, an RCA is used to tackle social, technical, and organisational issues, an RCA
for security must focus on the blind spot that computer sciences methods have for
the human component, and propagate findings to the methods used for the technical
layers. By providing a Threat Model closer to reality for instance.
(D9) In safety, an adverse event, being coincidental, may never reoccur on similar
systems. In security, an attack incident will reoccur because attackers actively
probe similar systems to recreate it. The sharing of recommendations is thus
critical.
In safety, recommendations to an incident can be shared or enforced by regula-
tions to prevent the incident to coincidentally occur on similar systems. In security,
the risk of re-occurrence is di↵erent because it is a malicious actor who provokes
the incident, and this actor actively probes other systems for the existence of the
incident’s contributors in order to exploit them. Therefore, when an attack is ob-
served on a system and recommendations produced, others systems should also be
considered, and the recommendations should designed to be shared.
5.2.3.4 Implementation of recommendations
(D10) In safety, people involved in incidents that require an RCA are mostly trained
professionals (e.g., pilots, air tra c controllers, power plant operator). In
security, the corresponding people are much more diverse with regard to their
relevant skills and knowledge (e.g., children, bank employees, elderly people,
medical doctor). Furthermore they can have motives and concerns unrelated
to security.
Where in safety, some recommendations can be implemented in regulations, laws
and organisational policies, implementation of recommendations is less straightfor-
ward in computer security. Standards do exist for companies. For instance, com-
panies need to comply with PCI-DSS [143] to process credit card information. But
as security is now integral in every business, segmented standards do not appear
to be a suitable solution. Umbrella laws exist to push companies that handle per-
sonal data to be liable for data breaches (see, for instance, in Europe [39]), and ‘to
implement security measures that guarantee a level of security appropriate to the
risk presented’ [137], but these texts do not provide the level of details found in
aeronautics or nuclear safety regulations.
Individuals can be professionals, and professionals follow training and have to
follow the rules edited by their hierarchy. Regarding other individuals, they may
have to follow a compulsory training to get a licence for an activity, for instance,
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driving. When an activity is not subject to any licence, information can be provided
to the end-user to foster a safe behaviour, or the environment is altered to add safe-
guards to lower the consequences of an adverse event (and this is enforced by law).
For instance, stickers are placed on the walls inside a building to inform people of the
safest route the get out of it, and seatbelts are placed in cars to avoid being ejected
in case of accident. In security, recommendations on the environment are similar
but controlling user behaviours has to follow other routes than enforced discipline,
because even in professional settings, coercion does not work well [113]. Therefore,
to control human-related contributors, we can resort to education [138], persuasion
techniques [87], behaviour change theories (for instance, see Barrier Analysis [48]),
nudges [180], or even gamification [49].
(D11) In safety, root causes are identified and controlled. In security, it may be
impossible to control all identified contributors that will be actively manipulated
by the attacker.
In safety, a root cause can usually be identified and reliably controlled. But, in
security, the attacker can find its way around a control, and expose the corresponding
contributor. Therefore, complementary computer security methods should be used
to account for the consequences of an attack on a contributor, even if the contributor
is controlled. Furthermore, attacks performed on a system can be replayed on similar
—but not identical— systems, and variations of attacks can emerge, using part of
the same set of contributors. Thus, in security, it is important to consider the
implementation of recommendations as one barrier for an attack, not a remedy.
5.2.4 Towards an RCA for Socio-Technical Security: Chal-
lenges
The di↵erences we have highlighted for each step of the RCA in Section 5.2.3 suggest
that we cannot easily migrate RCA from safety to socio-technical security unless we
solve a few challenges.
5.2.4.1 Data collection and investigation
As in safety, before analysing an incident, data should be collected. However since
there is no established process to do so (D1), and we deal with an attacker and aim
at fostering Threat Intelligence (D2), and since the context is unknown (D3), the
first challenge we have to face is the following:
(C1) Addressing the lack of knowledge and structured data: The challenge
is to compile and format the needed factual information about the investigated
attack to allow for the RCA to be performed. In particular, it is important to
describe what the attacker does and what are the attack’s e↵ects on the user
and on the system’s security. Furthermore, The RCA should provide precise
information regarding the data to collect and the Indicators of Compromise of
a STA.
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5.2.4.2 Analysis
As in safety, an RCA for computer security will have an Analysis phase. As previ-
ously stated, this phase should encompass the human’s erroneous action (D4) and
(D5), provide contributors more than a sole Root Cause (D6), and support the
analysis of sub-sequent attacker’s moves (D7). Furthermore, objectivity and sys-
tematicity of the analysis are part of the motivations of this work; therefore, the
second challenge is:
(C2) Investigating Attacks: The RCA for security must output a set of contribu-
tors and human-related factors that are likely to explain the success of attacks,
or potential attacks. Additionally, the analysis should safeguard against one
inherent shortcoming of RCA: the possible lack of objectivity.
5.2.4.3 Recommendations generation
Providing recommendations as they are produced in safety does not pose any chal-
lenge and is achievable by an RCA for security. However, as explained in Sec-
tion 5.2.3.3, providing recommendations is not enough to thwart Socio-Technical
Attacks. Indeed, in addition to recommendations, an RCA for socio-technical secu-
rity should support existing security methods (D8) and the sharing of information
(D9). Therefore, the third challenge is:
(C3) Creating reusable knowledge: To integrate with existent computer secu-
rity’s techniques, the RCA technique should provide direct links between the
attacker’s capabilities and their e↵ects on a system’s security. The end goal
is to be able to augment a said threat model with capabilities that an attacker
can gain by performing user-mediated attacks allowed by the threat model.
5.2.4.4 Implementation of recommendations
Implementation of recommendations as provided in safety is also achievable by an
RCA for security. But, as explained by (D10), the controls act upon contributors and
not the root cause, and (D11) that we may not be able to control all contributors,
there is a need of synergy between social and technical methods to thwart further
attacks. Therefore the last challenge is as follows:
(C4) Match patterns of known attacks: The RCA, in addition to the retrospec-
tive analysis of past attacks needs to provide a socio-technical security analysis
where, from a system’s description, socio-technical vulnerabilities, along with
their contributors are listed.
5.2.4.5 Subsidiary challenges
A subsidiary challenge emerges from the dynamic dimension of security:
(C5) Being flexible: As computer systems, the threats that they are exposed to,
their practices and the research surrounding these topics evolve continuously,
the method should be flexible enough to adapt to new threat, attacks, and tech-
nologies.
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5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced RCA techniques used in the safety field, and ex-
plained how inspiration from these techniques to perform socio-technical security
analysis could be beneficial for complementing the framework introduced in Chap-
ter 3.2: STEAL. Several di↵erences were identified between safety and security to
produce a list of five challenges that one needs to tackle in order to build a useful
RCA methodology for security. In the next chapter, we present our methodology—
S·CREAM—that aims at tackling all these challenges and providing computer secu-
rity with a systematic tool to improve e↵ective security of socio-technical systems.
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Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must
be the truth.
—Sir Arthur Ignatius Conan Doyle, ‘The Sign of the Four’
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In this chapter we present S·CREAM, an RCA technique for secu-
rity. First, we introduce the technique’s process and concepts, then we
detail the implementation of S·CREAM along with a companion tool:
S·CREAM assistant. Part of the content of this chapter appears in ‘In
Cyber-Space No One Can Hear You S·CREAM - A Root Cause Analysis
for Socio-Technical Security’ by Ana Ferreira, Jean-Louis Huynen,
Vincent Koenig, and Gabriele Lenzini published in the Proceedings of
the 11th International Workshop on Security and Trust Management
(STM 2015, Vienna, Austria) [67].
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, we introduced RCA techniques in safety and the challenges that an
RCA should meet to be beneficial for the field of security.
In the present chapter, we propose our own RCA for security that is inspired
by one particular RCA technique: the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis
Method (CREAM) [91]. The resulting methodology, called S·CREAM (a contraction
of Security and CREAM), is a complete revision of the technique that we extended
and adapted to work in security.
Contribution. We devise a method, S·CREAM, which when applied to a spe-
cific security incident, helps analysts investigate how attackers may have pushed
users to perform hazardous actions causing the incident. This capability to iden-
tify the factors that would have potentially contributed to the success of an attack
is S·CREAM’s main contribution and is inspired by the RCA techniques found in
safety. However, to integrate S·CREAM into the landscape of computer security
tools and methods, we augment it with subsidiary capabilities. S·CREAM can
reuse knowledge on attacks, thus allowing for the identification of weaknesses in
other systems before such incident recurs. This new capability provides the two
following modalities, depending on how analysts apply our method: (a) applied on
a set of analysed attacks, S·CREAM helps compile a catalogue of vulnerabilities,
called Socio-Technical Attack Modes (AMs), which attackers can exploit to manip-
ulate user’s actions; (b) applied over a specific system, S·CREAM helps investigate
the system’s resilience against a specific threat model.
Outline. This chapter covers our implementation of an RCA method for socio-
technical security —S·CREAM, and its technical implementation in a tool —
S·CREAM assistant . The di↵erences introduced in Section 5.2.4 lead to the
challenges that S·CREAM must consider and address. Section 6.2 introduces a high
level description of S·CREAM’s concepts and process. In Section 6.3, we explain
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Figure 6.1: The generic process of an RCA against the challenges introduced in
Section 5.2.4.
the method’s internal mechanisms in detail. Eventually, we present S·CREAM
assistant in Section 6.4.
6.2 S·CREAM’s process and concepts
6.2.1 Overview
Building an RCA for a socio-technical security analysis means addressing the five
challenges listed in Chapter 5. We show that considering these five challenges leads
to a new process, which we obtained by modifying the generic RCA process. Fig-
ure 6.2 sketches the reviewed process, whereas Figure 6.1 recalls the original RCA
process. In both pictures, we show how the process addresses (or fails to address)
the five challenges.
The steps structure S·CREAM’s high-level work flow, successively detailed in
Section 6.3. The reviewed process is still made of four steps, each addressing one
challenge, while the fifth challenge is addressed by the all steps taken together.
In the next subsections, we comment on why addressing the challenges intro-
duced in Chapter 5 requires S·CREAM to follows a non-standard process. We also
comment on a high-level description of S·CREAM.
6.2.2 The failure of the generic RCA process
Figure 6.1 shows how the generic process of an RCA would fail, if used for security
to address challenges C3, C4, and C5 (coloured in red in the Figure).
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The first two steps of the process seem to be, in appearance, easily adaptable to
security analysis. The first step could collect data about an attack and its indica-
tors as stated in C1. The second step could implement a customised retrospective
analysis that identifies contributors to STAs, and address C2. However, the process
is unable to address C3 and C4. Used without adaptation, the third step would
take the root causes yielded from the retrospective analysis of an attack and gen-
erate recommendations for this attack. Eventually, these recommendations would
be implemented to prevent the occurrence of this, and only this, precise attack on
a system. However, such a generic RCA step is not informative enough to address
C3 and C4 because it is too specific to the system under investigation. The generic
process of an RCA is not designed to produce recommendations that can be trans-
fered to other systems to impede the presence of the socio-technical vulnerabilities
enabling the attack.
6.2.3 S·CREAM’s overall process
The process is designed to be followed by a security analyst, a person investigating
attacks or a system’s socio-technical security.
As for the generic process, steps are backward-dependent. Each step builds on its
preceding step, and thereby, depends on the successful completion of the preceding
step. For instance, one cannot obtain a list of the possible contributors to an attack
without first describing the attack. This dependency is depicted in Figure 6.2 and
read as follows: each step requires all its neighbour steps on the left to be executed
beforehand.
For each step, we describe its concepts (what it is about), input (what it needs
to operate), output (what it produces), and operation (how it operates). We supple-
ment the exposition by referring to the following toy example of an attack wherever
necessary:
The setting is a system S1 on which a user can perform an action A1
following a request for the identity I1. An attacker aims at executing an
action A1 on a system S1. To do so, it sends a message that imitates
the graphical identity of I1, and that contains the request to perform the
action A1 on S1, to a user. This user confuses the attacker for I1 and
performs the action A1 on S1 on behalf of the attacker.
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Figure 6.2: S·CREAM process and steps. The figure’s Security Analysis step (see
Section 6.2.7) sketches the semi-automatic modality. An expert-driven modality
reuses the Data Collection and Investigations and the Retrospective Analysis steps
to investigate potential attacks, and then appends its products to the semi-automatic
Security Analysis ’s results. Acronyms used in the figure: PR = Pre-Requisites, Co =
Contributor, Ef = E↵ect, STC = Socio-Technical Capability, TM = Threat Model.
6.2.4 First step: Data collection, and investigations
This step addresses C1 and supports the resolution of the other challenges by struc-
turing the data related to the attack under scrutiny.
Concepts
Definition 1 (Attack description scheme) The Attack description
scheme is a template that guides the collection of information. The scheme
contains the list of information needed for the subsequent analysis to be
performed successfully.
Definition 2 (Pre-Requisites) The Pre-Requisites (PRs) are flags associ-
ated with the di↵erent fields contained in the Attack description scheme. They
represent the capabilities that an attacker is required to possess in order to
perform the attack.
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Inputs
• The factual information gathered about the attack (i.e., through Digital
Forensics, Incident Response, live monitoring, and in person investiga-
tion).
• An attack description scheme. The scheme will define the structure of the
information that this and the other steps will process, and the PRs that
can be applied on this information. This scheme structures the way the
analyst will later on generalise attacks, and test other systems for socio-
technical vulnerabilities. For instance, expressing attacks’ PRs in terms
of capabilities on protocols is di↵erent from expressing these same PRs
in terms of capabilities on security ceremonies. We take these decisions
for our implementation of the Data Collection and Investigations steps
described in Section 6.3.2. Furthermore, information about the attacker,
the e↵ect of the attack on the system, the system, and the context will be
used in the Retrospective Analysis . This information constrains the uni-
verse of Contributors that can be discovered. For instance, Contributors
related to the user state of mind cannot be yielded by the Retrospective
Analysis if not collected and stored in the attack description.
Output A factual, structured description of the attack with its PRs.
Operation The analyst uses the gathered information to fill the scheme and seeks
further information about the attack when needed. Information can be gath-
ered through di↵erent means of investigation. The security analyst ponders
upon which fields to define as required by setting the PRs on the attack’s
description (by ticking check boxes for instance).
We now give an example with a generic scheme. This scheme asks for a textual
description of the Attacker’s actions, their e↵ect on the system’s security, the User’s
behaviour, the System, and the Context. Here is a description of the output produced
by the Data Collection and Investigations step using the example scheme, and the
toy attack example as inputs:
• Attacker’s actions: what information did the attacker gather to perform the
attack, what is the form and content of the messages sent, what is their time of
appearance et cetera. In our example, the attacker sends a message imitating
the graphical identity of I1 and a request to perform A1 on S1.
• E↵ect on the system’s security: what are the consequences of the success of
the attack on the system. What the attacker achieved. In our example, the
unauthorised attacker performed the action A1 via the user.
• User’s behaviour: what are the user’s behaviours that allowed the attack to be
a success, what should the user have done to avoid the attack. In our example:
the user performs A1 on S1.
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• System’s description: information about the interactions between the user and
the system as well as about the interfaces mediating these interactions. In our
example, I1 is authorised to issue requests to the user.
• Context’s description: information about the context in which the attack oc-
curred and the context in which the user-system interactions usually occurs.
• PRs to perform the attack: what the attacker needs to control and what
capabilities he needs to be able to perform the attack. In our example, the
attacker needs to be able to ‘send a message’ and to ‘imitate the graphical
identity’.
We describe our implementation of the Data Collection and Investigations step
in Section 6.3.
6.2.5 Second step: Retrospective Analysis
The Retrospective Analysis step addresses the challenge that we called C2 in Chap-
ter 5. It provides the analyst with a method to extract the Contributors of an
attack’s success.
Concepts
Definition 3 (Error Mode) An Error Mode (EM) is the analogue of a fail-
ure mode as is used in technological failure analysis. An EM describes the
observable user’s erroneous behaviour in space and time. Defining the EM of
an observed erroneous action will for instance clarify if the user performs an
action at the wrong time, or an action on the wrong object.
Definition 4 (Contributor) A Contributor is a characteristic pertaining to
any component of the system where the attack has occurred, that has facilitated
the attack’s success.
Inputs It is the output of theData Collection and Investigations step. In particular,
it is information about the Attacker’s actions, the user’s behaviours, the system
and the context.
Output
• A list of EMs, or the errors corresponding to the user’s observed behaviour
that permitted the success of the attack.
• A list of Contributors that are responsible for the occurrence of the said
observed behaviour.
Operation This step’s operation is based on cause-consequent links that the ana-
lyst follows until he identifies likely Contributors to the attack. The analyst
first identifies what EMs drove the user’s insecure behaviour, then he follows
the causal relationships S·CREAM provides until he finds a satisfactory list of
Contributors.
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In our toy example, the observed error mode is that the user misidentifies a
message as emanating from I1. We reckon that the Retrospective Analysis would
identify the fact that the received message mimicked the graphical identity of this
entity as Contributor. With additional information, S·CREAM could identify more
Contributors. For instance, the malicious message could have been received at a
time when a genuine message from the spoofed entity was expected, and the ‘Habits
and expectations’ Contributor could have been selected.
In the setting of our process, the identified Contributors are used in the next
step: the Generalisation step. It is worth mentioning here that if one wanted only
to study one attack on a particular system, one could follow the generic process of
RCA described earlier and produce recommendations to thwart this attack on this
particular system. Such recommendations are not directly provided by S·CREAM.
It is the analyst’s duty to produce the recommendations about the controls that
should be applied to prevent the recurrence of the attack on the system, from the
list of Contributors yielded by the Retrospective Analysis .
Our implementation based on CREAM along with the associated tool are de-
scribed in great lengths in Section 6.3.3 and in Section 6.4.
6.2.6 Third step: Generalisation
The Generalisation step addresses the challenge that we called C3 in Chapter 5.
Unlike the other steps, the Generalisation requires not only one but several success-
ful preceding steps (Retrospective Analysis) to operate. The Generalisation step
is meant to create reusable links between the attacker’s capabilities and security
incidents. These links then enable an analyst to probe a system for socio-technical
vulnerabilities under a Threat Model (see the Security Analysis step).
Concepts
Definition 5 (Socio-Technical Capability) A Socio-Technical Capability
(STC) is the capability to produce an e↵ect harmful for a system’s security
by performing a user-mediated attack. This e↵ect can be directly or indirectly
harmful for the system’s security. This means, producing an e↵ect on another
component that will ultimately harm the system’s security is also an STC.
In our toy example, we can identify the action A1 as being an STC, however,
we can also identify Identity Spoofing as an STC because spoofing I1’s identity
is an e↵ect on the user that ultimately leads to performing A1.
Definition 6 (Attack Mode) An Attack Mode (AM) is a link between an
STC, one of its Contributors, and some PRs
In our example attack, if we identify ‘Expectancies of a message’ as a Con-
tributor, then an AM could be built through the following:
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• ‘Identity Spoofing’ as STC,
• ‘Expectancies of a message’ as Contributor, and
• ‘Send a message’ and ‘Reproduce any graphics’ as PRs applied on the
attacker’s capabilities.
Definition 7 (Socio-Technical vulnerability) A socio-technical vulnera-
bility is the presence of an uncontrolled AM in a system.
Definition 8 (Catalogue of Attack Modes) A catalogue of AMs is a
repository of AMs.
Inputs A set of the outputs obtained from the Data Collection and Investiga-
tions and Retrospective Analysis steps performed on previously studied at-
tacks.
Output Attack Modes compiled into a catalogue.
Operation The analyst builds Attack Modes by grouping the outputs from several
corresponding Data Collection and Investigations and Retrospective Analy-
sis steps together. The analyst chooses which STCs to create depending on the
attacks he analysed before the Generalisation step. For instance, if he studied
several attacks related to pretexting, he may have gained knowledge about the
Contributors that facilitate spoofing identities. From this list of Contributors
and descriptions of attacks, he can decide to create a Spoof STC.
Indeed, generalising a set of attacks into a catalogue of AMs starts with a
simple question: ‘What are the STCs gained through these attacks?’. Once
this question is answered, the description of the AMs consists of, for each AM,
appending the PRs defined in the Data Collection and Investigations step
and one Contributor identified during the Retrospective Analysis step of an
attack to the STCs, which the analyst identified has being gained during this
attack. The catalogue of AMs is built by repeating this process for all the
identified Contributors that correspond to the attacks that the analyst wants
to generalise.
For instance, if we represent an AM as a the three constituents: PRs (PR), a
Contributor (Co), an STC (STC); an AM built from the attack in our example
would be:
(PR1, Co1, STCA)
With:
• PR1 = (Send message, Imitate graphical identity)
• Co1 = (Habits and Expectancies)
• STCA= A1
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But this AM is not generalised as the action A1 can be specific to the system
S1 on which it is performed. If we want our AMs to be reusable and helpful in
preventing an attacker to perform an attack, say Attack 2, identical to Attack
1 but launched on a di↵erent system, and therefore, targeted to the specific
action of this second system, we need to set the AM’s STC to a common e↵ect
between these attacks.
As defined earlier, an STC can be an e↵ect that ultimately causes harms to the
system’s security. We can thus choose to build AMs with the STC ‘Identity
Spoofing’ and obtain:
(PR1, Co1, Identity spoofing)
(PR2, Co2, Identity spoofing)
The AMs now reflect what has been observed in past attacks and provide links
between an Attacker’s capabilities, e↵ects that have had security consequences
in the past, and what Contributors one should control to prevent this kind of
attack from recurring. Furthermore, Contributors can be used as Indicators of
an STA as the manipulation of these Contributors can betray the occurrence
of an attack.
Our implementation of the Generalisation step is described in Section 6.3.4.
6.2.7 Fourth step: Security Analysis
This step is where the information gained in the Retrospective Analysis step and
generalised in the Generalisation step can be reused by the analyst for addressing the
challenge C4 introduced in Chapter 5. This step operates following the two following
modalities: a mandatory semi-automated Security Analysis and an optional expert-
driven Security Analysis .
6.2.7.1 Semi-automatic Security Analysis
In this step’s modality, the analyst makes use of a catalogue of AMs previously
built by generalising STAs. The analysis identifies socio-technical vulnerabilities in
a system by filtering the catalogue of AMs by the Threat Model that applies to this
system.
Concepts
Definition 9 (Threat Model) Determines the attacker’s capabilities, and
optionally, the attacker’s goal in terms of the STC in question.
For instance, an attacker can be enabled to send messages optionally with the
goal of spoofing identities.
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Definition 10 (Contributor) In this prospective context, a Contributor is
a characteristic pertaining to any component of the system that can contribute
(because it already did in the past on another system in another attack) to an
attack.
Inputs The inputs are a catalogue of AMs and the system to be analysed.
Output This step outputs a list of socio-technical vulnerabilities. That is to say a
list of STCs, Contributors couples.
Operation The analyst must, in turn, perform several operations, which are as
follows:
First, the analyst describes the Threat Model that is applied to the system in
the same scheme used to describe the attacks employed to build the catalogue
of AMs.
Then, the analyst filters the catalogue of AMs in order to list the AMs which
have PRs that fit into the system’s Threat Model.
Hence, if the catalogue is only made of the two AMs built from the previous
example and that for the Threat Model TMS, PR1 does not fit TMS and PR2
fits TMS:
¬(PR1 ✓ TMS) ^ (PR2 ✓ TMS)
Then, only the AM with the PRs PR2 is listed in the output. It constitutes the
list of potential socio-technical vulnerabilities identified for the system under
the Threat Model TMS:
(Co2 , Identity spoofing)
6.2.7.2 Analyst-driven Security Analysis
The analyst-driven Security Analysis is an optional path for the Security Analy-
sis where the analyst can input additional insights into the results.
Concepts
Definition 11 (Potential Attack) An attack that the analyst reckons is
possible against the system but for which no factual information exists. It is
a plausible ‘what if ’ scenario.
Inputs The knowledge the analyst has of the potential attack.
Output A list of Contributors to the potential attack.
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Operation The analyst must, in turn, perform several operations, which are as
follows:
First, the analyst identifies a potential attack against the system under
scrutiny.
Then, he proceeds to investigate this attack by performing a Retrospective
Analysis step (preceded by a Data Collection and Investigations), which yields
the attack’s Contributors.
Our implementation of the Security Analysis step is described in Section 6.3.6.
6.2.8 Controlling socio-technical vulnerabilities
S·CREAM’s outputs were designed to allow an analyst to thwart potential user-
mediated attacks by: (i) applying controls on the Contributors of identified socio-
technical vulnerabilities, (ii) leverage the use of computer security methods by listing
the STCs attainable by an attacker given a Threat Model, and (iii) providing Indi-
cators of STAs.
Thus, depending on the presence of a Contributor in the system and the success
of the di↵erent methods, there are several paths that an analyst can follow:
• The Contributor is not found: In this case, the socio-technical vulnerability
does not exist in the system.
• The Contributor is found and reliable controls can be applied: In this case, the
analyst applies recommendations as he would have done in a generic RCA pro-
cess. The socio-technical vulnerability is controlled and the system’s security
is safe.
• The Contributor is found but no reliable control can be applied: In this
case, the system has a gaping socio-technical vulnerability. The analyst can
then turn to computer security methods to prove that the system is secure
against an extended Threat Model that incorporates the newly discovered
socio-technical vulnerability. If it can’t be proven secure, then the analyst can
attempt to redesign the system to make it secure against the extended Threat
Model.
• If everything else fails, S·CREAM’s outputs can be considered to create so-
phisticated Indicators of STAs that can be used, for instance, to monitor the
system and respond quickly to a security incident.
6.3 S·CREAM’s implementation
We describe our implementation of S·CREAM, the technique we devised by cus-
tomising the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) and that
proposes as a way to identify Contributors of Socio-Technical Attacks (STAs).
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6.3.1 Implementation Choices
6.3.1.1 Building the Retrospective Analysis at the heart of the Root
Cause Analysis method
We selected CREAM [91] as our preferred Root Cause Analysis (RCA). CREAM
is a 2nd generation Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method. By considering
cognitive causes of errors, CREAM brings a great deal of details into the analysis
of an accident, and because of such richness in details, it has been criticised in
HRA [27]. However, such richness is what makes CREAM a great candidate for
computer security. Indeed, more than identifying solely the root cause of an attack,
we are interested in identifying its potential Contributors, or in other words, all the
factors that an attacker could have used to push the human involved in the attack
to behave erroneously and compromise the system’s security. Among other criteria,
the most important aspect of CREAM is that it o↵ers retrospective and prospective
analysis. Thus, it provides us with bi-directional links between causes and e↵ects.
This allows us to build a catalogue of Attack Modes (AMs) that can be used for both
detecting attacks (starting from observed e↵ects) and predicting attacks (starting
from a threat model).
CREAM relies on the two following pillars: (i) a classification of erroneous actions
(this is represented in tables linked together by causal relationships) and (ii) a
method that describes how to follow these links back to the human as well as the
contextual and the technological factors at the origin of an ‘event’. An event is
caused by the manifestation of an ‘erroneous action’, and is called the phenotype [91].
The confluence of underlying factors that made the erroneous action arise is called
its genotype. CREAM’s tables of causal relationships between antecedent (cause
of errors) and consequent (e↵ect of errors) link a phenotype with its genotype [91].
Following these causal relationships, it is possible to find what caused an erroneous
action and the root cause(s) of an event.
CREAM is the building block of our method, however, it needs to be customised
for security. We call the result S·CREAM, which stands for ‘Security CREAM’.
S·CREAM is explained in the following sections.
6.3.1.2 Choosing a source to bootstrap S·CREAM’s catalogue of AMs
We bootstrap S·CREAM’s catalogue of AMs with a library of known attack patterns
drawn from Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [41].
This library contains attacks ‘generated from in-depth analysis of specific real-world
exploit examples.’1 It is maintained by MITRE Corporation, and it compiles and
documents a wide range of attacks centered on the user. We use CAPEC’s repository
to extract and select these Attack Patterns whose success relies on critical actions
of the user. The CAPEC taxonomy contains descriptions of social-engineering At-
tack Patterns, together with their Pre-Requisites (PRs), mechanisms, and possible
mitigations.
1See https://capec.mitre.org/
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6.3.2 Implementing the Data Collection, and Investiga-
tions step of S·CREAM
There are two aspects of importance when implementing the Data Collection and In-
vestigations step described in Section 6.2: (i) the implementation should enable the
analyst to perform a sub-sequent Retrospective Analysis step to objectively choose
the paths to follow through antecedent-consequent links, and (ii) the implementa-
tion should structure the information about the attacker’s capabilities required to
perform the attack in a way that allows the analyst to filter the attacks by these
capabilities.
It is the attack description scheme that defines what data are to be collected, and
how the data should be organised, i.e., what attack properties should be defined.
The scheme is customisable. We choose to describe the e↵ects the attack has on a
system’s security and the attacker’s actions.
Describing the e↵ects. We choose to describe the consequences of an attack
on the user and on the system in text because a precise description is the key to a
successful Retrospective Analysis . Indeed, there are so many applications, user inter-
actions, decision processes, and consecutive actions possible, that the text is the best
way to forward a fine-grained description of an attack. Thus, this implementation
deviates from the Data Collection and Investigations step described in Section 6.2
by lacking structure to describe the e↵ect an attack produces on a system. This
is because creating a proper scheme is a complex matter that will be addressed in
future works, as discussed in Chapter 9.
Describing the attacker’s actions. In contrast to the e↵ects, we describe the
attacker’s actions in a very structured way. We follow what has been proposed
when introducing STEAL in Chapter 3, i.e., describing attacks as a set of messages
flowing between the attacker and the victim prior to the manifestation of the critical
action. With the notable distinction that we don’t use UML diagrams to describe all
the messages flowing between the user and the attacker, we focus on the attacker’s
messages, and we extract from them a set of common properties. Thus, the event
that initiates the attack is described through common properties shared by the
messages sent from the attacker to the user. These properties are as follows:
1. a source, which is the principal that the user believes to be interacting with,
2. an identity split into declared identity (i.e., who the attacker says he is, like the
from field of an email) and imitated identity (i.e., who the attacker imitates
to be by stealing a logo for instance),
3. a command for the user to execute,
4. a description of the subsequent action to state if the action is booby-trapped
or spoofed,
5. a sequence that describes the temporal situation of the message, and
6. a medium (web, phone, or paper).
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Describing the PRs. To describe the attacker’s capabilities that are needed to
perform the attack, we attach a pre-requisite flag to each property contained in the
scheme.
6.3.3 Implementing theRetrospective Analysis of S·CREAM
S·CREAM’s Retrospective Analysis draws from the retrospective analysis of CREAM
and includes adaptations required by our computer security focus. We sketch
CREAM’s original analysis, and S·CREAM’s analysis side-by-side in Figure 6.3.
In CREAM’s retrospective analysis, one first defines common performance con-
ditions (see left-hand side of Figure 6.3) to describe the analysed event followed by
the Error Modes to investigate. This investigation is a process where the analyst
searches for the antecedents of each Error Mode. This process is recursive, i.e., each
antecedent that an analyst finds can be investigated in turn. Antecedents justi-
fied by other antecedents are called ‘generic’, whereas those which are ‘su cient in
themselves’ are called ‘specific’. To avoid following ‘generic antecedents’ endlessly,
one must stop the investigation on the current branch when a ‘specific antecedent’ is
found to be the most likely cause of the event (in Figure 6.3, see the yes branch on
the right-hand side of the CREAM block that leads to the end state for the current
branch).
As discussed in (D6) (see Chapter 5), the computer security context in which we
intend to use CREAM’s retrospective analysis calls for a di↵erent procedure. Two
adaptations of CREAM’s retrospective analysis method are therefore needed.
First, we customise the phase preceding the investigation instead of formalising
the context in common performance conditions. S·CREAM implements a Data
Collection and Investigations step as described in the previous section (in Figure 6.3,
the description step depicted as a green box replaces the first activity of CREAM).
Second, S·CREAM uses a less restrictive stop rule to yield Contributors. By
doing so, we avoid pointing invariably to the attacker’s action, which allow us to
investigate additional contributing antecedents. Hence, where CREAM stops as soon
as a specific antecedent is found as being a likely cause of the event, S·CREAM lists
all likely specific antecedents for the event in addition to the specific antecedents
that are contained into sibling generic antecedents. It then stops the investigation
of the current branch.
As S·CREAM’s Retrospective Analysis follows a Data Collection and Investiga-
tions step (see also the red box in Figure 6.3), the analyst uses the description of
the attack to define the critical actions carried out by the victim (i.e., those with
an e↵ect on the system’s security) and the associated Error Modes. For the Retro-
spective Analysis to be possible, the analyst has to identify at least one Error Mode
for an attack. Additional Error Modes may have to be analysed in the course of
the events that lead to the critical action, for instance, if the victim first encounters
the attacker and misidentifies him/her as being trustworthy. Considering each an-
tecedent with the attack’s description in hand, the analyst follows the stop rule to
build the list of Contributors of the attack under scrutiny.
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Figure 6.3: Side-by-side comparison between CREAM (left-hand side) and
S·CREAM (right-hand side) processes.
6.3.4 Implementing the Generalisation step of S·CREAM
Building Socio-Technical Capabilities. The Generalisation step’s descrip-
tion in Section 6.2 states that this step builds AMs, or links between an attacker’s
capabilities and the e↵ects he can potentially produce on a system’s security. For
instance, sending a message that nudges a user to click on a malicious link may
allow the attacker to execute some code on the system. There may be an observable
instance of such an attack that exists, but it is not reasonable to create a Socio-
Technical Capability (STC) called ‘Remote Code Execution’ (and with it all the
AMs with the Contributors that make it possible) that links an attacker that can
send a message with this STC. Indeed, there are so many di↵erences in the usage
and the consequences of this action of clicking that it makes no sense to create STCs
based on its consequences, instead creating an STC ‘Push the user to click on an ob-
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ject’ would make more sense. For the initial development of S·CREAM’s catalogue
of AMs, we are interested in STCs that are the intermediate goals of the attacker
and are peripheral and decoupled from the system on which they are exploited.
The STCs that S·CREAM will initially provide are links between what the at-
tacker can do and the consequences on the user and not the system. We gear
S·CREAM’s Generalisation step towards STCs related to the user. Here is a list of
STCs that we foresee could be reachable by the use of S·CREAM (given that the
attacks that make use of these capabilities exist in the corpus of attacks used to
build a catalogue) and actually useful for computer security methods:
• Spoof The attacker is able to usurp another entity’s identity. This STC is,
for instance, used in phishing to impersonate an entity that is likely to send
the request contained in the phishing email.
• Block The attacker is able to block messages reaching the user by distracting
him for instance.
• Alter Some AMs may provide the attacker with the capability of changing
the perception the user has of a genuine message.
S·CREAM allows to hide some Attack Modes. As for STCs, Contributors
can be highly specific to a system or a context of attack. Thus S·CREAM provides
a way (a flag) to remove AMs that use a Contributor that is highly unlikely to be
found in other systems than the one in which it was observed (sight parallax-related
Contributors for instance). This flag can be set at any time, thus buying time for the
analyst to judge the usefulness of an AM while performing Socio-Technical Security
Analyses before deciding on its filtering.
The Generalisation step can be run numerous times on diverse sets of attacks
to enrich the resulting catalogue of AMs (and nothing forbids the creation of di↵er-
ent, specialised catalogues). In the next section, we bootstrap the catalogue using
CAPEC as the attack corpus.
6.3.5 Bootstrapping S·CREAM’s catalogue of Attack
Modes
As explained in Section 6.3.1.2, we now bootstrap S·CREAM’s catalogue of AMs
yielding attacks from the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC). Building a catalogue of AMs consists of: (i) Investigating a corpus of
attacks through the use of the Data Collection and Investigations and Retrospective
Analysis steps, and (ii) generalising the results.
6.3.5.1 Investigating CAPEC’s attacks
We identified 15 Attack Patterns out of CAPEC (retrieved on January 2016) where
the user is at the source of the success of the attack. Attack Patterns (APs) children
of CAPEC-403 Social Engineering were not selected in the first place because they
did not provide enough details about the messages flowing between the attacker and
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its victim or the e↵ect on the system’s security. In addition, CAPEC-485: Signature
Spoofing by Key Recreation was ignored because one of its PRs is that the attacker
can break private keys, and we usually consider unbreakable private keys in security
analysis.
The list of the analysed APs along with the identified Contributors is shown
in Table 6.1. For the purpose of illustration, we detail the analysis of one Attack
Pattern, the CAPEC-195 ‘Principal Spoofing’. This Attack Pattern is not considered
an issue solely from technical point of view. Its root cause mostly depends on
the user’s weaknesses and technical factors further increase its likelihood. We first
detail how we integrate this Attack Pattern into our framework, then we perform a
S·CREAM analysis of its causes of success.
Description step of CAPEC-195 ‘Principal Spoofing’. In the CAPEC-195
‘Principal Spoofing’ Attack Pattern, the attacker pretends to be an additional actor
in the interaction. This attack relies on the perception that the message content has
been sent by an honest identity. Its description in our framework can be summed
up by the following: (1) the source is another principal that the target knows, (2)
the imitated identity is used because the appearance of the message is crafted to
reflect the source’s identity, (3) the command is not specified, (4) the attacker is
the initiator of the non-spoofed action ‘disclose information’ or ‘perform action on
behalf of the attacker’, (5) the message is a continuation of a previous interaction
as the target must know the principal, and (6) the medium can either be in person,
or through the phone, smart phone, operating system, Wifi, paper, or web.
Retrospective Analysis of CAPEC-195 ‘Principal Spoofing’. The main
Error Mode (EM) of this Attack Pattern is the misidentification of the attacker for
another principal. We identify this as being a ‘Wrong object:Similar Object’ EM.
Figure 6.3 shows which path we follow among the possible antecedents for this EM.
As the declared identity is not used in this attack, the specific antecedents related to
the labeling do not contribute to the behaviour. Therefore, we continue the analysis
by looking at the generic antecedents, and following the generic antecedent ‘Wrong
identification:Incorrect identification’, the specific antecedent ‘Erroneous informa-
tion’ is selected as Contributor because the imitated identity is spoofed. This root
cause provided by S·CREAM is the same as the explanation provided by CAPEC:
the wrong information provided by the attacker tricks the user. As shown in Ta-
ble 6.2, we follow our custom stop rule and consider the other specific antecedents
and sibling generic antecedents for this branch.
6.3.5.2 Generalizing the results into a catalogue of AMs
Starting from the results of the 15 CAPEC’s APs analysed with S·CREAM, we
build a catalogue of AMs that can further be used when analysing other systems
(see Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1: Table listing the AMs corresponding to the Identity Spoofing and the
Action Spoofing STCs. The right column displays the Contributors that the AP
allowed us to identify as linked to the STC. Contributors are only appended once
to the list of each STC’s Contributors and other components of AMs such as PRs
are not displayed for the sake of space. APs are sorted numerically.
STCs CAPEC Attack Patterns List of Contributors
Identity
Spoofing
89 - Pharming
SA: Incorrect label
SA: Presentation failure
SA: Ambiguous symbol set
SA: Ambiguous signals
SA: Erroneous information
SA: Habit, Expectancy
SA: Inadequate training
SA: Multiple signals
GA: Missing information
GA: Faulty diagnosis
GA: Mislabelling
GA: Wrong reasoning
GA: Insu cient knowledge
98 - Phishing SA: Too short planning horizon
163 - Spear Phishing
164 - Mobile Phishing
194 - Fake Source of Data
195 - Principal Spoof
SA: Competing task
SA: Mis learning
SA: Error in mental model
476 - Signature Spoof by Misrepresentation
GA: Inadequate quality control
GA: Inattention
477 - Signature Spoof by Mixing Content
action
spoofing
103 - Click jacking
SA: Incorrect label
SA: Presentation failure
SA: Erroneous information
SA: Habit, expectancy
181 - Flash File Overlay
SA: Inadequate training
SA: Too short planing horizon
SA: Insu cient knowledge
222 - Iframe Overlay
501 - Activity Hijack
504 - Task impersonation
505 - Scheme Squatting
506 - Tap Jacking
SA: Ambiguous symbol set
SA: Ambiguous signals
SA: Multiple signals
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Table 6.2: Justifications for the selections of Contributors for the ‘Wrong identifi-
cation’ generic antecedent. Specific antecedents inside generic antecedents are not
displayed and specific antecedents and generic antecedents are abbreviated as SA
and GA.
Antecedent Justification
SA ‘Ambiguous Signals and
Symbols’
The usability of the interface can contribute to this Error Mode.
SA ‘Habit and Expectan-
cies’
As the message sent by the attacker is a continuation from a previous interaction we
can reasonably consider that this antecedent plays a role in the target’s behaviour.
GA ‘Distraction’ We don’t have additional information regarding the SAs contained in this GA in our
description. But it is likely that the user was performing a main task while assessing
the identity of the attacker, so we consider SA ‘Competing task’ as an additional
Contributor.
GA ‘Missing Information’ The attacker deliberately hides its real identity and the presentation fails to clearly
state the sender identity. So we consider the corresponding SAs as Contributors.
GA ‘Faulty Diagnosis’ The user may have a wrong mental model about how to assess identity, or misunder-
stood previous explanations.
6.3.5.3 Choosing the Socio-Technical Capabilities
To decide what STCs we add in the catalogue of AMs, we take inspiration from
CAPEC’s hierarchical structure. Indeed, it appears that all the studied APs were
pulled from two meta APs: CAPEC-151: Identity spoofing and CAPEC-173: Action
spoofing, and hence, we chose to create two STCs which are Identity spoofing and
Action spoofing :
• Identity spoofing : The attacker is able to usurp an identity. From a user
standpoint, the attacker is no di↵erent from the spoofed source.
• Action spoofing : The attacker is able to change an action’s target. The
user is deceived into thinking that an action he performs will behave as he
expects, whereas another action, which is harmful for the system, is executed
in its place. Opening a SMS that bricks a smart phone is an instance of such
spoofed action.
We detail the Generalisation step for one STC built from a reduced set of two
APs, then we give an overview of the full catalogue.
6.3.5.4 Compiling APs’analyses results into STCs
Despite being built from a small set of APs, the catalogue of AMs that we built
cannot be listed in this document. To illustrate the Generalisation step, we work
with the results of two APs that we compile into one STC. We focus on the results
from the S·CREAM analyses of CAPEC-195: ‘Principal Spoofing’ and CAPEC-194
‘Fake source of data’.
Table 6.3 compiles this reduced list of AMs where we can see the PRs that
an attacker needs in order to gain the Identity spoofing STC against a system.
As explained in Section 6.3.4, we only consider PRs related to the attacker in our
implementation. Table 6.3 displays on its left-hand side the Contributors yielded
from the analyses of the APs, and on its right-hand side, the PRs an attacker needs
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Table 6.3: Reduced list of AMs for the Identity spoofing STC. The attacker’s
capabilities have to match the set of the AM ’s PRs in order for the attacker to be
able to use the AM. For instance (see highlighted row), an attacker has to be in
control of his ‘Declared identity’ (he can declare himself as anyone) in a message
that is a continuation of a previous interaction between the victim and the source
(on any medium) to gain the Identity spoofing STC by exploiting the ‘Incorrect
label’ Contributor. AMs that only require the attacker to be able to send a message
are not shown for the sake of space, namely: Bad mental Models, Mislearning, and
Multiple Signals.
Attack Modes Attacker pre-requisites
Contributor Source Declared Identity Imitated Identity Command Action Sequence Medium
Ambiguous symbols - - rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
Incorrect label - rq - - - rq : continuation rq :any
Erroneous Information
- rq - - - rq : continuation rq :any
- - rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
Habits and Expectancies
- rq - - - rq : continuation rq :any
- - rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
Competing task
- rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
- - rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
Hidden information
- rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
- - rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
Presentation failure
- rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
- - rq - - rq : continuation rq :any
to meet for these AMs to be usable by an attacker. Some Contributors (i.e., Habit
and Expectancies) are duplicated because they appear in both attacks with di↵erent
sets of PRs.
6.3.5.5 The resulting catalogue of Attack Modes
As shown in Table 6.1, each of the 15 APs has been attributed to corresponding
STCs. Eight were assigned to Identity spoofing and seven to Action spoofing .
Table 6.1 has been shortened to avoid repetition and does not display the PRs
associated with each AM.
This catalogue of AMs represents the list of Contributors an attacker can exploit
to attempt to gain the corresponding STC (if its capabilities meet the PRs). We
further develop the use of such a construct in the following section.
6.3.6 Implementing the Security Analysis of S·CREAM
Once the catalogue of AMs is bootstrapped, the implementation of this step is
only a matter of filtering AMs and displaying the Contributors of linked potential
attacks. To perform the semi-automated Security Analysis , the analyst describes
the attacker’s capabilities on the system under scrutiny (the Threat Model), and
the S·CREAM assistant will then filter and display the corresponding AMs. To
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add his insights about potential attack while performing an analyst-driven Security
Analysis , the analyst attaches attacks to the system being analysed, as he would
attach attacks to an STC. To ensure that the potential attacks are indeed pos-
sible on the system, S·CREAM assistant filters out the attacks that exceed the
attacker’s capabilities described during the semi-automatic Security Analysis . Al-
beit being potential attacks, these attacks are no di↵erent from regular attacks to
the S·CREAM assistant and are investigated in the same way (Data Collection and
Investigations step then Retrospective Analysis step). Contributors corresponding
to the linked potential attacks are displayed along with the AMs resulting from
the semi-automatic Security Analysis . The di↵erence is that the AMs instructs the
analyst about STCs, whereas the Contributors yielded from the analyst-driven Se-
curity Analysis provide information on how an attacker could achieve the potential
attack’s adverse e↵ect on the system.
6.4 S·CREAM’s companion tool: S·CREAM as-
sistant
CREAM is based on tables that the analyst browses through by following causal
relationships. This task can be cumbersome and requires the analyst to take several
decisions that can undermine the analysis’ validity. For instance, the analyst can
miss a link to a table or overlook an antecedent that could have been a major
Contributor to the success of an attack. To partially address this obstacle, in [67],
we used Serwy’s software implementation of CREAM [154]. While being perfectly
suitable to perform CREAM analyses, this software does not implement any of the
customisations described in Section 6.3. We thus had to run and document these
parts using pencil and paper. The quality assurance of the results, the low costs
of operation, and the usability of the method are the main rationale behind the
inception of this tool. S·CREAM assistant greatly improves the analysis experience
by providing guidance, checking for the completion of the analysis, and providing an
interface for navigating and filtering the resulting catalogue of AMs. Indeed, given
the number of AMs and the possible filters, it is potentially unbearable to perform
some analyses without the support of a dedicated tool. Furthermore, S·CREAM
assistant facilitates the collaboration of a group of analysts.
S·CREAM assistant is an application written in JavaScript that runs locally
within a web-browser. Its code is open sourced [95] under the MIT licence.
6.4.1 Main functions
S·CREAM assistant stores the analyst’s work, provides guidance, and automates
tedious tasks encountered while running S·CREAM analyses. Its main functions
are mapped on the steps described in Section 6.2 and meet the specifications of
S·CREAM described in Section 6.3.
Description. In S·CREAM assistant , the Data Collection and Investigations step
is accessed from the ‘Retrospective Analysis’ tab. S·CREAM assistant implements
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Figure 6.3: (Previous page) Screen capture of S·CREAM assistant while performing
the Retrospective Analysis of the ‘Wrong Object’ Error Mode (EM) observed in
CAPEC-195. A green light means that we consider the specific antecedent to be a
Contributor or that we expand the generic antecedent. A red light means that we
do not consider that the antecedent contributes to the EM. Stop signs show where
stop rules are engaged.
the Data Collection and Investigations step as a form where the analyst fills in the
information related to the attack under scrutiny for the structured description.
Retrospective Analysis. As shown in Figure 6.3, S·CREAM assistant imple-
ments the Retrospective Analysis step. The analyst determines the list of EMs
observed in the attack under scrutiny from CREAM’s taxonomy of EMs. This
is done via a dialog box triggered by the ‘Manage Error Modes’ button. Then
S·CREAM assistant enables the analyst to investigate each EM with the help of an
interactive tree. By clicking on the ‘Analyse’ button, S·CREAM assistant pushes
the corresponding EM from the list into the tree view for analysis. For an EM un-
der scrutiny, S·CREAM assistant displays the possible antecedents that the analyst
has to consider as possible Contributors in the form of children to the EM root
node. S·CREAM assistant takes care of finding the children of generic antecedents
in CREAM’s tables and of implementing S·CREAM’s custom stop-rule. When a
specific antecedent is selected or unselected, the corresponding branch is automati-
cally checked to enable the stop rule on the right specific antecedent (if applicable),
and to open or to close the generic antecedents that fall under its realm. That is to
say, the generic antecedents that are siblings or children of siblings of the specific
antecedent that carries the stop rule. In addition to this, S·CREAM assistant veri-
fies automatically if the tree has reached a ‘completed’ state, meaning that at least
one Contributor to the EM under investigation has been found. At any time of this
process, the analyst can consult the results of the analysis that are compiled in a
dedicated view.
Generalisation. To build the catalogue of AMs, S·CREAM assistant enables the
analysts to store a list of STCs that they can link to the analysed attacks. As shown
in Figure 6.4, the tool displays a list of available attacks on the left and a list of
linked attacks on the right. An attack can only be linked to one STC at a time (see
data model on Figure 6.5 and specifications of S·CREAM in Section 6.2.6). Once
the attacks have been linked to an STC, the analyst can compile a list of AMs for
this STC. Each AM displays a Contributor, the exploited EM, a justification, which
is a comment that the analyst can use to justify his choice, and a check box. The
check box allows the analyst to discard an AM from further Security Analysis steps
by enabling the ‘specific’ flag (as explained in 6.3.4). The view responsible for
displaying the AMs hides the details of the description of each AM for the sake of
space, while the link to its description exists and is used in the Security Analysis step
(see below).
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Figure 6.4: Screen capture of the attacker manager for STCs in S·CREAM assistant .
Security Analysis. S·CREAM assistant supports the Security Analysis step by
allowing the analyst to filter the catalogue of AMs to view only the STCs that fit a
given Threat Model. This means that the analyst builds the list of STCs available
to an attacker that possesses the Threat Model’s capabilities. These capabilities are
described in the same way as the attacks are with each property being attached to
pre-requisite flag. The list of STCs is built by comparing for each STC, the PRs
attached to its AMs with the Threat Model’s PRs. An STC is displayed to the
analyst only if at least one of its AM fits the system’s Threat Model. Finally, the
analyst browses the STCs along with their usable AMs corresponding to the system
he described.
In addition to listing the STCs along with their AMs corresponding to a system,
S·CREAM assistant provides the analyst with the possibility to attach attacks to a
system (see Figure 6.5). This is meant to investigate potential attacks on a system
and get a more precise understanding of its socio-technical vulnerabilities. To add
attacks on a system, the analyst uses the same attacker manager as described earlier
(see Figure 6.4). The analyst can only select attacks that fit the Threat Model
described for the system.
Once, the Threat Model is described and potential attacks are linked, S·CREAM
assistant displays the list of corresponding STCs (with their AMs) along with the
Contributors corresponding to the linked attacks.
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Figure 6.5: S·CREAM Assistant data model. Tables in blue are implemented using
js-data and stored in the web-browser’s Local Storage.
6.4.2 Additional features
S·CREAM assistant allows the analyst to export and import the data stored locally.
Furthermore, to address C5 introduced in Chapter 5 (the need for flexibility of the
method), and make S·CREAM assistant ready to follow further developments of
S·CREAM, XSLT style sheets are applied on CREAM tables’ XML representation
at runtime. This allows the analyst to add, alter, or remove antecedent-consequent
links from S·CREAM in case he performs domain-specific analyses. While perform-
ing a Retrospective Analysis , the analyst can choose one of these style sheets, which
we refer to as S·CREAM flavors, to apply to the original CREAM tables.
6.4.3 Technical implementation
We wanted the application to be multi-platform, portable, and stand-alone in the
first iterations, while still being able to transpose it to a client-server model, or
even to a desktop application if we later decide so. Consequently, we chose to im-
plement S·CREAM assistant in JavaScript, storing all data in the web browser’s
Local Storage. S·CREAM assistant uses several frameworks. AngularJS [80] man-
ages the Views and the Controllers, js-data [109] handles the Models and provides
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an Object-Relation Mapping, and D3.js [22] displays the interactive tree used to
visualise S·CREAM’s Retrospective Analysis step.
As shown in Figure 6.5, S·CREAM assistant ’s data model uses di↵erent formats
and is scattered across di↵erent storages. XML, XSLT, and JSON are used to
configure S·CREAM assistant before running analyses, and Local Storage is used
at runtime to store the work in progress. JSON is also used in the import/export
feature and to store a serialised representation of the Java Script objects used at
runtime (among these the interactive tree) in the Local Storage.
An XML file is used to store CREAM’s original tables and XSLT files provide an
easy way to the analyst to create S·CREAM flavors. An analyst can add a S·CREAM
flavor by creating a corresponding XSLT style sheet, and thereafter registering the
new style sheet in the main Java Script file of S·CREAM assistant , app.js.
This aforementioned file also stores the di↵erent types of descriptions (i.e., the
STEAL-inspired one we use in this work) under the form of AngularJS constants
that the analyst can modify at will before running S·CREAM assistant .
The interactive tree is stored in the Local Storage after each change to ensure
no loss of work in case the analyst closes S·CREAM assistant or his web browser.
6.5 Conclusion
In this section, we have illustrated how we adapted CREAM, a technique used in
safety to investigate the cause of ‘human errors’, to security. The resulting tech-
nique, named S·CREAM, has been bootstrapped and given a supporting tool, the
S·CREAM assistant . In the next section, we use S·CREAM on several use-cases
and identify the Contributors that can undermine the security of the systems these
use-cases describe. Further, we assess S·CREAM’s relevance for security.
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If everything seems under control, you’re not going fast enough.
—Mario Andretti
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In this chapter, we use S·CREAM on several use cases to stress out its
relevance in security. The chosen use cases are the verification of identity
via TLS certificates in web browsers, security ceremonies encountered
when using Wi-Fi Hotspots, and YubiKey security tokens.
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6, we presented S·CREAM which is our implementation of an Root Cause
Analysis (RCA) for security that ultimately aims at answering the two following
research questions stated in Chapter 2: RQ1: How can we detect a socio-technical
vulnerability in a system?, and RQ3: How can we identify the factors that foster
human behaviours that are harmful to a system’s security?. In this Chapter, we
use S·CREAM to illustrate how it proposes answers to these research questions by
performing the Security Analysis of several use cases. The chosen use cases are
the verification of identity via Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates in web
browsers (studied with STEAL in Chapter 3), security ceremonies encountered when
using Wi-Fi Hotspots (studied with STEAL in Chapter 4), and YubiKey security
tokens [188].
Studying these use cases calls for the definition of some methods. Indeed,
S·CREAM, albeit ordering its steps to satisfy the steps’ dependencies, does not
impose a process to perform the socio-technical analysis of a system. For instance,
an analyst can use a pre-existing catalog of Attack Modes (AMs) and perform a
Security Analysis step to extend a threat model, or use the Data Collection and
Investigations and the Retrospective Analysis steps to find the Contributors to an
attack without using any of the other steps.
Methods. For each use case we, in turn, perform the semi-automatic (with the
catalog of AMs bootstrapped in Chapter 6) and the analyst-driven Security Analysis .
Given a threat model, the semi-automatic Security Analysis o↵ers a rapid overview
of the Contributors that, if found on the system under scrutiny, could be used by
an attacker to gain the corresponding Socio-Technical Capabilities (STCs) in this
system. The analyst-driven Security Analysis provides additional insights about
the Contributors that could cause a potential attack on this system to succeed. As
S·CREAM’s analyst-driven Security Analysis does not provide a mean to identify or
devise potential attacks, the analyst is left with the choice of the most appropriate
method to find these attacks (or his own expertise). We choose to use STEAL
to find potential attacks in these use cases, reusing the attacks already studied in
the previous chapters and identifying new attacks for the new one: the Yubikeys
use case. Thereafter, in a short security discussion, we explain how the identified
Contributors could be controlled, and we discuss the overlap between the results
obtained by using S·CREAM and the ones we obtained earlier using only STEAL
(if applicable). Regarding the proposition of controls and remediations, we focus
our e↵orts on Contributors found in the results of both the semi-automatic and
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the analyst-driven Security Analyses. The rationale being that the Contributors
identified by both the methods may be more likely to be exploited in the potential
attacks, and since they are identified by the semi-automatic Security Analysis , we
know that they were already exploited in the past attacks.
7.2 Authentication of identities with TLS certifi-
cates in web browsers
7.2.1 Description
We focus on one particular interaction between the user and the web browser that
appears in the validation of identities of TLS certificates: the display of interstitial
warnings (also discussed in Annex A). Some web browsers rely on these warnings
to ask the user to take a decision about whether or not to continue to connect to a
web server when the validation of the web server’s certificate fails (see Chapter 3).
This decision has security consequences that makes it critical, because connecting to
the web server that presents an invalid certificate can harm data confidentiality and
data integrity. Thus, the safe choice for a user facing such an interstitial warning
when trying to connect to a web server is to abort the connection.
7.2.2 Threat Model
The main assumption for this system is that the attacker cannot modify the inter-
actions between the user and the browser while the warning is displayed. What the
attacker can do though, is to use the area where the web pages and the browser’s
interstitial warnings are displayed to send messages to the user prior to the warning
interaction.
7.2.3 Semi-automatic Security Analysis
For compatibility with the catalogue of AMs we built in Section 6.3.5, we use the
same description scheme. We consider that this system’s Threat Model allows one
to write messages on the web medium in which the attacker controls the source,
the declared identity, the imitated identity, and the command. By assumption, the
attacker cannot spoof the action the user is about to perform (the action triggered
by the button displayed by the interstitial warning). We consider not having infor-
mation about the sequence because the attacker can impersonate any source, and
hence, we only have sequential information about the user-web browser interaction.
In consequence, by using S·CREAM assistant with the bootstrapped catalogue of
AMs populating with CAPEC, we learn that the reachable STC is Identity spoof-
ing . The Contributors identified by the semi-automatic Security Analysis are listed
in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Lists of Contributors of the Identity spoofing STC and of the potential
Man In The Middle attack. Shared Contributors are highlighted in blue.
STC: Identity Spoofing Attack: Man In The Middle
GA-Faulty diagnosis GA: Cognitive bias
GA-Inadequate quality control GA: Faulty diagnosis
GA-Inattention SA: Competing task
GA-Insu cient knowledge SA: Confusing symptoms
GA-Mislabelling SA: Erroneous analogy
GA-Missing information SA: Erroneous information
GA-Wrong reasoning SA: Error in mental model
SA-Ambiguous label SA: Habit, expectancy
SA-Ambiguous signals SA: Information overload
SA-Ambiguous symbol set SA: Inadequate training
SA-Competing task SA: Incorrect label
SA-Erroneous information SA: Misleading symptoms
SA-Error in mental model SA: Model error
SA-Habit, expectancy SA: New situation
SA-Hidden information SA: Overlook side consequent
SA-Inadequate training SA: Presentation failure
SA-Incorrect label
SA-Mislearning
SA-Model error
SA-Multiple signals
SA-Overlook side consequent
SA-Presentation failure
SA-Too short planning horizon
7.2.4 Analyst-driven Security Analysis
After the semi-automatic Security Analysis , we know that the attacker may be able
to spoof an identity. We now investigate a potential attack (detailed in Annex A)
that takes advantage of this capability and attempts to further exploit the user
to escalate to a Man In The Middle attack. This potential attack, described in
Annex A, targets the Google Chrome web browser. The attacker presents a fake
interstitial warning to the user just before the genuine warning is displayed. The
attacker’s fake interstitial warning appears no di↵erent from the genuine one to the
user as the attacker controls both the declared and the imitated identity, and it
intends to prompt the user to think that the word ‘self’ in ‘self-signed’ certificate
means ‘a certification authority called SELF’ instead of its real English meaning.
The consequence of this manipulation is that the user can misinterpret the genuine
warning when it warns the user that a web server using ‘self-signed’ certificates
should be avoided. The expected e↵ect being that the user trusts the attacker’s self-
signed certificate and allow the attacker to perform a Man In The Middle attack.
The Contributors identified by the analyst-driven Security Analysis are listed in
Table 7.1.
7.2.5 Discussion on the results and the possible remedia-
tions
Table 7.1 lists the Contributors obtained from the Security Analyses. As the Threat
Model leaves the attacker with total freedom prior to the display of the genuine
warning, there are a lot of Contributors that the attacker can exploit in its attempts
to spoof an identity.
As the Man In The Middle attack shares several Contributors with the Identity
spoofing STC, we assume that controlling these Contributors is likely to weaken
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the chances of this attack to be successful along with all the others attacks based
on this STC. We group these Contributors into the following categories and then
discuss potential remediations (a Contributor can belong to several categories):
• Attacker’s capabilities: ‘Presentation failure’, ‘Erroneous information’, and
‘Incorrect label’ are related to the technical capability of the attacker to present
fake information as being genuine to the user. One immediate remedy would
be to change the way warnings are displayed to make their impersonation
more di cult or impossible. They should be displayed in a place where the
attacker can’t write. If this is not possible, adding additional signs outside the
display area that a warning is genuine can help. The Microsoft Windows User
Account Control display is an example of this strategy.
• Human features: ‘Habit, Expectancy’, and ‘Overlook side consequent’ are
related to the tendency of people to go with the flow and are an example
of what we can’t control. ‘Inadequate training’ could be solved by better
education.
• System’s features: ‘Inadequate training’, and ‘Error in mental model’ can
be related to the system. The use of a web browser should not need any
specific training. The web browser, its use of TLS as well as its behaviours
and interactions should be simple and predictable and provide a good user
experience. In a nutshell, it should be usable. Concepts that end up being
manipulated by the end users should be well-defined, and they should be
introduced only if needed. See for instance, Jackson et al.’s work on the
matter [102].
• Organisational: ‘Inadequate training’ is related to the lack of training the user
might have prior to this encounter, which could help him avoiding the threat.
7.3 Hotspot use cases
This work is based on the work presented in Chapter 4, where we identified several
‘critical actions’ in four use cases of Wi-Fi Hotspots. In the previous works, we
formulated hypotheses about the factors that could lead to successful attacks, but
could not investigate all of these factors through user-studies or surveys. Only the
link between network names, context, and trust in the network (see Chapters 3,
and 4) as well as the influence of graphical cues during the selection process (see
Chapter 4) were studied.
7.3.1 Description
A detailed description of the four use cases can be found in Chapter 4. Here, we
only provide the gist of each situation:
• HotSpot 1.1: Pay-per-use Hotspot The user selects a network to con-
nect to, performs a payment through HTTPS, and then uses the unencrypted
network.
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Table 7.2: Potential factors that we identified in the previous works that can poten-
tially foster the insecure behaviours.
Critical Action potential factors
Changing settings HS 2.1: Money, free services
Selecting a malicious
Access Point
HS 1.1: Context, likeliness of the SSID name, signal strength
HS 2.2: Images, venue name, roaming partners, quantity of information
Using a malicious
Access Point
HS 1.1: Encrypted money transaction, encryption, encryption cues
HS 1.2: Trust in the ISP, trust in authority, encrypted interactions
HS 2.1: Complexity, money, network, surprise, automatic connection
• HotSpot 1.2: Internet Service Provider’s Homespot The user is a cus-
tomer of an ISP that gives access to Wi-Fi hotspots hosted by the other ISP’s
customers. The user selects the network named as instructed by the user’s ISP,
and is then redirected to a website where he enters his credentials through an
HTTPS session. The user eventually uses the unencrypted network.
• HotSpot 2.1: Mobile Network Operator’s partner Hotspot 2.0 [37]
This use case is related to the particular feature of some smart phones that can
steer tra c o↵ the 3G and 4G networks to nearby Wi-Fi networks following a
routing policy, the ANDSF1 policy [1]. The connection to the Wi-Fi network
is done without any user intervention to a secure network. However, the user
can apply preferences in terms of the policy to prefer personal networks, or
certain types of networks (unencrypted for instance).
• HotSpot 2.2: The future of Hotspots This use case focuses on the co-
habitation between conventional Hotspots with Hotspots 2.0, which support
a feature called the Mobility Services Advertisement Protocol. This feature
allows network providers to advertise the networks’ services through a name
and an icon, and then to redirect users that connect to the associated network
to an url.
We are interested in the three following critical actions that a user can perform:
changing phone settings for a loose ANSDF policy (HS2.1), selecting a malicious
Access Point (HS1.1, HS2.2), and using a malicious Access Point (HS 1.1, HS 1.2,
and HS 2.1). Table 7.2 lists the factors that we identified in our previous works as
being the likely influencers of the user’s decision to perform these critical actions.
7.3.2 Threat Model
We consider that the attacker can read and write in the ether and on the Inter-
net, but it can’t break the cryptography. It means that it can, for instance, bring
up access points, read unencrypted Wi-Fi tra c, and post urls on Internet forum
boards; however, it cannot read HTTPS tra c or impersonate an Access Point that
is authenticated by cryptographic means.
1Access Network Discovery and Selection Function
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Table 7.3: Results of each analyst-driven Security Analysis for each Hotspot use
case grouped by insecure behaviours.
Changing settings Selecting a malicious AP
HS 2.1 HS 1.1 HS 2.2
GA: Insu cient knowledge SA: Ambiguous signals GA: Distraction
SA: Overlook side consequent SA: Ambiguous symbol set GA: Insu cient knowledge
SA: Too short planning horizon SA: Erroneous information SA: Ambiguous signals
SA: Violation SA: Habit, expectancy SA: Ambiguous symbol set
SA: Incorrect label SA: Erroneous information
SA: Overlook side consequent SA: Error in goal
SA: Habit, expectancy
SA: Incorrect label
SA: Information overload
SA: Overlook side consequent
Using a malicious AP
HS 1.1 HS 1.2 HS 2.1
GA: Cognitive bias GA: Cognitive bias GA: Cognitive bias
SA: Ambiguous signals SA: Ambiguous signals SA: Competing task
SA: Ambiguous symbol set SA: Ambiguous symbol set SA: Habit, expectancy
SA: Competing task SA: Competing task SA: Hidden information
SA: Error in mental model SA: Error in mental model SA: Multiple signals
SA: Habit, expectancy SA: Habit, expectancy SA: Overlook side consequent
SA: Hidden information SA: Hidden information SA: Presentation failure
SA: Multiple signals SA: Multiple signals
SA: Overlook side consequent SA: Overlook side consequent
SA: Parallel tasks SA: Parallel tasks
SA: Too short planning horizon SA: Too short planning horizon
7.3.3 Semi-automatic Security Analysis
To build the extended Threat Model, we settle on the lowest common denominator
between the di↵erent investigated critical actions. We consider that the attacker
has control over the source, the declared identity, and that he can write in the
ether. However, the attacker cannot spoof actions or initiate interactions. In conse-
quence, the reachable STC is Identity spoofing . Once we describe this system into
the S·CREAM assistant , we learn that the attacker can manipulate the following
Contributors to gain the Identity spoofing STC: SA-Incorrect label, GA-Missing
information, SA-Erroneous information, and SA-Presentation failure.
7.3.4 Analyst-driven Security Analysis
Each insecure behaviour (for the applicable use cases) is contextualised in a potential
attack where the attacker sets up malicious Access Point and listen to unencrypted
tra c. Table 7.3 shows the results of each analyst-driven Security Analysis con-
ducted with S·CREAM grouped by insecure behaviours.
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7.3.5 Discussion on the results and the possible remedia-
tions
7.3.5.1 Contributors to the STC
The semi-automatic Security Analysis does not bring interesting results when con-
sidering traditional Hotspots as it only states the obvious: since the attacker can
provide anything as network name, he can spoof identities of other principals. Even
when we consider Hotspot 2.0, the conclusions are still the same, i.e., the attacker
can still write any network name and spoof identities. But contrary to traditional
hotspots, Hotspot 2.0 can provide mutual authentication to prevent the user from
joining a malicious Access Point. Nonetheless, if for any reason, this control fails (for
instance, if the attacker downgrades the authentication mechanism to a mechanism
without mutual authentication), it is worth investigating further the Contributors
that can foster the exploitation of the STC in such a case.
7.3.5.2 Changing settings
The results that S·CREAM yields for this behaviour are related to the cognitive
process that drives the user’s decisions. The user can modify these settings with a
goal in mind and without understanding the side e↵ects the decision can have in the
future. These settings could be redesigned to o↵er the user more information about
these aspects of his decision.
7.3.5.3 Selecting a malicious Access Point
The Contributors for the selection of a malicious Access Point are mostly linked to
technological factors. S·CREAM identifies not only the obvious ‘erroneous infor-
mation’ Contributors but also the ‘ambiguous symbol set’ that we know, for having
tested it in Chapter 4, to have the capability to influence user’s decision when select-
ing a network. Among the Contributors that we can attribute to the user, only the
knowledge-related Contributors could be addressed, in particular by user training.
Comparing the results between HS1.1 and HS2.2, we observe at first glance
that there are almost twice as much Contributors for this critical action in HS
2.2 than there are in HS 1.1. This shows that the new features introduced by
Hotspot 2.0 expand the Socio-Technical Attack (STA) surface. Hotspot 2.0 may
provide technical means to authenticate the AP, and under the perfect encryption
assumption, is a better option for building Hotspots than the old-fashioned Hotspots.
However, as far as the social part of the interaction is concerned, the attacker can
use the new features to trick people into choosing his network over the others.
7.3.5.4 Using a malicious Access Point
The main novelty when considering the use of a malicious Access Point is the inter-
ference from a competing task for which we can’t propose remediations.
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7.3.5.5 Comparison with previous works
As explained earlier, we had expectations regarding the possible factors that could
nudge a user to jeopardise his security in the di↵erent use cases. Unfortunately, as
we did not have enough ressources to test every hypotheses we had produced with
STEAL (see hypotheses listed in Tables 7.2), we can only compare results yielded
with S·CREAM to a few verified results, and from them draw, comments on the
nature of the others.
For instance, we expected money to be a motivator for the user to change its
mobile phone’s settings for a loose ANDSF policy because driving tra c o↵ the
ISP network would save the user some money from his monthly phone bill. And
instead of ‘money’, S·CREAM points out four Contributors focused on the cognitive
process that drives user’s decisions. This hints towards a di↵erence between the
Contributors that we can expect from S·CREAM in its present state, which states
that S·CREAM won’t point out Contributors linked to user’s motivation. Indeed,
humans do not act erroneously on purpose. The motivated erroneous behaviours
fall into the ‘violation’ category, and these behaviours are not investigated further
by the underlying CREAM methodology.
7.4 YubiKeys use case
A YubiKey is a multi-purpose security token in the form of a USB dongle. A Yu-
biKey is versatile as it can present itself as a keyboard or a two-factor authentication
device to a computer (or via NFC to a smart phone). A YubiKey can be used to
generate and store a 64 characters password, generate One Time Password, or to
play di↵erent challenge-response protocols [190].
The main advantages of YubiKeys are their ease of use, low price, and wide
adoption by big service providers. Indeed, a YubiKey’s user interface consists of
only one button and a LED. Yubikey’s solid construction allows to carry a YubiKey
all the time, and it is supported by services like Google, Dropbox, or Github. The
YubiKey is advertised as a push button solution for security.
We are interested in YubiKeys mainly because of their peculiar user interface and
user interactions. Yubico made the choice to not include a screen on the device to
lower its cost and foster its adoption. The absence of a screen has for consequence
to shift the duty of providing feedback to the user to a LED light. The LED’s
behaviors (e.g., flashing rapidly, being on or o↵, et cetera) have di↵erent meanings
and are explained in the user’s manual [190].
One aspect of Yubikeys is that they support two configuration slots on one device.
To use these configurations, the user touches the button of the device for di↵erent
periods of time. These slots can be configured to generate OTPs or a static password.
See below a quote from yubico’s YubiKeys security evaluation document [189] that
describes this functionality as well as its assumed security implications:
The YubiKey 2.0 introduces a mechanism where the user can use two
separate credentials. We call the storage for these credentials ‘slot 1’
and ‘slot 2’. To generate a credential from slot 1, the user touches the
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button for a short period of time (e.g., well below 2 seconds). To generate
a credential from slot 2, the user touches the button for a long period of
time (e.g., well above 3 seconds). With proper user education, we believe
this does not add any additional security problems so we continue to
evaluate the YubiKey configured with just the slot 1 credential.
It is worth noting that YubiKeys (now in version 4) come in two forms: the
standard YubiKey is 18 x 45 x 3 mm, has a round-shaped button, and its LED is
located at the top, and the YubiKey ‘nano’ is much smaller, completely disappears
into a USB port when plugged in, and it has its button and its LED on its edge.
7.4.1 Description
As YubiKeys have a lot of functionalities and di↵erent use cases, we focus our anal-
ysis on the basic operation of a YubiKey with the ‘Dual configuration’ functionality
enabled. We set a YubiKey nano to yield an OTP on slot 1, and a static password
on slot 2.
7.4.2 Threat Model
The main assumptions for this system are that the attacker can read and write on
the Internet. This Threat Model implies that the attacker is free to send messages
on the web medium to the user before and after the operation of the Yubikey by
touching its button. More specifically, we consider that the user is visiting a website
under the control of the attacker.
7.4.3 Semi-automatic Security Analysis
We consider that this system’s Threat Model allows the attacker to control the
source, the declared identity, the imitated identity, the command, and that it can
write on the web medium. As the attacker has no control over the YubiKey, he
cannot spoof the action the user is about to perform. The attacker has control of
the sequence of communication with the user. In consequence, by using S·CREAM,
we find that the reachable STC is Identity spoofing .
7.4.4 Analyst-driven Security Analysis
To find likely potential attacks on this system, our strategy is to formulate hypothe-
ses about the consequences of the user’s actions in consideration of the attacker’s
extended capabilities.
There are two actions that a user has to carry out when using a YubiKey on a
computer: plugging the YubiKey into a USB port, and operating the YubiKey by
touching its button according to the authentication scheme. On the YubiKey nano,
both actions are critical from a security point of view.
• plugging the Yubikey nano in a computer can accidentally produce an OTP
because of the location of the button at the edge of the device. Plugging or
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Table 7.4: Contributors yielded by the Security Analysis.
STC: Identity spoofing Attack: Foster ‘Sequence-
Wrong action’ EM on
plugging
Attack: Foster ‘Duration-
Too long’ EM on operat-
ing
GA-Faulty diagnosis GA: Sound GA: Adverse ambient conditions
GA-Inadequate quality control SA: Competing task SA: Confusing symptoms
GA-Inattention SA: Design SA: Inadequate training
GA-Insu cient knowledge SA: Noise SA: Information overload
GA-Mislabelling SA: Mislearning
GA-Missing information SA: Multiple signals
GA-Wrong reasoning SA: New situation
SA-Ambiguous label SA: Noise
SA-Ambiguous signals SA: Overlook side consequent
SA-Ambiguous symbol set SA: Too short planning horizon
SA-Competing task SA: Trapping error
SA-Erroneous information
SA-Error in mental model
SA-Habit, expectancy
SA-Hidden information
SA-Inadequate training
SA-Incorrect label
SA-Mislearning
SA-Model error
SA-Overlook side consequent
SA-Presentation failure
SA-Too short planning horizon
unplugging a YubiKey nano can lead to a loss of confidentiality of the OTP
code located in the first slot. As the YubiKey operates after the touching
event is finished we consider that the Error Mode to investigate is ‘Sequence-
Wrong action’, and that the user appends an irrelevant action to the sequence
of actions.
• operating the YubiKey nano has two important dimensions: the action’s
duration (i.e., less than 2 seconds or more than 3 seconds) and the action’s
location (i.e., which user interface element has the focus at the time of the
action). The user needs to touch the device for the right amount of time while
being in communication with the correct entity; otherwise, there can be a
loss of confidentiality. As location-based attacks are already covered by the
Identity spoofing (i.e., the user misidentifies the attacker for another entity),
we focus on the duration. In particular, we investigate the Error Mode (EM)
‘Duration-Too long’.
We sum up the results of this investigation in Table 7.4.
7.4.5 Discussion on the results and the possible remedia-
tions
Regarding Identity spoofing , the attacker has a lot of options when it comes to
impersonating another entity (see the Identity spoofing ’s column in Table 7.4).
A prominent example of such attack is the Man In the Browser attack: the attacker,
in control of the web browser, redirects the user to a website he controls when the
user attempts to go to his bank’s website. The attacker then asks for the credentials
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(including two-factors Authentication credentials as the one provided by a YubiKey)
and logs into the bank’s website in place of the user. The key result of this analysis
is that there is little that can be done to thwart the attack, given the number of
Contributors. Therefore, we can either accept the risk that poses this vulnerability
or design alternatives to two-factors authentication mechanisms where the attacker
can not socio-technically impersonate other entities. The results of this analysis
come to the same conclusion as the security evaluation made by yubico [189], which
states, ‘We conclude that the system does not provide good defence against a real-
time man-in-the-middle or phishing attack.’
The observation of the failure of 2 Factors Authentication mechanisms leads
to the inception of Fido U2F [158][191] that allows the security device (such as a
YubiKey) to authenticate the website before running any authentication schemes.
Regarding potential attacks on the ‘Dual configuration’ functionality, Table 7.4
shows that there are three Contributors that an attacker can manipulate to foster
the occurrence of the ‘Sequence-Wrong action’ EM during the plugging critical
action. The attacker, in control of the webpage can emit sounds or noises to apply
pressure on the user, and he can also create a competing task. While we can see
little practical application of this attack, we consider that these AMs are exploitable
and it’s yubico’s duty to consider whether or not this socio-technical vulnerability
should be controlled.
Finally, we turn to the case of the operating critical action. Investigating
this critical action with S·CREAM yielded more Contributors than the plugging
critical action, and therefore, it appears more likely to observe potential attacks that
exploit the operating action as opposed to the plugging action. Table 7.4 lists
the Contributors that we reckon can be used to trigger to the ‘Duration-Too long’
EM. For instance, we select ‘SA-Confusing symptoms’ because the attacker can
provide fake feedback to the user regarding the success of the fake authentication,
which could in turn lead the user to start a remediation loop in which he would try
everything in his power to authenticate successfully; in the process, leaking every
confidential information the YubiKey’s slots hold. For example, sometimes users try
every password they know when an attacker sends a ‘bad authentication’ message
as the sole feedback. This kind of an attack is very well possible given the fact that
the YubiKey provides little feedback when a slot is yielded and no feedback about
which slot is yielded. Furthermore, the user might be unsure how he configured his
YubiKey (and someone may have configured it for him).
7.5 Conclusion
We have illustrated how to use S·CREAM to perform a socio-technical Security
Analysis of di↵erent systems. We chose a method that draws from S·CREAM’s
accumulation of knowledge from previous attacks and from the analyst’s expertise.
S·CREAM o↵ered interesting insights on the use cases already studied with STEAL
and novel insights on the security of Yubikey security tokens.
The S·CREAM analysis of YubiKeys is very important for validating the
S·CREAM methodology because it neatly aligns design and usability choices with
security consequences. It sheds a new light on the possible vulnerabilities, espe-
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cially socio-technical vulnerabilities, which can a↵ect these devices beyond simple
Phishing attacks, and it shows that Yubikeys, despite being technically secure, fail
to provide e↵ective security because of functionality as well as usability choices.
Furthermore, the Yubikey use case showed how S·CREAM can be used to analyse
the security of tangible objects that o↵er haptic interactions, and how S·CREAM
can give new insights on the e↵ects of these modalities of interactions on the sys-
tem’s security. Finally, the Yubikey use case is a great example of how S·CREAM
can be used to avoid the analyst’s bias. Indeed, contrary to the security analyst’s
gut feeling that the Yubikey’s ‘Dual configuration’ feature does not have security
implication [189], S·CREAM Security Analysis results show that there are a lot of
potential ways through which an attacker could exploit this feature.
In the next Chapter, we discuss how S·CREAM meets the challenges we defined
for RCA to be a valuable tool for security.
141
Chapter 7. Applying S·CREAM for socio-technical security analysis
142
I always said that the data tables in THERP were not written
in stone, and I was not Moses coming down from a mountain
with these tables so inscribed.
—Alan Swain, creator of THERP [166]
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In this chapter, we discuss whether S·CREAM meets the challenges for
a Root Cause Analysis for security that we defined in Chapter 5. We
discuss each of the four steps that S·CREAM comprises, starting from
S·CREAM’s ultimate step, the Security Analysis, following reverse order.
We discuss each step’s shortcomings and potential improvements as well
as identify the inherited shortcomings, to be discussed upon reaching the
step at their source down the stack of S·CREAM’s steps.
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss how S·CREAM meets the challenges to build a Root
Cause Analysis (RCA) for security that we identified in Chapter 5. As stated in
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Chapter 6, S·CREAM assigns the duty to address each one of the four first challenges
to an operational step, and C5, being flexible, is addressed by the whole methodology
and its implementation. Table 8.1 is an overview of the links between challenges
and S·CREAM’s steps.
Table 8.1: Links between the challenges stated in Chapter 5 and S·CREAM’s steps
introduced in Chapter 6. Each challenge depends on its predecessor except C5,
which is the subsidiary challenge of being flexible.
Challenge Challenge description S·CREAM step
C1
Addressing the lack of knowledge
and structured data
Data Collection and Investigations
C2 Investigating Attacks Retrospective Analysis
C3 Creating reusable knowledge Generalisation
C4 Match patterns of known attacks Security Analysis
C5 Being flexible All steps
The challenge that corresponds to S·CREAM’s ultimate step Security Analysis ,
is to be able to match patterns of known attacks or identify socio-technical vulnera-
bilities in a system. As this step is the last in a chain of backward-dependent steps,
its shortcomings may be caused by implementation choices made at lower level in
the stack of steps. For instance, implementation choices made in the Data Collection
and Investigations step. For this reason, in the following, we choose to discuss steps’
shortcomings and their causes in the backward order, carrying inherited deficiencies
down the stack until the discussion focuses on the concerned step.
8.2 How S·CREAM meets our challenges
8.2.1 Challenge C4: Matching patterns of known attacks
8.2.1.1 Evaluation of S·CREAM’s fulfilment of the challenge
Challenge C4 states that the RCA technique should provide direct links between the
attacker’s capabilities and their e↵ects on a system’s security. We consider that
S·CREAM addresses the challenge as we demonstrate in Chapter 7 how to apply
S·CREAM on several use cases, and how a security analyst can, from the di↵erent
threat models, pinpoint potential socio-technical vulnerabilities.
But there is one limitation in the methodology that we need to address, which
is its partial reliance on the analyst’s skills and expertise. Indeed, in the study of
Chapter 7’s use cases, the most interesting findings were the ones yielded through
the use of the analyst-driven Security Analysis , while the semi-automatic Security
Analyses yielded the Identity spoofing for all use cases. Furthermore, once the
semi-automatic Security Analysis lists the potential Contributors for a system, the
analyst is left alone with the duty of pondering on whether or not these Contributors
can actually constitute socio-technical vulnerabilities.
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Moreover, one can wonder whether the choice of limiting the pre-requisites pre-
sented in the Attack Modes (AMs) to the attacker’s capabilities was the right thing
to do.
Eventually, there is the problem of the complexity of the Contributors’s wording
and concepts. Indeed, S·CREAM is based on Cognitive Reliability and Error Anal-
ysis Method (CREAM)’s tables, and consequently, S·CREAM’s Contributors use
CREAM’s antecedents, which can sometimes be daunting. For instance, CREAM
makes a di↵erence between ‘mis learning’ (the user is at fault), and ‘inadequate
training’ (the training is at fault). In this case, one antecedent hints that there is a
possible remediation (improve the training), however, if while performing the Ret-
rospective Analysis of an attack, the analyst chooses ‘mis learning’ over ‘inadequate
training’, then no remediation will be possible in the Security Analysis when the
corresponding AM is identified in a system.
8.2.1.2 Inherited shortcomings and potential improvements
S·CREAM and its companion tool, S·CREAM assistant , only enables the analyst
to define pre-requisites for the attacker’s capabilities. Broadening the scope of these
pre-requisites by allowing the analyst to define pre-requisites pertaining to the con-
text, the user and the system itself would improve the resolution of the AMs. This
improved precision would make the semi-automatic Security Analysis step more ob-
jective because with better security analysis, the results would be stripped of false-
positives and the analyst would be relieved from the burden to filter out useless
Contributors.
Let us focus on the example of the ‘Competing task’ Contributor. If the ‘Com-
peting task’ Contributor is identified as a Contributor of an Socio-Technical Capa-
bility (STC) in a system, the analyst has to decide whether the system should allow
for tasks to be run concurrently or not, or if the attacker can create competing tasks.
If we modify the pre-requisites’ structure to allow the analyst to define pre-requisites
about the system’s stance regarding concurrent tasks, the analyst is relieved from
this task and the analysis gains more objectivity.
Another aspect of the di culty to assess the criticality of a Contributor is that
it can be distant to the STC it is linked to. Indeed, as an attack can rely on the
exploitation of several Error Modes to succeed, trying to build remediations from a
merged list of Contributors may not be the best solution to assess the vulnerability
of a system. S·CREAM could be altered to replace the merged list of AMs by sets
of AMs and create an object that holds the relationships between these. That is to
say, this object could state that an attacker needs to exploit an AM of each set to
gain the STC. Controlling all the Contributors of a set of AMs would then disrupt
the potential gain of the corresponding STC by preventing one of the mandatory
Error Modes from occurring.
Finally, regarding S·CREAM’s Contributors, we believe that each should be
assessed thoroughly to determine their utility in a Security Analysis . Taking back
the example of the ‘mis learning’ Contributor, we believe that it would be beneficial
if it was removed from the tables.
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8.2.1.3 Step’s shortcomings and potential improvements
All analysts are not equal, and determining if a Contributor, for instance, related
to usability, constitutes a socio-technical vulnerability is not a straightforward task.
Without modifying the pre-requisites, the Security Analysis could provide more
guidance to the analyst while assessing the relevance of Contributors in a system’s
security. We identified two major improvements that could be made to S·CREAM
assistant that would help the analyst in this task. First, S·CREAM assistant could
provide a helper that displays, for instance, a checklist for each Contributor. Second,
S·CREAM assistant could allow experts in the field related to a potential Contribu-
tor to cooperate with the analyst in determining the likelihood that this Contributor
influenced the outcome of the attack and to complement the analysis with additional
input.
8.2.2 Challenge C3: Creating reusable knowledges
8.2.2.1 Evaluation of S·CREAM’s fulfilment of the challenge
As shown in Chapter 7, we successfully used the catalogue of AMs bootstrapped in
Chapter 6 to extend the threat models associated to di↵erent use cases. Therefore,
we consider that S·CREAM’s Generalisation step meets Challenge C3.
Nonetheless, one can argue that the generated knowledge is limited because there
are only two STCs, and they are very generic. Furthermore, we did not devise the
expected STCs mentioned in Chapter 6, namely Block and Alter .
One can also wonder what the di↵erence is between the ‘Action Spoofing’ field
from the description of an attack and the Action spoofing STC. The answer is
that they are actually di↵erent dimensions of the same malicious behaviour. As a
description, ‘Action Spoofing’ describes the technical capability of the attacker
to change the target of an action, whereas as a Socio-Technical Capability, it
represents the capability of decoying the user into performing this booby-trapped
action. These two dimensions are needed for an attack based on a spoofed action
to work. Where one could control technical factors to prevent the attacker from
spoofing an action, S·CREAM’s results o↵er additional socio-technical factors that
one can use for the same purpose.
8.2.2.2 Inherited shortcomings and potential improvements
We have not identified any inherited shortcoming.
8.2.2.3 Step’s shortcomings and potential improvements
There are two decisions that impacted the STCs provided by S·CREAM. The first
one is that we focused on STCs pertaining to the attacker’s e↵ect on the user,
however we can specialise the STCs further. In particular, we believe that it would
be valuable to have STCs specialised by environments. For instance, as the user-
device interactions di↵er from mobile phones to desktops, having STCs dedicated
for each environment would better describe the attacker’s capabilities in terms of
actions on the system.
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The lack of the expected STCs Block and Alter in the catalogue of AMs is the
result of the decision of using CAPEC as the corpus of attack from which to build the
catalogue. Now, there are works, in particular Heartfield et al.’s work on semantic
attacks [86], that would constitute a more diverse corpus to build the catalogue.
Indeed, CAPEC is lacking a lot of interesting Socio-Technical Attacks (STAs), such
as tabnabbing attacks [146], fake loading bars, fake ads, et cetera.
Further, S·CREAM has still not been used to investigate real attacks, and we
think that this is a mandatory step for it to get a better, more useful catalogue of
AMs.
8.2.3 Challenge C2: Investigating Attacks
8.2.3.1 Evaluation of S·CREAM’s fulfilment of the challenge
As demonstrated in Chapter 6 with the bootstrapping of the catalogue of AMs, and
in Chapter 7 with the analyst-driven Security Analyses performed on several use
cases, S·CREAM’s Retrospective Analysis fulfils Challenge C2. Indeed, S·CREAM’s
Retrospective Analysis yields human-related factors that are likely to explain the
success of attacks, or potential attacks.
Nonetheless, one can argue that it fails to be objective as the analyst plays
an important role in the Retrospective Analysis process. Indeed, while performing
the Retrospective Analysis , the analyst has to choose first the Error Modes (EMs)
observable in the attack, then the antecedents that contribute to the attack’s success.
As mentioned earlier, the analyst can misunderstand the antecedent and miss it or
mistakenly add it as Contributor. And the same can happen while selecting EMs.
All these errors can potentially have harmful consequences on subsequent Security
Analyses.
Further, one can argue about the relevance of CREAM’s antecedents and that
of EMs for computer security.
8.2.3.2 Inherited shortcomings and potential improvements
As already mentioned when discussing C4, broadening the scope of the attack’s de-
scription with information about the context, the user, and the system could help
addressing the question of objectivity. Indeed, with this additional bit of infor-
mation, S·CREAM could be adapted to have links between Contributors and item
descriptions. For instance, knowing that the victim performed additional tasks dur-
ing an attack, S·CREAM could pre-select the ‘Competing task’ Contributor (if
applicable to the error modes under scrutiny). S·CREAM would then provide ad-
ditional guidance to the analyst, thus improving the method’s objectivity and the
quality of the results.
8.2.3.3 Step’s shortcomings and potential improvements
Regarding S·CREAM objectivity, we think that the remedies proposed for the Secu-
rity Analysis also apply to the Retrospective Analysis : S·CREAM assistant should
allow the analyst to ask for the cooperation of experts or to compare his analy-
sis results with results of others to enhance the quality of the results. Further,
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S·CREAM assistant should provide helpers for each antecedent to help the analyst
in determining whether or not the antecedent is a Contributor of the attack. For
instance, to select the ‘error in mental model’ antecedent, the analyst should have
access to a tool to help determine how complex a system is for its users. Or at mini-
mum, S·CREAM should provide some documentation or bibliographic references to
improve the analyst’s understanding of an antecedent.
Regarding S·CREAM’s EMs, we can observe that the catalogue of AMs presented
in Section 6.3.5 is based on the investigations of 15 Attack Patterns, and yet, we only
used EMs belonging to two categories out of eight to build it. These two categories
are ‘Sequence’ and ‘Wrong Object’. Further, one Error Mode, ‘Wrong object-Similar
object’ is present in almost all situations.
This shows that, from CREAM’s EMs point of view, the STAs we investigated
are similar to one another. But CAPEC Attack Patterns that encompass a user
are rudimentary, and again, one can wonder if our results would be di↵erent using
a di↵erent source as the corpus of attacks. Indeed, exploitation of psychological
characteristics in STAs are on the rise (e.g., tabnabbing attack), but are nowhere to
be found in CAPEC.
Furthermore, it’s only when it comes to the yubikey use case in Chapter 7 that
additional EMs are used (‘Duration-Too long’ and ‘Sequence-Wrong action’), show-
ing that these EMs could indeed be useful for computer security. We believe that,
even if not all are proven useful today, all EMs present in the Cognitive Reliability
and Error Analysis Method for Socio-Technical security (S·CREAM) should be kept
to deal with future interactions. Indeed, two-factors authentication, Biometrics,
Virtual Reality, Augmented Reality, and touch interactions with haptic feedback
are about to become mainstream, and these additional EMs could be useful to in-
vestigate future attacks performed through their manipulation.
Consequently, we believe that S·CREAM’s Error Modes, inherited from
CREAM, are su cient for studying user-mediated attacks, and that even if
some EMs do not prove useful today, all of them should be kept.
But the previous observation may not be true for Contributors. As we saw on the
hotspot use case in Chapter 7, we did not find any Contributors related to money, or
Contributors aimed at explaining user’s motivation when we expected to find some
(alas we only hypothesised it).
In CREAM, antecedents related to the user are found in the “Personal related
genotype”. Hollnagel explains [91] that regarding the main cognitive functions
(observation, planning, and interpretation), CREAM mostly contains Specific An-
tecedents because:
This is an area where there has been a considerable amount of research,
and where several specific models or theories have been proposed [...].
From the point of view of CREAM, practically all information processing
theories and models propose specific antecedents only, since they describe
relatively shallow hierarchical category structures.
As a consequence, several antecedents that we would expect to be generic are
specific. For instance, violations are considered specific, which stops further in-
vestigation. We believe that it is also because in safety, there is no actor trying
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to motivate an operator to fail or behave erroneously and a money-driven violation
could actually be punished by the law. There is then, no need of money in CREAM’s
tables. We argue that with the extensive set of research on scams, insider threat, and
violation of security policies that we introduced in Chapter 2, S·CREAM should be
further improved, and antecedents specialised in computer security should be added.
It is worth noting that, at the moment, the Data Collection and Investigations step
do not o↵er the possibility to describe the transfer of value between an attacker and
a user, and that this could be an interesting addition.
8.2.4 Challenge C1: Addressing the lack of knowledge and
structured data to support the analysis
8.2.4.1 Evaluation of S·CREAM’s fulfilment of the challenge
We are aware that S·CREAM does not o↵er the detailed collection of information
about STAs that would be needed to exploit the technique to its full potential. This
lack for instance undermines the potential creation of Indicators of STA. In the
current scheme, STAs are described in terms of the attacker’s actions and attack’s
e↵ects on the system. Further, this description is flattened as it does not allow
a description of a succession of actions as it would be possible, for instance, with
attack trees. As mentioned when discussing C4 and C2, this limitation of the Data
Collection and Investigations propagates on all the steps of the technique. Con-
sequently, we performed our S·CREAM analyses on generic descriptions of attacks
and potential attacks (furthermore CAPEC is also very generic in its description of
its Attack Patterns (APs)), while RCA techniques like CREAM are designed to be
used on real events with a lot of details.
Keeping the description of attack simple is a limitation when it comes to using
the technique on real attacks, however, it was ‘good enough’ to prove the usefulness
of RCA techniques in security. The main rationale behind this choice is that we
wanted to keep the technique simple for a first run, and that we believe that o↵ering
detailed descriptions of attacks is a long-term goal for S·CREAM. As stated in C1,
the RCA should provide a list of factual information to collect in order to maximise
its outputs. This information can be related to the user, the environment, the
system, and the attacker, but at the moment, there is no existing method to collect
evidence and testimonies from users after STAs. Additionally, the scheme in which
to describe these STA is to be be defined.
8.2.4.2 Inherited shortcomings and potential improvements
We have not identified any inherited shortcoming.
8.2.4.3 Step’s shortcomings and their potential improvements
First, instead of only describing the messages exchanged between the attacker and
its victim, we should use in the Data Collection and Investigations step, a scheme
that allows to add a description of the system, the context, and the user.
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Further, a method to collect this information, including retrieving information
from and about the victim, has to be defined. This is an additional sub-challenge
S·CREAM should solve and, we chose to keep this as a direction for future works.
Additionally, regarding the support of Indicator of STA, we think that more
than the Data Collection and Investigations step, it is the Generalisation step that
needs improvements. In this regard, we identified two shortcomings in particular.
First, Contributors are di cult to turn into Indicators of STA because it is already
di cult to assist humans in the task of identifying them in a system. Indeed,
documentation to precisely define Contributors and helpers for locating them are
still lacking. Second, we believe that AMs still need to be improved before turning
their identified Contributors into Indicators of STA. Indeed, we believe that AMs
would be more useful and would help avoiding false positives in the detection of
STAs, if instead of yielding only one Contributor, AMs yielded patterns or sets of
Contributors for an STC.
8.2.5 Challenge C5: Being flexible
8.2.5.1 Evaluation of S·CREAM’s fulfilment of the challenge
Thanks to S·CREAM assistant ’s design and the way the catalogue of AMs is consti-
tuted, most of the aforementioned improvements are easily implementable. Indeed,
the need to change Data Collection and Investigations step’s scheme along with the
need to improve the catalogue of AMs or specialise S·CREAM’s table are things
that were foreseen from the beginning, and are easily customisable in S·CREAM
assistant .
However, the implementation of helpers to guide this analyst in his decision
regarding the contribution of an antecedent to an attack or regarding the presence
of a Contributor in a system will call for more investments. The same is true for
the need to cross-check analysis between analysts, share analyses among peers, and
ask for help to an expert of a field of research associated with an antecedent.
S·CREAM assistant will need further developments and S·CREAM will need
to be used on a wide range of attacks. Additionally, its catalogue will need to be
cleverly enriched before it entirely proves its usefulness in the analysis of the security
of socio-technical systems.
8.3 Conclusion
By examining each of the four steps in S·CREAM, we showed that S·CREAM meets
the challenges stated in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, several shortcomings were identi-
fied that highlighted S·CREAM’s current weaknesses, potential improvements, and
directions for future works.
This is only a first step, which entails that there is a need to apply S·CREAM
on more STAs and attack patterns to improve the way it models them and the
information it provides. Still, our methodology and its catalogue of AMs are pre-
liminary. Expanding S·CREAM, its lists of antecedents, and the help it provides to
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the analyst will guarantee more objectivity in the analysis process and more reliable
analysis results.
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The nice thing about having a brain is that one can learn, that
ignorance can be supplanted by knowledge, and that small bits
of knowledge can gradually pile up into substantial heaps.
—Douglas Hofstadter, ‘Le Ton beau de Marot’
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9.1 Summary
When one intends to improve the security of a system, the problem of how to protect
the system from Socio-Technical Attacks (STAs) is an issue of utmost importance
because STAs are cheap, highly e↵ective, and di cult to thwart. But analysing a
system for vulnerabilities of a socio-technical nature is a complex matter because
these vulnerabilities lie at the junction of the interplay of the system, the user, and
the context, and therefore, technical and social aspects should both be considered
for an e↵ective analysis.
The research field of usable security has been established as a place where studies
on security and usability converge (e.g., [43]). However, this thesis shows that
combining other computer sciences and social sciences methods can lead to richer
strategies of analysis. One should look at a system and its threats holistically as
a place where technical choices can have harmful consequences on the ‘social’ side,
and consequently, on the e↵ective system’s security and vice-versa.
Furthermore, focusing only on some parts of the human-related aspects of a
system, such as the user interface, is unsatisfactory. Indeed, there are a host of
other contextual aspects that should be considered. For instance, the user training,
the user goals, the organisation’s security policies, the organisation’s hierarchical
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setup, the user’s time-constraints, and user physical location can all impact the
interactions that the user has with the system.
We stipulate that the best strategy for the analysis of socio-technical systems’
security is to study the factors that can influence a user to engage in behaviours that
can harm security. Therefore, this thesis tackles socio-technical security analysis by
studying how to identify harmful user’s behaviours and their influencing factors. In
Chapter 2, we stated the following research questions:
Research Questions
RQ1 How can we detect a socio-technical vulnerability in a system?
RQ2 How can we identify in the interactions between a system and its users,
the human behaviours that can harm this system’s security?
RQ3 How can we identify the factors that foster human behaviours that are
harmful to a system’s security?
These research questions pose methodological challenges. Furthermore, they
may demand di↵erent answers when stated in front of di↵erent audiences, i.e., re-
searchers and practitioners, because of the di↵erent goals, interests, and capabilities
these audiences may have in their respective practices of security analysis. For the
resolution of these research questions we identified the following objectives for this
thesis:
Objectives
O1 What form should a framework that intends to identify harmful behaviours
for security, and to investigate the factors that foster their occurrence
take?
O2 What form should a semi-automatic, or tool-assisted methodology for the
security analysis of socio-technical systems take?
We adopted the two following approaches to tackle these objectives:
(a) testing hypotheses about potential factors by running experiments
(b) identifying the factors that have helped STAs to succeed in the past through
Root Cause Analyses (RCAs).
9.2 Contributions
The thesis reaches the aforementioned objectives through the two following contri-
butions:
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Addressing O1: STEAL, a framework for socio-technical security analysis.
In Part II, we presented a framework that we call the Socio-TEchical Attack AnaL-
ysis (STEAL) framework. It provides a common ground for an interdisciplinary ap-
proach towards security analysis. This common ground is a reference model based
on Bella and Coles-Kemp’s concertina model [16] that allows security researchers
to describe a system along with its users and its context in order to identify and
investigate potential attacks and defences. STEAL addresses Objective O1 by al-
lowing security researchers to use computer sciences and social sciences methods
sequentially to identify what we call critical actions, or actions that can undermine
a security property, and to formulate and test hypotheses about the factors that
foster an insecure behaviour at these critical action points.
Addressing O2: S·CREAM, an RCA for socio-technical security. In
Part III, we presented a methodology that we call Cognitive Reliability and Error
Analysis Method for Socio-Technical security (S·CREAM). It is inspired from an
RCA technique used in the safety field called Cognitive Reliability and Error Anal-
ysis Method (CREAM) [91]. The S·CREAM RCA methodology o↵ers the following
features, which when used in combination, answer Objective O2: (1) it implements
a Retrospective Analysis to pinpoint the factors, amongst those available from a
catalogue of human-related factors, that contributed to the success of an attack, (2)
it allows for the constitution of a knowledge database of factors that are known to
have facilitated attacks in the past, and (3) it provides a tool-supported operational
procedure —S·CREAM’s Security Analysis— to semi-automatically detect if these
factors are applicable on a specific system when the threat model is given.
9.3 Discussion
We now discuss how the thesis’s contributions allow to answer the research questions,
and how they sustain accurate and objective socio-technical security analyses for
each community of users.
As demonstrated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, both the STEAL framework and
the S·CREAM methodology can be used to identify socio-technical vulnerabilities.
This addresses the first research question RQ1.
STEAL and S·CREAM do not share the same approach, and they do not have
the same purpose. Indeed, STEAL is geared towards the close inspection of a
system by a security researcher. On the other hand, S·CREAM intends to reuse
knowledge gained from past research works and past analyses, in the most objective
and automated way as possible, for use by security practitioners.
The STEAL framework is more apt for an exploratory approach, supporting the
investigations of a security researcher. As shown in Chapter 3, in this framework,
the researcher is invited to pinpoint the critical actions that could lead to an attack,
by addressing RQ2. Then the researcher can formulate hypotheses regarding their
success and the causes behind it, without other support than his own knowledge
and experience. After performing the required experiments to test his hypotheses,
the researcher gains insights about the potential STAs. This allows the researcher
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to identify subtle socio-technical vulnerabilities with complex causing factors, by
addressing RQ3.
STEAL o↵ers a framework to support scientific methods, and using STEAL,
security researchers are involved in every aspect of the research process. The re-
searchers choose the hypotheses and research methods, and they stay in control of
the collection of data, their exploitation, and their interpretation. As a consequence,
the security researchers assume responsibility for their assumptions, know the lim-
itations of their analyses, and can prove that their results are up to the scientific
standards.
That makes STEAL particularly suitable for research, however, without the need
for producing scientific proofs to back up their findings, STEAL is of less appeal
to security practitioners. The analysis of a system’s security produced by using
STEAL can be very accurate if the security researcher has the resources to focus
on several critical action points and to test several hypotheses. But realistically,
researchers can’t investigate every possible hypotheses, and they also have to choose
between which hypotheses to focus on and which ones to leave for ‘future work’. We
identified the three following main reasons for hypotheses to be discarded in spite
of being worthwhile to the investigation: (1) the researcher can fail to formulate the
hypothesis because it is outside his area of expertise, (2) the experiment needed to
investigate the hypothesis may be too expensive or impossible for the researcher to
realise, and (3) the researcher may give the priority to other hypotheses that appear
more likely to produce positive results.
The experiments we reported on in Chapter 4 are good illustrations of these
issues. Indeed, we identified several potential hypotheses on Wi-Fi hotspots that
are worth investigating, however, we only investigated hypotheses on the critical
actions we found in the selection phase. The main reasons why the experiments
have focus on the low-hanging fruits are extraneous to research itself and are linked
to the Ph.D. process. Indeed, if we focused on the simple issues, it was for the
pedagogical virtue of the exercise, for the guarantee of being able to produce reliable
and exploitable results through experiments of manageable complexity, and for the
ability to handle every aspect of experiments as well as to assume control of the
process.
Despite having presented STEAL and S·CREAM as having been designed to
satisfy the need of one community in particular (researchers for the former, and
practitioners for the later), both STEAL and S·CREAM can be used by and be
beneficial to both communities.
While we presented S·CREAM as a methodology born from the needs of security
practitioners, in reality, its creation is rooted in some of the frustrations we had as
security researchers confronting the complexity of using STEAL. Indeed, it is the
discrepancy between the complexity of the hypotheses we investigated using STEAL
and the amount of time we needed to perform the investigations that originally
launched the reflections around the creation of S·CREAM. Studying the e↵ective
security of a whole system using STEAL seemed impractical and it highlighted
the need for a methodology that, instead of acting as a spotlight on pre-defined
hypotheses, could give an overview of the STAs that could a↵ect a system without
the burden of the full-featured scientific methods.
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Where STEAL and S·CREAM both provide valid answers to the third research
question RQ3 (identify factors), the former provides scientific proofs of the results
it produces, and the latter produces a comprehensive overview of all the factors
that can potentially be involved in a socio-technical vulnerability. In contrast to the
STEAL framework, the S·CREAM methodology removes the burden of selecting
potential factors from the analyst. That is to say, instead of using the analyst’s
knowledge to produce hypotheses, S·CREAM uses a knowledge base of human-
related factors extracted from social sciences and a catalogue of Attack Modes (AMs)
built from past analyses to perform socio-technical analyses.
This di↵erence of approach between S·CREAM and STEAL gives the analyst
the ability to take shortcuts and avoid some researcher-related biases. Indeed, per-
forming a security analysis with S·CREAM is much quicker and cheaper as there
is no experiment to run. Second, the analysis is more comprehensive because it
systematically o↵ers potential relevant factors to the analyst (akin to the analyst
using a check-list to avoid overlooking any factor). Furthermore, it helps avoid some
of the biases that the analyst could su↵er from, for instance, the confirmation bias
(or even the sunk-cost fallacy given the cost of running experiments). Additionally,
S·CREAM allows to extend a threat model to support the formal verification of
systems to check that while accounting for a socio-technical vulnerability identified
through S·CREAM, the system guarantees some security properties.
S·CREAM o↵ers readily usable results for security practitioners without pro-
viding traces to the reasons behind these results. It produces a list of potential
STAs along with their contributors, and it is the analyst’s burden to ponder on
whether or not these contributors should be controlled. Thus, S·CREAM needs
to be used with discernment, and one should not jump to its conclusions. This
remark is critical if the user is a security researcher. Indeed, we don’t think re-
searchers can use S·CREAM results ‘as is’, but instead, should only use S·CREAM
in conjunction with STEAL to boost investigations. For instance, in Chapter 4, we
presented experiments on the Wi-Fi selection process and the user understanding of
the meaning of the di↵erent symbols used in the graphical user interface of Wi-Fi
network managers. Where user-studies and surveys had been performed to investi-
gate this problem from scratch (generating frustration), preliminary answers could
have been readily obtained through a S·CREAM Security Analysis to support the
design of these studies. S·CREAM proposes additional inputs, allowing to triangu-
late findings, and thus contributes to the validation of such findings. Furthermore,
S·CREAM’s findings can also be fed back into STEAL’s formal analysis. Such a
combination of methods and data sources is an invaluable asset that contributes to
the consolidation of the relatively young field of socio-technical security research.
But S·CREAM has some limitations that one needs to be aware of before using it.
First, the S·CREAM methodology needs maintenance. Indeed, both the tables in-
herited from CREAM and the catalogue of AMs require care for the methodology to
reach its full potential. As we discussed in Chapter 8, without proper antecedent-
consequent tables dedicated to security, the Contributors yielded by S·CREAM’s
Security Analysis are very generic, and sometimes, di cult to understand. Fur-
thermore, the catalogue of AMs requires the analyst to carefully select the Socio-
Technical Capabilities (STCs) for the current analysis. Eventually, the catalogue
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itself needs to be fed through the analysis of carefully documented attacks to gain
in relevance. Clearly, the catalogue that we bootstrapped from Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) in this thesis is still rudimentary
and needs refinements.
In addition to these maintenance needs, S·CREAM has other limitations. One
limitation of the catalogue of AMs is that it fails to provide an order or a rough
priority hierarchy for determining which AM exerts the most urgency to be miti-
gated. The catalogue does not provide chains of AMs that could be broken but only
individual AM. This forces the analyst to consider remediations on all the AMs,
whereas a strategy geared towards breaking chains of AMs or considering attack
trees, could be more e cient.
Another limitation of S·CREAM is that the analyst is not necessarily an expert
on all aspects upon which S·CREAM can shed light. This shortcoming is even
more salient when we consider the possible additions we can make to its tables.
For instance, there is a lot of literature on warnings, and how warnings can have a
negative impact on user’s decisions when not implemented properly. If this literature
were to make its way into S·CREAM’s tables with new possible antecedents, the
analyst would be expected to be able to decide whether the warnings that are
presented to the user fulfil their mission.
While security practitioners are the end-users of S·CREAM, the burden of main-
taining the methodology does not have to lie on their shoulders. Indeed, security
organisations could take on the task to maintain S·CREAM’s tables. STEAL could
be used by security researchers to investigate new factors and add to the existing
pool of knowledge contained in S·CREAM’s tables to increase the amount of time
saved in subsequent socio-technical analyses and to guarantee scientific accuracy. We
believe that it would be beneficial for both communities to create a better STEAL-
S·CREAM link as it could embrace security researchers’ work on STAs, and ensure
security practitioners of the scientific grounding of the results they obtain through
S·CREAM.
9.4 Directions for future works
The most challenging research direction for future works on S·CREAM will be to
design helpers, such as check-lists, to o↵er guidance to the analyst who performs Ret-
rospective Analyses and Security Analyses. The potentiality that an analyst chooses
a Contributor without fully understanding its meaning and implication should be
removed.
Another great challenge is the specialisation of S·CREAM antecedent-consequent
tables inherited from CREAM. Providing up-to-date tables of antecedents that
reflect the current state of the research on factors that influence security-related
behaviour as well as providing the corresponding up-to-date bibliographic references
and helpers is important as it will provide S·CREAM great relevance in its field.
Furthermore, S·CREAM only provides a rudimentary description scheme at the
time of writing. Carefully crafted schemes with relevant sets of pre-requisites should
be developed to further empower S·CREAM Generalisation and Security Analy-
sis steps.
160
9.4. Directions for future works
The most immediate future work concerns the ability that should be given to
the analysts to cooperate on S·CREAM’s Retrospective Analysis and Security Anal-
ysis steps in S·CREAM assistant . Furthermore, sharing schemes, catalogues of
AMs, and sets of attacks could prove useful and may be considered for later imple-
mentations.
Given the preceding discussion, it appears that S·CREAM yields results that
can lead to the improvement of the overall security of a system. We believe that the
shortcomings we identified can be fixed, and that by improving S·CREAM’s tables,
by maintaining its knowledge of security and human-related factors, and by fostering
its use and the sharing of experiences, S·CREAM can be a useful addition to a
security practitioner’s toolbox in every part of the security life cycle. Furthermore,
we believe that STEAL and S·CREAM o↵er security researchers an environment
where they can test and utilise their findings and that these tools can constitute
a first step towards a real security researchers-security practitioners partnership
regarding STAs.
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A
Complementary social analysis of the TLS
validation use case
We introduce a potential social study that spans from UI A to SA of the TLS use
case. We draft the study of a potential semantic attacks [153][106] on Web Browser’s
users when validating TLS certificate, where users are asked to choose instead of
the Web Browser.
We focus, in particular on a Google Chrome user having to choose whether
or not trusting a certificate. We don’t contextualise the framework in a research
process, but we can instantiate it to describe an attack scenario. We know that
users already ignore 60% of Interstitial Warnings (IW) in Google Chrome [119] and
this rate may increase if an Attack changes the user’s state just before he makes a
choice among the options UI A o↵ers him. By ignoring, we mean that users prefer to
choose the option ‘Proceed anyway’ and then store the self-signed certificate, over
‘Go back to safety’ (equivalent to the back action) and closing the tab. An Attack
controlling the user interface (i.e., Man-in-The-Browser) can send some specially
crafted information (i.e., the payload) in order to force the user (BCP) to deviate
from the prescribed (i.e., secure) behaviour. In Figure 3.5 we see that the attack
strikes in the PA. UI A interaction. We consider the application ‘Warning’ being all
the ‘Computer’ layers until UI A and the user being all the ‘Human’ layers until PA.
Here we choose to convey the payload by a fake IW which will be shown before
the genuine one. The payload aims at misleading the user in interpreting a self-
signed certificate as SELF-signed certificate, that is ‘certificate signed by S.E.L.F.’,
where SELF is a new certification authority yet unknown by the user’s browser, but
introducing itself as trusted in the text of the IW. This introduces a polysemy on the
word ‘self’ that may lead the user to misinterpret the meaning of the word (called
equivocation fallacy e.g. ‘The sign said ‘fine for parking here’, and since it was fine,
I parked here.’).
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As presented by the Sequence Diagram in Figure A.1, the fake IW only o↵ers
a ‘continue’ action that leads to the genuine one. The genuine warning o↵ers the
option to bring the user back to the fake interstitial warning (loop) or to store the
self-signed certificate (then the attack succeeds). The only way for the user to escape
this loop and make the attack fail is to hit the browser’s close button at any time
or to hit the back button when he is on the fake IW.
Figure A.1: Sequence diagram for the studied attack scenario. We use alternatives
this way to emphasise the needed actions to make the attack fail or succeed. The
possible use of the Context CA as a defence is not represented here for the sake of
simplicity.
The context CA does not actively play a role in this attack scenario but could be
used by a defence (see the empty arrow in Figure 3.5). For instance, in addition to
the explanations the Genuine Warning given to the user, a link to some education
/ information material could be proposed. This could a↵ect the user’s state and
change his following behaviour, hopefully to one that tends to be more secure.
To test whether or not this semantic attack could indeed work, we imagine an
experiment where a set of participants are placed in this situation and the attack
launched. A fake IW would be designed from the Chromium’s source code and the
attack implemented in a tool like BeEF [5] (and has actually been implemented
in BeEF in a module called ‘Chrome cert beggar’). To test any hypothesis about
how people resist such misleading inputs we need to instantiate the whole research
process (e.g., to decide how to launch the attack, what and how to observe, what
to ask users afterwards, etc.) and to run the corresponding experiments. Then we
could observe the patterns that lead users to resist or to fall for the attack and try
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to explain those patterns with the analysis of the qualitative investigations. Such an
experiment would need authorisation from an ethical committee, compliance with a
legal framework, and with ethical requirements (APA), before being set.
This draft of a social study of the TLS is presented here for the sake of complete-
ness. It worth noting that this toy study further shows that STEAL can support
both social sciences and computer sciences methods on a common model.
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B
Questionnaire used for testing the
influence of graphical cues in the selection
of Wi-Fi networks
In the following, we present an example of participation to the study about the
influence of graphical cues in the selection of Wi-Fi networks described in Chapter 4
(see Section 4.3.2). In this particular case, the participant is assigned to the condi-
tion in which he is given a password. As explained in Chapter 4, rounds of network
selection are randomised, and one round is randomly reintroduced to check the con-
sistency of the participant’s answers; in this particular case, rounds are displayed in
the following order: 2nd, 3rd, 1st, 3rd (reintroduced), and 4th.
167
Appendix B. Questionnaire used for testing the influence of graphical cues in the
selection of Wi-Fi networks
Figure B.1: This is the questionnaire’s landing page that the participant reaches
when picking our HIT from the amazon mechanical turk HIT list.
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Figure B.2: First, we ask for the participant’s consent to participate to the study.
Figure B.3: Then, we check whether the participant is technically able to participate.
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Figure B.4: In this first part of the collection of data, we retrieve socio-demographic
information from the participants.
Figure B.5: This page gives instructions to the participant regarding the survey.
Furthermore, the participant is randomly assigned to a condition (with password /
without a password), in this particular case, the participant is given a password.
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Figure B.6: This is the 1st choice out of 5. In this particular case, the 1st choice is
a 2nd round. The participant is assigned to a scenario displayed on the top of the
page. Once defined, the same scenario is used for all the subsequent choices this
participant is asked to make.
Figure B.7: This is the 2nd choice out of 5. In this particular case, the 2nd choice
is a 3rd round.
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Figure B.8: This is the 3rd choice out of 5. In this particular case, the 3rd choice is
a 1st round.
Figure B.9: This is the 4th choice out of 5. In this particular case, the 4th choice is a
3rd round. This 3rd round has been reintroduced randomly to check the consistency
of the participant’s answers.
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Figure B.10: This is the last choice. In this particular case, the 5th choice is a
4th round. In a 4th round, the networks names appear one after the other, each
subsequent addition is delayed by 200ms.
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Figure B.10: (previous page) Here, we ask the participants to rate on 4-points likert
scales, their understanding of the extent to which they agree that each of the 3
visual cues corroborate in meaning with 4 words related to ‘Encryption’, and ‘QoS’.
Figure B.11: After having investigated the participant’s understanding of the graph-
ical cues, we ask complementary questions about the participant’s attitude and belief
regarding the participant use of Wi-Fi networks.
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Figure B.12: In this last page of collection of data, we continue our investigation of
the participant’s beliefs, and we ask the participant about his connectivity habits.
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Figure B.13: Finally, we thank the participant and redirect him to the amazon
mechanical turk website.
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C
Pilot study performed to prepare the
questionnaire presented in Appendix B
In the following, we give additional details on the pilot-study that we conducted in
order to design the questionnaire that investigates the influence of graphical cues in
the selection of Wi-Fi networks (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B).
C.1 The vignettes
As explained in Section 4.3.2, we created and tested 3 vignettes, or candidate sce-
narios, for each scenario. Table C.1 lists the 3 vignettes that intend to convey the
lack of need for ‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’ (Quality of Service); Tables C.2 lists the
vignettes that intend to convey the lack of need for ‘Encryption’, and the need for
‘QoS’; Table C.3 lists the vignettes that intend to convey the need for ‘Encryption’,
and the lack of need for ‘QoS’; and finally, Table C.4 lists the vignettes that intend
to convey the need for ‘Encryption’, and the need for ‘QoS’.
C.2 The questionnaire
The questionnaire used in the pilot-study has the same structure (and uses the
same tools and settings) as the questionnaire presented in Appendix B. First, we
greet the participant and ask for his consent to participate, then we give the par-
ticipant some instructions (see Figure C.1) and collect diverse socio-demographic
information. Then, comes the part that is specific to the pilot-study: the rating of
the di↵erent vignettes on 4 points likert scales (‘Not necessary’, ‘Not important’,
‘Important’, and ‘Mandatory’). As we show in Figure C.2, the participant rates
on di↵erent likert scales how much the Wi-Fi network mentioned in the displayed
candidate scenario requires each listed property. 6 properties are related to ‘En-
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Table C.1: Vignettes that intend to convey the lack of need for ‘Encryption’ and
‘QoS’.
Vignette
Intended
meaning Displayed text
Encryp. QoS
A1 0 0 I am sitting in a book shop. As I am alone and have some
time to spare, I want to use my smartphone to check my
social network accounts for news about my friends. Unfor-
tunately, there is no 3G/4G network, so I use an available
Wi-Fi network instead.
A2 0 0 I am sitting in a co↵ee shop with some friends. As they
want to go for dinner later, I use my smartphone to check
for a good restaurant. Unfortunately, there is no 3G/4G
network available, so I have to use an available Wi-Fi net-
work instead.
A3 0 0 I am in a bar and have had a couple of drinks too many.
Thus, I need to find the nearest hotel in walking distance
with a vacant room. Unfortunately, there is no 3G/4G net-
work, so I use an available Wi-Fi network instead.
Table C.2: Vignettes that intend to convey the lack of need for ‘Encryption’, and
the need for ‘QoS’.
Vignette
Intended
meaning Displayed text
Encryp. QoS
B1 0 1 I just got o↵ the bus, and I’m heading to a job interview. I
check my smartphone to figure out how to get to my desti-
nation, but there is no 3G/4G and the smartphone is unable
to display the map of the current location. I thus decide to
try an available Wi-Fi network to get some connectivity.
B2 0 1 I am a graphic designer intending to show my latest work to
some of my friends. Since the 3G/4G connection is failing
to retrieve the files, which are rather big, I decide to try an
available Wi-Fi network to get some connectivity.
B3 0 1 I am a movie producer on the road. My assistant calls
me because he needs feedback on an HD movie trailer that
a client needs tonight. I only have my smartphone and
even though it is a relatively big file I need to download it.
Unfortunately, there is no 3G/4G. I thus decide to try an
available Wi-Fi network to get some connectivity.
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Table C.3: Vignettes that intend to convey the need for ‘Encryption’, and the lack
of need for ‘QoS’.
Vignette
Intended
meaning Displayed text
Encryp. QoS
C1 1 0 I am waiting at a bus stop and I need to verify whether the
check I deposited yesterday has been cleared. I need to use
the bank’s application on my smartphone to check the bank
account’s balance, but unfortunately there is no 3G/4G. I
thus decide to try an available Wi-Fi network to get some
connectivity.
C2 1 0 I am in a movie theater waiting for the movie to begin. As
I have a bit of extra time, I decide to order my groceries
online for the week. Unfortunately, there is no 3G/4G. I
thus decide to try an available Wi-Fi network.
C3 1 0 I am a Medical Doctor attending a conference and get con-
tacted by a colleague in order to provide advice on a patient.
In order to understand the case, I have to download the pa-
tient’s file from our private practice server. Unfortunately,
there is no 3G/4G so I decide to try an available Wi-Fi
network to get some connectivity.
cryption’ (Private, Secret, Masked, Protected, Encrypted, and Confidential), and 6
properties are related to ‘QoS’ (Fast, Responsive, First-Class, Good signal strength,
High-bandwidth, and High-speed). The participant repeats this rating operation
for the 12 vignettes. Then, we ask the participant several questions about his con-
nectivity habits, and his beliefs about Wi-Fi networks (see Figure C.3). Finally, we
debrief and thank the participant before redirecting him to the amazon mechanical
turk web site.
Figure C.1: This page gives instructions to the participant regarding the survey.
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Table C.4: Vignettes that intend to convey the need for ‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’.
Vignette
Intended
meaning Displayed text
Encryp. QoS
D1 1 1 I am rushing to meet a client to sign a contract. While hur-
rying there, I receive an SMS from a co-worker: ‘The boss
changed the contract and put it on the company’s Intranet
and wants you to use the updated version instead’. I need
to get the file rapidly, but unfortunately I can’t access the
company’s Intranet from my tablet. I ask my colleague to
send me the private document via email, which I can read
from the tablet. There is no 3G/4G, and thus I decide to
use an available Wi-Fi network to read my mail, retrieve
and save the attached file. This particular file is huge.
D2 1 1 I am a government o cial staying at an hotel. I scheduled
an international online meeting. I planned to use the hotel’s
Wi-Fi network but the hotel’s Wi-Fi proved unreliable when
I called my family earlier to test the connection. There is
no 3G/4G network, so I decide to go somewhere else to find
an available Wi-Fi network.
D3 1 1 I am a highly regarded technology blogger and was invited
among a selected few to attend a virtual pre-release video
presentation on the next hottest gadget. This is a unique
opportunity to be among the first to report on this new
item, which has the potential to attract millions of hits to
my website. As I am stuck in tra c and there is no 3G/4G
network, I decide to pull over to try an available Wi-Fi
network.
C.3 Choosing the best vignette to convey the sce-
nario’s meaning
To choose the vignette that will convey the best the intended meaning, we build box-
plots corresponding to the participants’ answers for 2 categories of ratings: Needed,
and Not needed. Not needed and Needed are the counts of participant ratings respec-
tively of the ‘Not necessary’ and ‘Not important’, and ‘Important’ and ‘Mandatory’.
As an example, Figure C.4 shows the boxplots corresponding to the vignettes that
intend to convey that ‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’ are not needed. We search for a vi-
gnette for which participants preferred the Not needed category ratings over the
Needed category ratings—for both dimensions. In this particular example, A1 is
not the best candidate because, for the ‘Encryption’ dimension, A2 and A3 are evi-
dently better (their counts of Not needed are higher, and their counts of Needed are
lower). As the di↵erence between A2 and A3 on this dimension is less evident, we
perform several Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests (the data do not satisfy the t-test’s
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Figure C.2: This page asks the participant to rate, for the described scenario, how
much each property is required by the Wi-Fi network. The participant is asked to
perform this task for the 12 vignettes.
pre-condidions). It appears that A2’s Needed category count is significantly lower
than A3’s (p=0.01), and that A2’s Not needed category count is significantly higher
than A3’s (p=0.01). We do not have a significant di↵erence on the ‘QoS’ dimension,
but when grouping by gender, we identify a gender e↵ect that we want to avoid in
A3. Indeed, we find out that the women who participated to the study significantly
tend to rate the A3 vignette more as requiring the ‘QoS’ property compared to men,
and this can be problematic for the subsequent questionnaire. In A2, the only gender
e↵ect we find is that the men who participated to the study tend to rate the ‘QoS’
as being Not needed significantly more than women, which is a di↵erence we need
to be aware of when doing the analysis of the subsequent questionnaire. Therefore
we choose the vignette A2 to convey the lack of need of ‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’.
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Figure C.3: This page gathers information regarding the participant’s connectivity
habits, and the participant’s beliefs about Wi-Fi networks.
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(a) A1: Encryption (b) A1: QoS
(c) A2: Encryption (d) A2: QoS
(e) A3: Encryption (f) A3: QoS
Figure C.4: Boxplots depicting the participants’ ratings corresponding to the vi-
gnettes that intend to convey the lack of need for ‘Encryption’ and ‘QoS’.
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Questions used in the study on the
influence of the context and trust on
Wi-Fi network selection
In this appendix, we present the questions asked to the participants who were part
of the study that investigated the influence of the network names (see Section 3.3)
and trust (see Section 4.3.1.1) on user Wi-Fi selection. The questionnaire has a set
of common questions, first about socio-demographic information, second about the
participant’s baseline preferences regarding the network names used in the study.
The questionnaire has 2 other rounds of questions that correspond to 2 conditions
to which the participants were randomly assigned: the context condition, and the
trust condition. The questionnaire was available in English, German, and French.
D.1 Questions common to both conditions
The survey begins with the gathering of socio demographic information. We collect:
age, gender, education (high school, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, phd, other),
and occupation. Furthermore, we ask if the participant is living or working in
Luxembourg (the location where the Wi-Fi network names were collected). We also
collect information regarding the participant computer literacy. The participant
answers on a 5 points likert scale (not at all comfortable, not very comfortable,
neutral, comfortable, very comfortable) to the question ‘I feel comfortable using
Information Technology (computers, smartphones, tablets...)’, and on a 5 points
likert scale (very good, good, average, not very good, not at all good) to the question
‘I would describe my IT skills to be’.
Then every participant is presented the following instructions:
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Please rate each wireless network listed below, in terms of preference,
and avoid selecting the option ‘neutral’ unless you cannot rate the name
at all.
These intructions are presented along with the list of network names (eduroam,
uni-visitor, uni-student, wifi unilu, hotcity, Hotel le Place D’Armes, Cafe de Paris,
secured hotspot, secure wifi BelleEtoile, free wifi BelleEtoile, Maroquinerie Kirchberg,
and free AP), and the corresponding 5 point likert scales (not at all preferred, not
very preferred, neutral, preferred, most preferred). Figure D.1 shows an illustration
of the actual presentation of this question.
Figure D.1: Illustration of the actual presentation of the online questionnaire, when
asking for the participant’s preferences regarding network names, in English. This
question is presented several times to the participants throughout the questionnaire,
with di↵erent instructions and likert scale ratings.
Then the participant is asked to provide an explanation for why he rated some
names higher than others in an open text field.
D.2 Trust condition
In the trust condition, the participant is only presented one additional page with
two questions. The participant is asked to rate the network names regarding trust
on 5 points likert scales:
Please rate each wireless network listed below, in terms of trust (i.e.
if you perceive some risk or threat associated with the name or if you
consider it to be trusted) (not at all trusted, not very trusted, neutral,
trusted, highly trusted), and avoid selecting the option ‘neutral’ unless
you cannot rate the name at all.
Then the participant is asked to provide an explanation for why he rated some
names higher than others in an open text field.
D.3 Context condition
In the context condition, the participant is presented 4 successive questions in which
the participant is asked to rate the network regarding his preferences. Only, each
time the location is di↵erent.
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Imagine that you are located at the University of Luxembourg.
Please rate each wireless network listed below, in terms of preference
(not at all preferred, not very preferred, neutral, preferred, most pre-
ferred), and avoid selecting the option ‘neutral’ unless you cannot rate
the name at all.
Imagine that you are located at the City Center in Luxembourg
(e.g. Place D’Armes) Please rate each wireless network listed below,
in terms of preference (not at all preferred, not very preferred, neutral,
preferred, most preferred), and avoid selecting the option ‘neutral’ unless
you cannot rate the name at all.
Imagine that you are located at the shopping mall (e.g. Belle
Etoile). Please rate each wireless network listed below, in terms of
preference (not at all preferred, not very preferred, neutral, preferred,
most preferred), and avoid selecting the option ‘neutral’ unless you
cannot rate the name at all.
Imagine that you are located at the Hospital (e.g. Kirchberg Hos-
pital) . Please rate each wireless network listed below, in terms of
preference (not at all preferred, not very preferred, neutral, preferred,
most preferred), and avoid selecting the option ‘neutral’ unless you can-
not rate the name at all.
After each question, the participant is asked to provide an explanation for why
he rated some names higher than others in an open text field.
189
Appendix D. Questions used in the study on the influence of the context and trust
on Wi-Fi network selection
190
Bibliography
[1] 3GPP Technical Specification 24.312 Access Network Discovery and Selection
Function (ANDSF) Management Object (MO), December 2013.
[2] I. Abdelhalim, S. Schneider, and H. Treharne. An integrated framework for
checking the behaviour of fUML models using CSP. International Journal on
Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 2012.
[3] A. Adams and M. A. S.asse. Users Are Not the Enemy. Comm. ACM, 42:40–
46, 1999.
[4] D. Akhawe and A. P. Felt. Alice in Warningland: A Large-Scale Field Study
of Browser Security Warning E↵ectiveness. In in Proc. of the 22nd USENIX
Security Symposium, August 14-16, 2013, Washington, DC, USA, 2013.
[5] W. Alcorn. BeEF: The Browser Exploitation Framework. Available at http:
//beefproject.com/.
[6] S. Alfawaz, K. Nelson, and K. Mohannak. Information security culture: A
behaviour compliance conceptual framework. In Proceedings of the Eighth
Australasian Conference on Information Security - Volume 105, AISC ’10,
pages 47–55, Darlinghurst, Australia, Australia, 2010. Australian Computer
Society, Inc.
[7] A. Algarni, Y. Xu, T. Chan, and Y. Tian. Social engineering in social network-
ing sites: A↵ect-based model. In Internet Technology and Secured Transactions
(ICITST), 2013 8th International Conference for, pages 508–515. IEEE, 2013.
[8] Wi-Fi Alliance. Wi-Fi CERTIFIED Passpoint: A new program from the Wi-
Fi Alliance to enable seamless Wi-Fi access in hotspots., June 2012. http:
//www.wi-fi.org.
[9] R. Anderson and T. Moore. Information Security Economics - and Beyond. In
DEON ’08: Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Deontic Logic
in Computer Science, volume 5076, pages 1–26. Springer, July, 15-18 2008.
[10] R. J. Anderson. Usability and Psychology, chapter 2. Security Engineering: A
Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. Wiley, 2008.
[11] APM Group Ltd. ITIL Home, 2012. http://www.itil-officialsite.com/.
[12] I. Arce. The weakest Link Revisited. Security Privacy, IEEE, 1(2):72 – 76,
mar-apr 2003.
191
Bibliography
[13] S. Band, D. Cappelli, L. Fischer, A. Moore, E. Shaw, and Trzeciak R. Com-
paring Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis. Techni-
cal Report CMU/SEI-2006-TR-026, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 2006.
[14] J. E. Bardram. The trouble with login: on usability and computer security
in ubiquitous computing. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 9(6):357–367,
2005.
[15] A. Beautement, M. A. Sasse, and M. Wonham. The compliance budget: man-
aging security behaviour in organisations. In Proc. of NSPW 08, Lake Tahoe,
California, USA, September 22-25, 2008, pages 46–58. ACM, 2008.
[16] G. Bella and L. Coles-Kemp. Layered analysis of security ceremonies. In
Information Security and Privacy Research: 27th IFIP TC 11 Information
Security and Privacy Conference, SEC 2012, Heraklion, Crete, Greece, June
4-6, 2012. Proceedings, pages 273–286. Springer, 2012.
[17] G. Bella, P. Curzon, and G. Lenzini. Service security and privacy as a socio-
technical problem. Journal of Computer Security, 25(5):563–585, 2015.
[18] G. Bella, R. Giustolisi, and G. Lenzini. A Socio-Technical Understanding of
TLS Cerficate Validation. In Proc. of 7th IFIPTM 2013. IFIP, 2013.
[19] G. Bella, R. Giustolisi, and G. Lenzini. Socio-Technical Formal Analysis of
TLS Certificate Validation in Modern Browsers. In Proc. of PST 2013. IFIP,
2013.
[20] M. Blaze. Toward a Broader View of Security Protocols, volume 3957, pages
106–120. Springer.
[21] R. L. Boring. Fifty Years of THERP and Human Reliability Analysis. Pro-
ceedings of PSAM11, 2012.
[22] M. Bostock, V. Ogievetsky, and J. Heer. D3: Data-driven documents. IEEE
Trans. Visualization & Comp. Graphics (Proc. InfoVis), 2011.
[23] B. M. Bowen, R. Devarajan, and S. Stolfo. Measuring the human factor of
cyber security. In Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2011 IEEE
International Conference on, pages 230–235, Nov 2011.
[24] J. Brodkin. NFL to block mobile streaming video in super bowl stadium,
January 2014. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/01/nfl-
to-block-mobile-streaming-video-in-super-bowl-stadium.
[25] J. S. Brown, A. Collins, and P. Duguid. Situated cognition and the culture of
learning. Educational Researcher, 18(1):32–42, 1989.
[26] J. Brumfield. 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report. Technical report,
Verizon, 2015.
192
Bibliography
[27] P. C. Cacciabue. Guide to Applying Human Factors Methods - Human Error
and Accident Management in Safety-Critical Systems. Springer, 2004.
[28] L. J. Camp. Mental models of privacy and security. IEEE Technology and
Society Magazine, 28(3):37–46, 2009. cited By 23.
[29] M. C. Carlos, J. E. Martina, S. Catarina, G. Price, and R. F. Custo´dio. An
Updated Threat Model for Security Ceremonies. In Symposium on Applied
Computing, pages 1836–1843, 2013.
[30] M. C. Carlos and G. Price. Understanding the weaknesses of human-protocol
interaction. In Jim Blyth, Sven Dietrich, and L.Jean Camp, editors, Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, volume 7398 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 13–26. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[31] C. Castelfranchi and R. Falcone. Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Com-
putational Model. Wiley, 2010.
[32] A. Chapanis. Research techniques in human engineering. Johns Hopkins Press,
1959.
[33] T. Chenoweth, R. Minch, and S. Tabor. Wireless insecurity: examining user
security behavior on public networks. Commun. ACM, 53(2):134–138, Febru-
ary 2010.
[34] R. B. Cialdini. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (Revision Edition).
Harper Business, 2007.
[35] Cisco. Cisco context-aware service configuration guide - 7.3. Available at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/mse/3350/7-3/CAS_
Configuration_Guide/Guide/CAS_73/msecg_Overview.html.
[36] Cisco. Rogue management in a unified wireless network - v7.4. Avail-
able at http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/technology/
roguedetection_deploy/Rogue_Detection.html.
[37] Cisco. The future of hotspots: Making wi-fi as secure and easy to use
as cellular, 2012. Available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/
collateral/ns341/ns524/ns673/white_paper_c11-649337.html.
[38] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D. Peled. Model Checking. MIT press, 1999.
[39] European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament
and of the council on the protection of individuals with regard to the process-
ing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data
Protection Regulation. See http://ec. europa. eu/justice/data-protection/ . . . ,
0011, 2012.
[40] G. Conti, M. Ahamad, and J. Stasko. Attacking information visualization
system usability overloading and deceiving the human. In Proc. of SOUPS
2005, pages 89–100. ACM, 2005.
193
Bibliography
[41] MITRE Corporation. CAPEC - Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification, 2014. Available at https://capec.mitre.org/.
[42] L. F. Cranor. A Framework for Reasoning About the Human in the Loop.
In Proc. of 1st Conf. on Usability, Psychology, and Security, pages 1–15.
USENIX Association, 2008.
[43] L. F. Cranor and S. Garfinkel. Security and Usability: Design Secure Systems
that People can use. O’Reilly Media, 2005.
[44] M. J. C. Crump and T. M. McDonnell, J. V.and Gureckis. Evaluating Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk as a tool for experimental behavioral research. PloS
one, 8(3):e57410, January 2013.
[45] P. Curzon, R. Ruksˇe˙nas, and A. Blandford. An approach to formal verification
of human–computer interaction. Formal Aspects of Computing, 19(4):513–550,
2007.
[46] F. Dalpiaz, P. Giorgini, and J. Mylopoulos. Adaptive Socio-Technical Sys-
tems: a Requirements-driven Approach. Requirements Engineering, pages
1–24, 2013.
[47] N. David, A. David, R. R. Hansen, Kim G. Larsen, A. Legay, M. Chr. Olesen,
and C. W. Probst. Modelling Social-Technical Attacks with Timed Automata.
Mist, pages 21–28, 2015.
[48] T. P Davis Jr. Barrier analysis facilitators guide: a tool for improving be-
havior change communication in child survival and community development
programs. Technical report, Food for the Hungry, 2004.
[49] T. Denning, A. Lerner, A. Shostack, and T. Kohno. Control-Alt-Hack: The
Design and Evaluation of a Card Game for Computer Security Awareness and
Education. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS ’13, pages 915–928, New York, NY, USA,
2013. ACM.
[50] R. Dhamija, J. D. Tygar, and M. Hearst. Why phishing works. In Proceedings
of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI
’06, pages 581–590, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[51] T. Dimkov, W. Pieters, and P. H. Hartel. Portunes: Representing Attack Sce-
narios Spanning through the Physical, Digital and Social Domain. In A. Ar-
mando and G. Lowe, editors, Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Anal-
ysis and Issues in the Theory of Security - Joint Workshop, ARSPA-WITS
2010, Paphos, Cyprus, March 27-28, 2010. Revised Selected Papers, volume
6186 of LNCS, pages 112–129. springer, 2011.
[52] D. Dolev and A. Yao. On the security of public-key protocols. IEEE Trans-
action on Information Theory, 29(2):198–208, 1983.
194
Bibliography
[53] J. Downs, A. Acquisti, and D. Barbagallo. Predictors of risky decisions: Im-
proving judgment and decision making based on evidence from phishing at-
tack. In Neuroeconomics, Judgment, and Decision Making. Psychology Press,
1 edition, 2015.
[54] J. S. Downs, M. B. Holbrook, and L. F. Cranor. Decision strategies and
susceptibility to phishing. In Proceedings of the second symposium on Usable
privacy and security, pages 79–90. ACM, 2006.
[55] Borgida E. and Nisbett R. E. The Di↵erential Impact of Abstract vs. Concrete
Information on Decisions. J. of Applied Social Phychology, pages 258–271,
1977.
[56] C. Ellison. Ceremony Design and Analysis. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2007/399, 2007.
[57] ENISA. Detect , SHARE , Protect Solutions for Improving Threat Data
Exchange among CERTs. Technical Report October, 2013.
[58] S. Fahl, M. Harbach, T. Muders, M. Smith, L. Baumga¨rtner, and B. Freisleben.
Why eve and mallory love android: an analysis of android SSL (in)security.
In Proc. of ACM CCS’12, pages 50–61, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[59] L. Falk, A. Prakash, and K. Borders. Analyzing websites for user-visible secu-
rity design flaws. In Proceedings of SOUPS 2008, pages 117–126, New York,
NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[60] Federal Aviation Administration. Code of federal regulations - 14 cfr 23.777 -
cockpit controls., 2002.
[61] A. P. Felt, A. Ainslie, R. W. Reeder, S. Consolvo, S. Thyagaraja, A. Bettes,
H. Harris, and J. Grimes. Improving SSL warnings: Comprehension and adher-
ence. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems, CHI ’15, pages 2893–2902, New York, NY, USA, 2015.
ACM.
[62] A. Ferreira, L. Coventry, and G. Lenzini. Principles of persuasion in social
engineering and their use in phishing. In 17th Int. Conf. on Human Computer
Interaction., page (in press), 2015.
[63] A. Ferreira, R. Giustolisi, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. Studies
in Socio-technical Security Analysis: Authentication of Identities
with TLS Certificates. In TrustCom/ISPA/IUCC, pages 1553–1558. IEEE
Computer Society, 2013.
[64] A. Ferreira, R. Giustolisi, JL. Huynen, and G. Lenzini. On Tools for Socio-
Technical Security Analysis. Grande Region Security and Reliability Day,
2013.
195
Bibliography
[65] A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. A Conceptual Frame-
work to Study Socio-Technical Security. In HCI (24), volume 8533 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 318–329. Springer, 2014.
[66] A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. Socio-technical Secu-
rity Analysis of Wireless Hotspots. In HCI (24), volume 8533 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 306–317. Springer, 2014.
[67] A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, and G. Lenzini. In Cyber-Space No
One Can Hear You S·CREAM - A Root Cause Analysis for Socio-
Technical Security. In STM, volume 9331 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 255–264. Springer, 2015.
[68] A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, G. Lenzini, and S. Rivas. Socio-
Technical Study on the E↵ect of Trust and Context When Choosing
WiFi Names. In STM, volume 8203 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 131–143. Springer, 2013.
[69] A. Ferreira, JL. Huynen, V. Koenig, G. Lenzini, and S. Rivas. Do Graphical
Cues E↵ectively Inform Users? - A Socio-Technical Security Study
in Accessing Wifi Networks. In HCI (22), volume 9190 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 323–334. Springer, 2015. [Best Paper Award].
[70] A. Ferreira and G. Lenzini. An analysis of social engineering principles in
e↵ective phishing. In Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust (STAST),
2015 Workshop on, pages 9–16, July 2015.
[71] J. Finch. The Vignette Technique in Survey Research. Sociology, 21(1):105–
114, 1987.
[72] I. Fle´chais. Designing secure and usable systems. PhD thesis, University
College London, 2005.
[73] International Organization for Standardization. Information Technology; Se-
curity Techniques; Information Security Management Guidelines for Telecom-
munications Organizations Based on ISO: Technologies de L’`ınformation:
Techniques de Se´curite´: Lignes Directrices Pour Les Organismes de
Te´le´communications Sur la Base de L’ISO/CEI 27002. International Organi-
zation for Standardization, 2009.
[74] D. Gambetta. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell
Pub, 1990.
[75] D. Gambetta. Can We Trust Trust? In D. Gambetta, editor, Trust: Making
and Breaking Cooperative Relatioins, chapter 13, pages 213–237. Basil Black-
well, 2000.
[76] G. Gavai, K. Sricharan, D. Gunning, R. Rolleston, J. Hanley, and M. Singhal.
Detecting insider threat from enterprise social and online activity data. In
Proceedings of the 7th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider
Security Threats, MIST ’15, pages 13–20, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
196
Bibliography
[77] M. Georgiev, S. Iyengar, S. Jana, Rishita A., D. Boneh, and V. Shmatikov. The
most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser
software. In Proc. ofACM CCS’12, pages 38–49, New York, NY, USA, 2012.
[78] P. Godfrey-Smith. Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Science. Science and Its Conceptual Foundations. Univ. of Chicago Press,
2009.
[79] D. Gollmann. Computer Security. Wiley, 2011.
[80] Google. AngularJS. Available at https://angularjs.org/.
[81] D. Gragg. A Multi-Level Defense Against Social Engineering. Technical report,
SANS Institute - InfoSec Reading Room, 2003.
[82] P. Grice. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press, 1989.
[83] K. H. Guo and Y. Yuan. The e↵ects of multilevel sanctions on informa-
tion security violations: A mediating model. Information & management,
49(6):320–326, 2012.
[84] J. T. Hallinan. Why We Make Mistakes: How We Look Without Seeing, Forget
Things in Seconds, and Are All Pretty Sure We Are Way Above Average.
Broadway Books, 2009.
[85] D. Harley. Re-floating the titanic: Dealing with social engineering attacks.
London: EICAR, page 13, 1998.
[86] R. Heartfield and G. Loukas. A Taxonomy of Attacks and a Survey of De-
fence Mechanisms for Semantic Social Engineering Attacks. ACM Computing
Surveys, 48(3):1–39, 2015.
[87] C. Herley. So Long, And No Thanks for the Externalities: the Rational Re-
jection of Security Advice by Users. In Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on
New security paradigms workshop, NSPW ’09, pages 133–144, New York, NY,
USA, 2009. ACM.
[88] C. Herley. Why do Nigerian Scammers Say They are From Nigeria? Workshop
on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 2012.
[89] R. J. Heuer. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 1999.
[90] A. R. Hoare. Communicating Sequential Processes. Prentice Hall International,
1985.
[91] E. Hollnagel. Cognitive reliability and error analysis method CREAM. Elsevier,
Oxford New York, 1998.
[92] A. Hovav and F. F. Putri. This is my device! why should I follow your
rules? employees’ compliance with BYOD security policy. Pervasive and
Mobile Computing, 2016.
197
Bibliography
[93] R. Huber. Distributed security alerting, March 2016. Available at https:
//slack.engineering/distributed-security-alerting-c89414c992d6.
[94] J. Hunker and C.W. Probst. Insiders and insider threats an overview of defini-
tions and mitigation techniques. Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiq-
uitous Computing, and Dependable Applications, 2(1):4–27, 2011.
[95] JL. Huynen. S·CREAM Assistant, a tool to support S·CREAM analyses.,
2016. Available at https://github.com/gallypette/SCREAM.
[96] IBM. IBM Security Services 2014 Cyber Security Intelligence Index.,
2014. Available at http://media.scmagazine.com/documents/82/ibm_
cyber_security_intelligenc_20450.pdf.
[97] 802.11u-2011–amendment 9: Interworking with external networks.
[98] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO ADREP 2000 tax-
onomy, 2000.
[99] Isaca. COBIT 5 Framework. Isaca, 2012.
[100] K. Ishikawa. Introduction to Quality Control. Springer, 2012.
[101] K. Ivaturi and L. Janczewski. A taxonomy for social engineering attacks. In
International Conference on Information Resources Management, Centre for
Information Technology, Organizations, and People (June 2011), 2011.
[102] D. Jackson. Towards a theory of conceptual design for software. In Onward!
Essays, 2015.
[103] L.J. Janczewski and F. Lingyan. Social engineering-based attacks: Model and
New Zfealand perspective. In Proc. of IMCSIT 2010, pages 847–853, 2010.
[104] D. Jeske, L. Coventry, and P. Briggs. Decision justifications for wireless net-
work selection. In Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust (STAST),
2014 Workshop on, pages 1–7, July 2014.
[105] C. Johnson, L. Badger, and D. Waltermire. NIST special publication 800-
150 (draft) guide to cyber threat information sharing. Technical report, The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), October 2014.
[106] M. Jordan and H. Gouday. The signs, and semiotics of the successful semantic
attack. In 14th Annual EICAR Conference, pages 344–364, 2005.
[107] A. Jøsang, I. G. Pedersen, and D. Povey. PKI seeks a trusting relationship.
In Proc. of ACISP 2000, Brisbane, Australia, 2000.
[108] A. Jøsang, K. A. Varmedal, C. Rosenberger, and R. Kumar. Service provider
authentication assurance. In Proc. of PST ’12, pages 203–210. IEEE Computer
Society, 2012.
[109] Js-data Development Team. Js-data. Available at http://www.js-data.io/.
198
Bibliography
[110] R. Kainda, I. Fle´chais, and A. W. Roscoe. Usability and security of out-of-band
channels in secure device pairing protocols. In Proc. of the 5th Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’09, pages 11:1–11:12, New York, NY,
USA, 2009. ACM.
[111] R. Kainda, I. Fle´chais, and A. W. Roscoe. Security and Usability: Analysis
and Evaluation. 2010 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and
Security, pages 275–282, 2010.
[112] I. Kirlappos, A. Beautement, and M. A. Sasse. “Comply or Die” Is Dead:
Long Live Security-Aware Principal Agents, pages 70–82. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013.
[113] I. Kirlappos, S. Parkin, and M. A. Sasse. Learning from “shadow security:”
why understanding non-compliant behaviors provides the basis for e↵ective
security. In Proceedings 2014 Workshop on Usable Security. Internet Society,
2014.
[114] P. Klasnja, S. Consolvo, J. Jung, B. M. Greenstein, L. LeGrand, P. Powledge,
and D. Wetherall. “When I am on Wi-Fi, I am fearless”: privacy concerns &
practices in everyday Wi-Fi use. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’09, pages 1993–2002, New York,
NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[115] R. Koppel, S. W. Smith, J. Blythe, and V. Kothari. Workarounds to com-
puter access in healthcare organizations: You want my password or a dead
patient? In Driving Quality in Informatics: Fulfilling the Promise, ITCH
2015, Victoria, BC, Canada, February 26 - March 1, 2015, pages 215–220,
2015.
[116] K.P.K. Kumar and G. Geethakumari. Analysis of semantic attacks in online
social networks. Communications in Computer and Information Science, 420
CCIS:45–56, 2014. cited By 0.
[117] P. Kumaraguru, S. Sheng, A. Acquisti, L. F. Cranor, and J. Hong. Teaching
Johnny not to Fall for Phish. ACM Trans. Internet Technol., 10(2):1–31, 2010.
[118] N. Kuntze, C. Rudolph, B. Brisbois, M. Boggess, B. Endicott-Popovsky, and
S. Leivesley. Safety vs. security: Why do people die despite good safety?
In 2015 Integrated Communication, Navigation and Surveillance Conference
(ICNS), pages 1–13, April 2015.
[119] A. Langley. Living with HTTPS, July 2012.
[120] L. Laribee. Development of methodical social engineering taxonomy project.
PhD thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2006.
[121] J. Lazar, J.H. Feng, and H. Hochheiser. Research Methods in Human-
Computer Interaction. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.
199
Bibliography
[122] E. Lee. Homeland Security and Private Sector Business: Corporations’ Role
in Critical Infrastructure Protection, Second Edition. CRC Press, 2014.
[123] M. G. Lee. Securing the human to protect the system: Human factors in cyber
security. In System Safety, incorporating the Cyber Security Conference 2012,
7th IET International Conference on, pages 1–5, Oct 2012.
[124] E. L. Lehmann. ’student’ and small-sample theory. STATISTICAL SCIENCE,
14:418–426, 1999.
[125] Periscope Film Llc. B-17 Bomber Pilot’s Flight Operating Manual. lulu.com,
2013.
[126] G. B. Magklaras and S. M. Furnell. Insider Threat Prediction Tool: Evaluating
the probability of IT misuse. Computers & Security, 21(1):62 – 73, 2001.
[127] Mandiant. Sophisticated indicators for the modern threat landscape: An in-
troduction to OpenIOC. Available at http://openioc.org/resources/An_
Introduction_to_OpenIOC.pdf.
[128] S. Mauw and M. Oostdijk. Foundations of attack trees. In D. Won and S. Kim,
editors, Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Information Security and Cryptology
(ICISC 2005), December 1-2, 2005, Seoul, Korea, volume 3935 of LNCS, pages
186–198. Springer, 2006.
[129] P. McCullagh. Generalized linear models. Chapman and Hall, London New
York, 1989.
[130] MISP Development Team. Malware Information Sharing Platform, 2015.
Available at http://www.misp-project.org/.
[131] K. Mitnick and W. L. Simon. the Art of Deception. Wiley Publishing Inc.,
2002.
[132] D. Miyamoto and T. Takahashi. Toward automated reduction of human errors
based on cognitive analysis. In Proceedings of the 2013 Seventh International
Conference on Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiquitous Comput-
ing, IMIS ’13, pages 820–825, Washington, DC, USA, 2013. IEEE Computer
Society.
[133] C. F. Mohd Foozy, R. Ahmad, M. A. Faizal, R. Yusof, and M. M. Zaki.
Generic taxonomy of social engineering attack. Technical Report 191, Univer-
sity Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, 2011.
[134] F. Mouton, L. Leenen, M. M. Malan, and H. S. Venter. ICT and Society:
11th IFIP TC 9 International Conference on Human Choice and Computers,
HCC11 2014, Turku, Finland, July 30 – August 1, 2014. Proceedings, chapter
Towards an Ontological Model Defining the Social Engineering Domain, pages
266–279. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014.
200
Bibliography
[135] National Security Agency. Defense in depth: A practical strategy for achieving
information assurance in today’s highly networked environments.
[136] Jakob Nielsen, editor. Designing User Interfaces for International Use. Else-
vier Science Publishers Ltd., Essex, UK, 1990.
[137] European Council of the European Union. EU steps up cybersecurity: member
states approve agreement, 2015.
[138] G. L. Orgill, G. W. Romney, M. G. Bailey, and P. M. Orgill. The urgency for
e↵ective user privacy-education to counter social engineering attacks on secure
computer systems. In Proc. of the 5th conference on Information technology
education, CITC5 ’04, pages 177–181, New York, NY, USA, 2004. ACM.
[139] E. Paja, F. Dalpiaz, and P. Giorgini. Sts-tool: Security requirements engineer-
ing for socio-technical systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including
subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioin-
formatics), 8431:65–96, 2014.
[140] E. Paja, M. Poggianella, F. Dalpiaz, P. Roberti, and P. Giorgini. Security
requirements engineering with sts-tool. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes
in Bioinformatics), 8900:95–109, 2014.
[141] G. Paolacci, J. Chandler, and P. G. Ipeirotis. Running experiments on amazon
mechanical turk. Judgment and Decision making, 5(5):411–419, 2010.
[142] S. Parkin, A. van Moorsel, P. G. Inglesant, and M. A. Sasse. A Stealth Ap-
proach to Usable Security: Helping IT Security Managers to Identify Workable
Security Solutions. In Proc. of NSPW 2010, Sept. 21-23, 2010, pages 33–50.
ACM, 2010.
[143] PCI SSC. Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures v3.1, 2015.
[144] R Development Core Team. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical
Computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria, 2008.
Available at http://www.R-project.org.
[145] D. G. Rand. The promise of Mechanical Turk: How online labor markets
can help theorists run behavioral experiments. Journal of Theoretical Biology,
299:172–179, 2012.
[146] A. Raskin. Tabnabbing: A New Type of Phishing Attack. Available at http:
//www.azarask.in/blog/post/a-new-type-of-phishing-attack/.
[147] J. Reason. Human Error. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[148] E. Rescorla. HTTP Over TLS. RFC 2818, 2000.
[149] R. Ruksˇe˙nas, P. Curzon, and A. Blandford. Modelling and Analysing Cognitive
Causes of Security Breaches. Innovation in Systems and Software Engineering,
4(2):143–160, 2008.
201
Bibliography
[150] S. Ruoti, J. Andersen, D. Zappala, and K. Seamons. Why Johnny Still, Still
Can’t Encrypt: Evaluating the Usability of a Modern PGP Client. Technical
report, arXiv.org, oct 2015.
[151] S.E. Schechter, R. Dhamija, A. Ozment, and I. Fischer. The Emperor’s New
Security Indicators. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP ’07), pages
51–65, 2007.
[152] B. Schneier. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World. Wiley,
2000.
[153] B. Schneier. Semantic attacks: The third wave of network attacks. Crypto-
Gram Newsletter, 14, 2000.
[154] R. D. Serwy and E. M. Rantanen. Evaluation of a software implementation
of the cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM). Proceedings
of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 51(18):1249–
1253, oct 2007.
[155] S. Sheng, M. Holbrook, P. Kumaraguru, L. F. Cranor, and J. Downs. Who falls
for phish?: a demographic analysis of phishing susceptibility and e↵ectiveness
of interventions. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems, pages 373–382. ACM, 2010.
[156] A. Sood and R. Enbody. Targeted Cyber Attacks: Multi-staged Attacks Driven
by Exploits and Malware. Elsevier Science, 2014.
[157] A. Sotirakopoulos, K. Hawkey, and K. Beznosov. On the challenges in usable
security lab studies: lessons learned from replicating a study on SSL warnings.
In Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security,
SOUPS ’11, pages 3:1–3:18, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[158] S. Srinivas, D. Balfanz, E. Ti↵any, and A. Czeskis. Universal 2nd Fac-
tor (U2F) Overview., 2015. Available at https://fidoalliance.org/
specifications/download/.
[159] F. Stajano and P. Wilson. Understanding Scam Victims: Seven Principles for
Systems Security. Commun. ACM, 54(3):70–75, March 2011.
[160] D. Stakenburg and J. Crampton. Underexposed risks of public wi-fi hotspots.
ComputerWeekly.Com, 2013.
[161] S. Stasiukonis. Social engineering, the USB way. Dark Reading, 7, 2006.
[162] D. F. Sterne. On the buzzword ‘security policy’. In Research in Security
and Privacy, 1991. Proceedings., 1991 IEEE Computer Society Symposium
on, pages 219–230, May 1991.
[163] B. Strauch. Investigating Human Error: Incidents, Accidents, and Complex
Systems. Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2004.
202
Bibliography
[164] J. Sun, Y. Liu, J. S. Dong, and J. Pang. PAT: Towards Flexible Verification
under Fairness, pages 709–714. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2009.
[165] J. Sunshine, S. Egelman, H. Almuhimedi, N. Atri, and L. F. Cranor. Crying
wolf: An empirical study of SSL warning e↵ectiveness. In Proc. of USENIX’09,
2009.
[166] A. D. Swain. THERP. Technical report, Sandia Corp., Albuquerque, N. Mex.,
1964.
[167] A.D. Swain, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. O ce of Nuclear Regula-
tory Research, and H.E. Guttmann. Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis
With Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications - Draft Report For In-
terim Use and Comment. NUREG/CR. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
1980.
[168] R. Tembe, Kyung Wha Hong, E. Murphy-Hill, C.B. Mayhorn, and C.M. Kel-
ley. American and indian conceptualizations of phishing. In Proc. of STAST
2013, pages 37–45. IEEE, 2013.
[169] P. Tetri and J. Vuorinen. Dissecting social engineering. Behaviour & Infor-
mation Technology, 32(10):1014–1023, 2013.
[170] The News York Times. An old swindle revived; The “Spanish Prisoner” and
Buried Treasure Bait Again Being O↵ered to Unwary Americans. 1898.
[171] A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science, 185:1124–1131, 1974.
[172] A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. Rational Choice and The Framing of Decisions.
J. Business, 59:251–278, 1986.
[173] B. Ur, F. Noma, J. Bees, S. M. Segreti, R. Shay, L. Bauer, N. Christin, and
L. F. Cranor. “I added‘!’at the end to make it secure”: Observing password
creation in the lab. In Eleventh Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS 2015), pages 123–140, 2015.
[174] US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard Occupational Classification and
Coding Structure. Technical Report February, 2010.
[175] U.S. Department of the Census. Current Population Survey interviewing man-
ual, June 2013.
[176] VCDB Development Team. VERIS Community Database. Available at http:
//vcdb.org/.
[177] Verizon. VERIS: The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing.
Available at http://veriscommunity.net/.
203
Bibliography
[178] M. Volkamer and K. Renaud. Mental models-general introduction and review
of their application to human-centred security. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture
Notes in Bioinformatics), 8260 LNCS:255–280, 2013. cited By 2.
[179] M. Volkamer, S. Stockhardt, S. Bartsch, and M. Kauer. Adopting the
CMU/APWG anti-phishing landing page idea for germany. In Proc. of STAST
2013, pages 46–52. IEEE, 2013.
[180] Y. Wang, P. G. Leon, A. Acquisti, L. F. Cranor, A. Forget, and N. Sadeh.
A field trial of privacy nudges for facebook. Proceedings of the 32nd annual
ACM conference on Human factors in computing systems - CHI ’14, pages
2367–2376, 2014.
[181] We Are Dynamo turker community. Guidelines for Academic Requesters.
Available at http://www.wearedynamo.org/.
[182] D. Weerasinghe, V. Rakocevic, and M. Rajarajan. Security framework for
mobile banking. In Proc. of 8th MoMM 2010, pages 421–424. ACM, 2010.
[183] R. West. The Psychology of Security. Communication of the ACM, 51(4):34–
38, April 2008.
[184] A. Whitten. Why Johnny can’t encrypt: A usability evaluation of PGP 5.0.
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Security, 1999.
[185] B. Whitworth. Socio-technical systems. Encyclopedia of human computer
interaction, pages 533–541, 2006.
[186] F. Wilcoxon. Individual comparisons by ranking methods. Biometrics bulletin,
1(6):80–83, 1945.
[187] M. Wu, R. C. Miller, and S. L. Garfinkel. Do security toolbars actually prevent
phishing attacks? Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human Factors
in computing systems - CHI ’06, page 601, 2006.
[188] yubico AB. Yubikey 4 and yubikey 4 nano. Available at https://www.yubico.
com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey4/.
[189] yubico AB. Yubikey security evaluation: Discussion of security properties and
best practices., 2012. Available at https://www.yubico.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/10/Security-Evaluation-v2.0.1.pdf.
[190] yubico AB. The yubikey manual: Usage, configuration and introduction of
basic concepts., 2015. Available at https://www.yubico.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/YubiKeyManual_v3.4.pdf.
[191] yubico AB. OTP vs. U2F: Strong to stronger., 2016. Available at https:
//www.yubico.com/2016/02/otp-vs-u2f-strong-to-stronger/.
204
Bibliography
[192] Y. Zhang, F. Monrose, and M. K. Reiter. The security of modern password
expiration: An algorithmic framework and empirical analysis. In Proc. of
the 17th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communication Security (CCS’10),
October 4-8, 2010, Chicago, IL, USA, pages 176–186. ACM, 2010.
205
